Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4109
2005-10-04 19:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CONDITIONAL DEAL TO FIX THE REFERENDUM LAW

Tags:  PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004109 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: CONDITIONAL DEAL TO FIX THE REFERENDUM LAW
PROBLEM IN RETURN FOR SECURITY GUARANTEES.

REF: BAGHDAD 4090

Classified By: DCM David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004109

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: CONDITIONAL DEAL TO FIX THE REFERENDUM LAW
PROBLEM IN RETURN FOR SECURITY GUARANTEES.

REF: BAGHDAD 4090

Classified By: DCM David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. DCM, UK Charge, and Acting UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
Schulenburg met with Deputy Speaker Shahrastani and
VP Adel Abd al-Mahdi October 4 to discuss the TNA's
October 2 "double standard" interpretation of the word
"nakhabeen" in TAL 61(c) as both actual voter and
registered voter (reftel). Shahrastani described the
measure as an important balancing mechanism to address
the effects of terrorist intimidation in Salahadin and
Diyala provinces on voter turnout. The DCM told
Shahrastani that these concerns should be addressed by
focusing on security and not on last-minute changes in
voting rules. Later on October 4, after conferring
with Shia Coalition members, Shahrastani and Shia
Coalition official Shaykh Hamam Hamudi said the Shia
Coalition leadership would to change the
interpretation of "nakhabeen" to persons actually
casting votes in exchange for additional security
guarantees and adjustments to the administration of
the referendum in specific towns in several
governorates. UN election team advisor Perelli thinks
some adjustments could be made to accommodate the Shia
Coalition's concerns. END
SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Shahrastani: Security Concerns Reason for Resolution
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In an October 4 meeting with DCM, Acting UN
SRSG and British Charge, the UN told Deputy Speaker
Shahrastani and VP Adel Abd al-Mahdi that UN HQS could
not support any change in voting rules, as had been
the subject of the October 2 TNA resolution. Such
changes would undercut the credibility of the
referendum itself and compel the UN to consider
withholding support. Shahrastani maintained that
terrorists interested in defeating the constitution
would intimidate and kill voters supporting the
constitution to prevent the Shia from coming to the
October 15 polls. Shahrastani said the interpretation
of "nakhabeen" as "registered voters" solely for
purposes of validating a two-thirds "no" vote" was
necessary to compensate for the large number of

voters who support the constitution but would be
afraid to vote in provinces such as Salahadin and
Diyala. Ayatollah Sistani would not issue a fetwa
this time, Shahrastani claimed, "because he could
not risk voters' lives."

-------------- --------------
DCM Responds: Focus on Security, Not Voting Rules
-------------- --------------


3. (C) DCM seconded UN concerns and responded that
the TNA's October 2 resolution damages the
credibility of the referendum both domestically and
internationally. He said that Sunni Arabs could
challenge the legality of the process. He joined
Schulenburg in stressing that the UN and
international community could not support or certify
the elections as "fair" with rule changes so close
to the October 15 polling. The DCM offered to work
closely on the security concerns so that this
interpretation could be dropped.


4. (C) Shahrastani responded that despite its best
intentions, the Coalition Forces could not completely
control security. The DCM continued to emphasize
addressing security as the way to address
Shahrastani's concerns. Deputy President Abd' al-
Mahdi interjected that the need for the UN seal of
approval was extremely important, and the TNA needed
to find a way forward. Based on this exchange,
Shahrastani agreed to meet with Shia coalition leaders
to change the October 2 resolution.

--------------
Conditional Deal Offered
--------------


5. (C) In the late afternoon after meeting with Shia
Coalition leaders, Shahrastani called in DCM and with
SCIRI party official (and Constitution Drafting
Committee Chair) Shaykh Hamam Hamudi and Kurdish
Alliance parliamentary leader Fuad Masum. Shahrastani
said that the Shia Coalition and Kurdish leadership
agreed to adjust the resolution to define nakhabeen
as those who actually cast ballots. However, there
were three conditions. First, Shahrastani provided a
list of 30 towns where the Shia Coalition and Kurds
want additional Iraqi security focus to protect
voters. He underlined these forces should remain in
the towns after October 15 to prevent retaliation
against voters at the hands of insurgents.
Shahrastani also requested Coalition air strikes
against alleged insurgent targets in Diyala; he
pledged the Shia and Kurds would provide more exact
information about target identities later. Such
action, he said, would give the public confidence
that the insurgents will be weakened before October

15. He said he would provide further information on
this request for Embassy to pass to MNF-I.


6. (C) Finally, Shahrastani said that the IECI and
UN election advisors should make adjustments to the
administration of the election such that oversight of
the polling is not in the hands of persons tied to the
insurgency. He stressed that the Islamic Party's
alleged control of the election administration in
Diyala would enable it to indicate to insurgents who
actually voted. DCM said we were already looking at
measures to improve security for the referendum. He
declined to give assurances on the election
administration and urged Shahrastani to be in contact
directly with the UN and the election commission.
Shahrastani said that once assurances on the three
conditions are secured, the leadership of the Shia
Coalition and Kurds will go back to the TNA general
membership (which they dominate).


7. (C) PolCouns in the evening called on UN election
team leader Carina Perelli to review the request for
adjustments on the administration of the referendum.
Perelli said there were standard sorts of measures for
voters threatened by insurgents. The UN team would
certainly look at solutions such as giving voters a
choice of places in which to vote. She was careful
not to promise to change election administrations.
She added that Shahrastani had not yet contacted the
election commission or the UN. The election
commission would need a formal request from the
National Assembly, she noted. (PolCouns called Hamudi
after this meeting to urge again direct contact.)

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The Shia Coalition (and the Kurds) recognize
they overreached. Now they need a way to climb down.
We will continue to push for them to work with the
election commission. We also will work closely with
MNF-I on the security issues raised today. End
comment.
Khalilzad