MCNS MEETS TO DISCUSS SECURITY IN BAGHDAD, TAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004133

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2015
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS MEETS TO DISCUSS SECURITY IN BAGHDAD, TAL
AFAR, SECTARIAN STRIFE


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d
)


1. (C//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Jaafari
convened on short notice a meeting of the Ministerial
Committee for National Security (MCNS) at his office on the
evening of September 25. Topics discussed included a
disagreement between Coalition Force (CF) officers and
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) officers
concerning the security plan for Baghdad, the situation in
Tal Afar, and an incident the previous night in which CF and
Iraqi Army (IA) forces had become engaged in a one hour
firefight in Sadr City with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia.
Jaafari was upset that he had learned the details of these
events late or second hand, and it was clear that in calling
the meeting he was sending a message that he is not to be
left in the dark. Underlying the entire discussion was a
sense of rising sectarian tensions. END SUMMARY.


2. (C//REL GBR AUS) On the evening of Sept. 25, National
Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak Rubaie announced that Prime
Minister Jaafari had decided to call an immediate meeting of
the MCNS at his office. All the members of the committee
were present: the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense Saadoun
al-Dulime, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr, Minister of State
for National Security Affairs Karem al-Anzi, Ambassador
Khalilzad, U.K. Ambassador Patey, and MNF-I Commanding
General Casey. MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Brims was
also present, as were a translator and notetakers.


3. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari entered the room last and
immediately launched the meeting with a minimum of
pleasantries. He said that he had called it to discuss three
urgent matters: recent reports that had reached him that CF
and Iraqi officials were meeting to discuss the security of
Baghdad; a report he had received from a trusted friend in
Tal Afar that atrocities and other bad acts were taking
place; and reports he had heard second hand of a major
firefight in the Sadr City district of Baghdad the previous
night that left a number of people dead.

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MEETINGS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY - SIGNS OF SECTARIAN TENSIONS
-------------- --------------


4. (C//REL GBR AUS) With regard to the security plan for
Baghdad, Interior Minister Jabr said that GEN Casey had
suggested a new plan be considered in light of the coming
referendum and elections, so officers from the MOI, MOD, and
the Multinational Force (MNF-I) met to discuss a new plan.
Some of the MOI officers felt their input was not even sought
and that the plan was being imposed on them, and threatened
to resign if it was implemented. During the discussions the
topic of how to assign police and defense units to different
districts of the city was raised. Iraqi officers preferred
that the units be assigned with consideration given to the
sectarian make-up of the units and the areas to be patrolled.
Jaafari told the group that security was his primary concern
and that he had never failed to attend a meeting to discuss
the subject. He believed that arguing over plans is a sign
of weakness and is very disturbing.


5. (C//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey explained that there was a
misperception about what had taken place. He confirmed that
plans for the security of Iraq and Baghdad can only be
decided by the MCNS. What was being discussed were possible
changes at the tactical level, designed to carry out the
plans agreed upon by the MCNS. It was only prudent to do so
given the upcoming referendum. Once a change had been agreed
upon by the commanders, the MCNS would be briefed. Jaafari
agreed that what was being discussed were options, not plans.



6. (C//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey continued that he perceived
that the disagreement between commanders had to do about
whether to employ Shia forces in Sunni neighborhoods and
vice-versa. This was very troubling as it was the first time
he had seen such sectarian fissures begin to manifest at that
level within the security forces. Minister of Defense Dulime
echoed these comments and warned that a deadly media campaign
directed by the terrorists was emerging. The enemy is trying
to convince the people that the MOI is a Shia force and the
MOD is a Sunni force. This is not true. He is a Sunni
minister, but 90 percent of his forces in Baghdad are Shia.
Jabr concurred, pointing out that while he is a Shia, the
commanders of his Commando and Public Order Battalions, the
chief of police in Baghdad, and the commander of his major
crimes unit are all Sunni. Dulime urged that these false
perceptions should not be allowed to affect the relationships
between the MOD, MOI, and CF. "If sectarian feelings start
infiltrating the MOI or MOD it would be the beginning of a
civil war."


7. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari agreed with Dulime that if not
checked, insurgent propaganda playing on the sectarian theme
would definitely lead to civil war. But, he emphasized, he
believes that actions, not merely words, are necessary to
prove one is nonsectarian. There must be strict guidance for
all security forces to avoid in engaging in sectarian acts of
violence, and all police and soldiers must abide by this
guidance.


8. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi said he has heard complaints that
the ISF is not being allowed to realize its full potential
because CF controls prevent them from operating in an
effective manner. He was critical of Operation Thunder and
opined that the disposition of forces in and around the city
did not conform to the agreed upon plan. He agreed with
Dulime that the terrorists are conducting a psychological
campaign to make it seem that Baghdad is being divided along
sectarian lines. He said that specific units must be
assigned to specific parts of the city where their mission
will be to destroy the enemy. He also proposed creating a
single team whose job would be to handle and interrogate
terrorists. This team would have trained officers, special
detention facilities, and counter-intelligence officers to
infiltrate terrorist cells. He was also of the opinion that
all cities should be the responsibility of the MOI, while the
areas outside of the cities should fall to the MOD.


9. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi continued that what matters is
good intelligence so that enemy leaders can be targeted
instead of being permitted to roam freely through Iraq and
other countries. Leaders of the Baath Party feed the
terrorists with money, plans, and relationships. Some have
been accepted into government positions, and some speak out
against the success in Tal Afar, telling lies that civilians
were killed. Some of these leaders talk as if they were
defending the terrorists. Al-Anzi's solution to the
insurgency is to arrest Baath Party leaders.

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SITUATION IN TAL AFAR
--------------


10. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari next addressed the issue of Tal
Afar. He stated that while we speak of the success of the
operation, he is receiving reports from people he trusts that
there are still problems in the town that include possible
sectarian violence. It is important that anyone caught
engaging in such acts be punished and shown on television to
get the message out that this will not be tolerated. He said
he had heard there were problems when the Police Commandos
were pulled out without being replaced by a Public Order
Brigade, leaving a vacuum that was filled momentarily by
terrorists who killed and burned homes. The report he
received also spoke of water shortages in Shia neighborhoods,
and plans for "terrorists" to infiltrate the newly forming
police force. Jaafari then complained that he was hearing
these reports from contacts in Tal Afar but nothing of the
other side of the story from his staff. Dulime said he was
receiving similar reports from Sunnis and suggested a
committee to report on the conditions.


11. (C//REL GBR AUS) In response to Jaafari's complaint that
he isntreeiving information onwhat i happnng i Tal
Afar MNF-I Deuty Commanding General Brims responded that he
had briefed the Prime Minister's aide on Tal Afar every day
since September 8. He advised that the predominately Shia
MOI Commando Brigade had been withdrawn from the city to
mitigate complaints that they were behaving in a sectarian
manner against Sunnis. MNF-I was unable to confirm or deny
the allegations. The deployment of the MOI Public Order
Battalion was being delayed for the same reason the commandos
had been removed, and this was on the advice of both military
commanders on scene and local officials. Brims stressed the
need for the ITG to immediately begin to pay compensation and
to move forward with their reconstruction program, which so
far has not budged. In addition, the formation of a balanced
police force is critical to the success of Tal Afar. At the
present, security is being provided by CF and IA until a
police force can be reconstituted.

--------------
INCIDENT IN SADR CITY
--------------


12. (C//REL GBR AUS) The Prime Minister next turned to the
subject of Sadr City. He was upset because the night before
a firefight had erupted between CF and IA soldiers and Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) members in that district of Baghdad. The
battle lasted ninety minutes and a number of people were
killed, yet he had not heard about it until hours later and
even then he had only limited details. GEN Casey explained
to Jaafari what had taken place. It was a joint CF/IA
operation with a specific target, but the IA forces were
ambushed by JAM and called for help. A CF quick reaction
force responded to assist. With regard to the assertion that
Jaafari was not being kept informed, GEN Casey noted that his
staff is briefed every morning by MNF-I about the events of
the previous 24 hours. In addition, it is the role of the
Prime Minister's Situation Room to monitor events as they are
taking place and inform him as needed.


13. (C//REL GBR AUS) Minister of Defense Dulime added that
these types of operations take place all the time and do not
need to be approved in advance at the highest levels. In
this case, the IA was fiercely attacked by JAM and suffered
three killed in action. In his opinion, one of the most
serious problems the ITG faces is the rise in influence of
JAM. Jaafari strongly disagreed. He said that JAM is part
of the government, with three ministers and 23 assembly
members. He challenged Dulime to produce documented evidence
that these people supported the insurgents and if so, he
would deal with them himself. Jaafari was quickly corrected
by Rubaie, who pointed out that Jaafari hadn't meant to say
JAM was in the government. Rather, the Prime Minister meant
that other supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr were.


14. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi supported the Prime Minister's
view on this. He asserted "there are no terrorists" in Sadr
City but there are members of JAM there. "And as far as I
know," he said, "the ITG has not declared war on Jaysh
al-Mahdi." The goal of the ITG is to turn JAM into a
political organization. Until that happens, it is
predictable that whenever CF operate in Sadr City there will
be trouble. He recommended that the families of those killed
be paid compensation by the government.


15. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari opined that in politics there
is no such thing as black or white. Sometimes it is
necessary to accept the bad to avoid the worst. "We all
knew," he said, "that when we were negotiating the
constitution we were dealing with people who support the
insurgency. There are people in the government who stand up
and speak out against the government when it is trying to rid
Tal Afar and other places of terrorists. This must be
accepted." Jaafari said that following the tragedy on the
A'imma Bridge where a thousand Shias died, he had not once
mentioned any of these "martyrs" by name. Rather, he had
told the story over and over of the young Sunni man, Othman,
who had died saving the lives of Shias. Jaafari is convinced
that if he had not done this, Iraq would be in a civil war
today. It is critical that the enemies of Iraq not be
allowed to inflame sectarian divisions.

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ADDRESSING SECTARIAN STRIFE
--------------


16. (C//REL GBR AUS) U.K Ambassador Patey observed that the
common theme of the subjects discussed had been the growing
specter of sectarian strife. The dispute of commanders about
how and where to place security forces, the situation in Tal
Afar, and the firefight with JAM in Sadr City all pointed to
signs of growing sectarian rivalries. He said that the
terrorists are winning the campaign of perceptions and that
it is important to counter this. He suggested the formation
of a commission composed of respected individuals from all
the major sectarian groups to refute the charges of those who
stand up and try to incite sectarian conflict. If
allegations that certain military or police units are putting
sectarianism ahead of loyalty to the state, this commission
should be able to say whether the allegations are true or
not. And if true, action must be taken to stop it.


17. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari agreed, and said that Iraqi
army and police units are not to be assigned to areas based
on the religious make-up of their members. "We cannot have a
Sunni army and a Shia police force." GEN Casey concurred,
but pointed out that Ambassador Patey's remarks went farther
than that. Casey reiterated the need for a publicity
campaign to publicize the good work the Iraqi military does,
and a commission to investigate and deal with complaints of
sectarianism.

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COMMENT
--------------


18. (C//REL GBR AUS) The Prime Minister was clearly showing
signs of stress. The fact that the meeting was called with
no advance notice and the tone he took throughout were
unusual. While civility prevailed, disagreements between the
Sunni Dulime and the Shias Jaafari and Anzi were evident.
While they all agree that they are fighting a tough battle to
prevent an outright break between Sunni and Shia, they
nevertheless are quick to defend the position of their own.













Khalilzad