MCNS DISCUSSES SECURITY IN BAGHDAD, TAL AFAR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004132

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS DISCUSSES SECURITY IN BAGHDAD, TAL AFAR,
SECTARIAN STRIFE

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS
1.4 (a),(b),AND (d).


1. (C//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Jaafari
convened on short notice a meeting of the Ministerial
Committee for National Security (MCNS) at his office on the
evening of September 25. Topics discussed included a
disagreement between Coalition Force (CF) officers and
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) officers
concerning the security plan for Baghdad, the situation in
Tal Afar, and an incident the previous night in which CF
and Iraqi Army (IA) forces had become engaged in a one-hour
firefight in Sadr City with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia.
Jaafari was upset that he had learned the details of these
events late or second hand, and it was clear that in
calling the meeting he was sending a message that he is not
to be left in the dark. Underlying the entire discussion
was a sense of rising sectarian tensions. END SUMMARY.


2. (C//REL GBR AUS) On the evening of Sept. 25, National
Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak Rubaie announced that Prime
Minister Jaafari had decided to call an immediate meeting
of the MCNS at his office. All the members of the
committee were present: the Prime Minister, Minister of
Defense Saadoun al-Dulime, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr,
Minister of State for National Security Affairs Karem
al-Anzi, Ambassador Khalilzad, U.K. Ambassador Patey, and
MNF-I Commanding General Casey. MNF-I Deputy Commanding
General Brims was also present, as were a translator and
notetakers.


3. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari entered the room last and
immediately launched the meeting with a minimum of
pleasantries. He said that he had called it to discuss
three urgent matters: recent reports
that CF and Iraqi officials were meeting to discuss the
security of Baghdad; a report he had received from a
trusted friend in Tal Afar that atrocities and other bad
acts were taking place; and reports he had heard second
hand of a major firefight in the Sadr City district of
Baghdad the previous night that left a number of people
dead.

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MEETINGS ON BAGHDAD SECURITY - SIGNS OF SECTARIAN TENSIONS
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4. (C//REL GBR AUS) With regard to the security plan for
Baghdad, Interior Minister Jabr explained that GEN Casey
had suggested a new plan be considered in light of the
coming referendum and elections; so officers from the MOI,
MOD, and the Multinational Force (MNF-I) met to discuss a
new plan. Some of the MOI officers felt that their input was
not even sought and that the plan was being imposed on
them; they threatened to resign if it were implemented.
During the discussions the topic of how to assign police
and defense units to different districts of the city was
raised. Iraqi officers preferred that the units be
assigned with consideration given to the sectarian make-up
of the units and the areas to be patrolled. Jaafari told
the MCNS that security was his primary concern and that he
had never failed to attend a meeting to discuss the
subject. He believes that arguing over plans is a sign of
weakness and is very disturbing.


5. (C//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey explained that there was a
misperception about what had taken place. He confirmed that
plans for the security of Iraq and Baghdad can only be
decided by the MCNS. What was being discussed were
possible changes at the tactical level, designed to carry
out the agreed plans of the MCNS. Once a change had
been agreed upon by the commanders, the MCNS would be
briefed. Jaafari agreed that what was being discussed was
options, not plans.


6. (C//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey continued that he perceived
that the disagreement between commanders had to do with
whether to employ Shia forces in Sunni neighborhoods and
vice-versa. This was very troubling to him as it was the
first time he had seen such sectarian fissures begin to
manifest at that level within the security forces. Minister
of Defense Dulime echoed these comments and warned that a
deadly media campaign directed by the terrorists was
emerging. The enemy is trying to convince the people that
the MOI is a Shia force and the MOD is a Sunni force. This
is not true. He is a Sunni minister, but 90 percent of his
forces in Baghdad are Shia. Jabr concurred, pointing out
that while he is a Shia, the commanders of his Commando and
Public Order Battalions, the chief of police in Baghdad,
and the commander of his major crimes unit are all Sunni.
Dulime urged that these false perceptions should not be
allowed to affect the relationships between the MOD, MOI,
and CF. "If sectarian feelings start infiltrating the MOI
or MOD, it would be the beginning of a civil war."


7. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari agreed with Dulime that, if not
checked, insurgent propaganda playing on the sectarian
theme definitely would lead to civil war. But, he
emphasized, actions, not merely words, are
necessary to prove one is nonsectarian. There must be
strict guidance for all security forces to avoid
engaging in sectarian acts of violence, and all police and
soldiers must abide by this guidance.


8. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi said he has heard complaints
that the ISF is not being allowed to realize its full
potential because CF controls prevent them from operating
in an effective manner. He was critical of Operation
Thunder and opined that the disposition of forces in and
around the city did not conform to the agreed-upon plan.
He agreed with Dulime that the terrorists are conducting a
psychological campaign to make it seem that Baghdad is
being divided along sectarian lines. He said that specific
units must be assigned to specific parts of the city where
their mission will be to destroy the enemy. He also
proposed creating a single team whose job would be to
handle and interrogate terrorists. This team would have
trained officers, special detention facilities, and
counter-intelligence officers to infiltrate terrorist
cells. He was also of the opinion that all cities should
be the responsibility of the MOI, while the areas outside
of the cities should fall to the MOD.


9. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi continued that what matters is
good intelligence so that enemy leaders can be targeted
instead of being permitted to roam freely through Iraq and
other countries. Leaders of the Baath Party feed the
terrorists with money, plans, and relationships. Some have
been accepted into government positions, and some speak out
against the success in Tal Afar, telling lies that
civilians were killed. Some of these leaders talk as if
they were defending the terrorists. Al-Anzi's solution to
the insurgency is to arrest Baath Party leaders.

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SITUATION IN TAL AFAR
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10. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari next addressed the issue of
Tal Afar. He stated that, while we speak of the success of
the operation, he is receiving reports from people he
trusts that there are still problems in the town that
include possible sectarian violence. It is important that
anyone caught engaging in such acts be punished and shown
on television to get the message out that this will not be
tolerated. He said he had heard there were problems when
the Police Commandos were pulled out without being replaced
by a Public Order Brigade, leaving a vacuum that was filled
momentarily by terrorists who killed and burned homes. The
report he received also spoke of water shortages in Shia
neighborhoods and plans for "terrorists" to infiltrate the
newly forming police force. Jaafari then complained that
he was hearing these reports from contacts in Tal Afar but
nothing of the other side of the story from his staff.
Dulime said he was receiving similar reports from Sunnis
and suggested a committee to report on the conditions.


11. (C//REL GBR AUS) In response to Jaafari's complaint
that he is not receiving information on what is happening
in Tal Afar, MNF-I Deputy Commanding General Brims
responded that he had briefed the Prime Minister's aide on
Tal Afar every day since September 8. He advised that the
predominately Shia MOI Commando Brigade had been withdrawn
from the city to mitigate complaints that they were
behaving in a sectarian manner against Sunnis. MNF-I was
unable to confirm or deny the allegations. The deployment
of the MOI Public Order Battalion was being delayed for
a similar reason (largely-Shia composition),and this was on
the advice of both military commanders on scene and local
officials. Brims stressed the need for the ITG to
immediately begin to pay compensation and to move forward
with their reconstruction program, which so far has not
budged. In addition, the formation of a balanced police
force is critical to the success of Tal Afar. At the
present, security is being provided by CF and IA until a
police force can be reconstituted.

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INCIDENT IN SADR CITY
--------------


12. (C//REL GBR AUS) The Prime Minister next turned to
the subject of Sadr City. He was upset because, the night
before, a firefight had erupted between CF and IA soldiers
and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) members in that district of
Baghdad. The battle lasted ninety minutes, and a number of
people were killed; yet he had not heard about it until
hours later, and even then he had only limited details. GEN
Casey explained to Jaafari what had taken place. It was a
joint CF/IA operation with a specific target, but the IA
forces were ambushed by JAM and called for help. A CF
quick reaction force responded to assist. With regard to
the assertion that Jaafari was not being kept informed, GEN
Casey noted that his staff is briefed every morning by
MNF-I about the events of the previous 24 hours. In
addition, it is the role of the Prime Minister's Situation
Room to monitor events as they are taking place and inform
him as needed.


13. (C//REL GBR AUS) Minister of Defense Dulime added
that these types of operations take place all the time and
do not need to be approved in advance at the highest
levels. In this case, the IA was fiercely attacked by JAM
and suffered three killed in action. In his opinion, one
of the most serious problems the ITG faces is the rise in
influence of JAM. Jaafari strongly disagreed. He said
that JAM is part of the government, with three ministers
and 23 assembly members. He challenged Dulime to produce
documented evidence that these people supported the
insurgents; if true, he would deal with them himself.
Jaafari was quickly corrected by Rubaie, who pointed out
that Jaafari hadn't meant to say JAM was in the
government. Rather, the Prime Minister meant that other
supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr were.


14. (C//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi supported the Prime
Minister's view on this. He asserted "there are no
terrorists" in Sadr City, but there are members of JAM
there. "And as far as I know," he said, "the ITG has not
declared war on Jaysh al-Mahdi." The goal of the ITG is to
turn JAM into a political organization. Until that
happens, it is predictable that, whenever CF operate in Sadr
City, there will be trouble. He recommended that the
families of those killed be paid compensation by the
government.


15. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari opined that in politics
there is no such thing as black or white. Sometimes it is
necessary to accept the bad to avoid the worst. "We all
knew," he said, " when we were negotiating the
constitution, we were dealing with people who support the
insurgency. There are people in the government who stand
up and speak out against the government when it is trying
to rid Tal Afar and other places of terrorists. This must
be accepted." Jaafari said that, following the tragedy on
the A'imma Bridge where a thousand Shias died, he had not
once mentioned any of these "martyrs" by name. Rather, he
had told the story over and over of the young Sunni man,
Othman, who had died saving the lives of Shias. Jaafari is
convinced that if he had not done this, Iraq would be in a
civil war today. It is critical that the enemies of Iraq
not be allowed to inflame sectarian divisions.

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ADDRESSING SECTARIAN STRIFE
--------------


16. (C//REL GBR AUS) U.K Ambassador Patey observed that
the common theme of the subjects discussed had been the
growing specter of sectarian strife. The dispute of
commanders about how and where to place security forces,
the situation in Tal Afar, and the firefight with JAM in
Sadr City all pointed to signs of growing sectarian
rivalries. He said that the terrorists are winning the
campaign of perceptions and that it is important to counter
this. He suggested the formation of a commission composed
of respected individuals from all the major sectarian
groups to refute the charges of those who stand up and try
to incite sectarian conflict. If there are allegations that
certain military or police units are putting sectarianism
ahead of loyalty to the state, this commission should be
able to say whether the allegations are true or not. And if
true, action must be taken to stop it.


17. (C//REL GBR AUS) Jaafari agreed and said that Iraqi
army and police units are not to be assigned to areas based
on the religious make-up of their members. "We cannot have
a Sunni army and a Shia police force." GEN Casey
concurred but pointed out that Ambassador Patey's remarks
went farther than that. Casey reiterated the need for a
publicity campaign to publicize the good work the Iraqi
military does and a commission to investigate and deal
with complaints of sectarianism.

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COMMENT
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18. (C//REL GBR AUS) The Prime Minister was clearly
showing signs of stress. The fact that the meeting was
called with no advance notice and the tone he took
throughout were unusual. While civility prevailed,
disagreements between the Sunni Dulime and the Shias
Jaafari and Anzi were evident. While they all agree that
they are fighting a tough battle to prevent an outright
break between Sunni and Shia, they nevertheless are quick
to defend the position of their own.
Khalilzad