TAL AFAR WRAP-UP: SHORT-TERM SUCCESS BUT MOMENTUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004073

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2015
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV PREF PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: TAL AFAR WRAP-UP: SHORT-TERM SUCCESS BUT MOMENTUM
MUST BE MAINTAINED

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 (
a),(b),AND (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Major fighting in Tal Afar has concluded and
the reconstruction process is proceeding apace. The
operation is considered by MNF-I to be an overall success: an
important base for terrorists and insurgents has been
disrupted, with a number either killed or detained. The
Iraqi Army (IA),supported by Police Commando units of the
Ministry of Interior (MOI),played a major and visible role
in the operations; by all accounts they performed well.
Relief efforts, including bilateral support from Turkey,
generally succeeded. Most of those who fled the city have
returned. Battle damage to residences and shops was minimal.
U.S. forces have paid out nearly $850,000 in compensation
and have started a number of projects to help the city
recover and move forward. However, despite these positive
points, there were and are important aspects of the operation
that needed (and still need) improvement. While the Prime
Minister and the Ministers of Defense and Interior publicly
played lead roles and put an Iraqi face on the operation, at
the levels below them the Iraqis required constant coaching
and prodding to formulate and execute plans both during the
lead-up to the operation and to deal with humanitarian issues
during and after combat operations. Political reconciliation
in Tal Afar is critical, and we judge that the Iraqis are
moving too slowly in paying promised compensation and in
addressing the concerns of the people. It is critical that
the tactical success against the insurgents be followed by
strategic success at the political level. END SUMMARY.

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OPERATION RESTORING RIGHTS
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2. (C) The centerpiece of Operation Restoring Rights was a
decisive combat operation to dislodge insurgents and foreign
fighters reported to have taken over the town of Tal Afar, a
city of 250,000 inhabited by an ethnically diverse population
of approximately 75 percent Turkmen and 25 percent Arabs and
Kurds. Approximately 75 percent are Sunni and the rest are
Shia. Ethnic tensions, which have been exacerbated for the
past year by the insurgency, have long created difficulties
in the town. In September 2004, Coalition Forces (CF)
entered the city to dislodge insurgents who were using it as
a base of operations. Following the withdrawal of CF, the
situation slowly degenerated. As ethnic tensions flared,
insurgents took advantage of the opportunity to return to the
city -- some invited and sheltered by the Sunni sheiks in an
effort to strengthen their hand against Shia rivals. Acts of
violence became commonplace, and many Shia left the city to
seek shelter elsewhere. The city's once-thriving economy
collapsed. The Shia turned to the Iraqi Transitional
Government (ITG) for assistance, but when it was slow to come
they sought other champions for their cause, including
Moqtada al-Sadr.


3. (C) As the situation became more untenable, the decision
was made to take military action to defeat the insurgents who
had occupied the city. Prior to embarking on military
action, attempts were made to solve the problem politically.
An ITG delegation visited Tal Afar in an effort to address
grievances, to determine whether a negotiated settlement
between the rival factions was possible, and to ascertain
whether such a settlement would lead to the departure of the
insurgents, who were thought to include a number of foreign
fighters. These attempts to broker a political deal
ultimately failed, and, following a period of preparatory and
shaping operations by the U.S. 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment
(3ACR) and the 3rd IA Division, decisive combat operations
began on September 10. Prior to the commencement of
operations the ITG had obtained the agreement of the Sunni
tribal sheiks that authorities must resort to military force
to free the city from insurgents.


4. (C) In many respects, the decisive combat operations were
anticlimactic. Many insurgents were engaged and killed
during the shaping operations. Also, despite strong
indications that the insurgents were preparing for a
defensive battle, by the time the operation commenced many
had fled either by blending in with the departing masses (who
had been warned to leave by their leaders) or by escaping
through a network of tunnels that were discovered after CF
and IA soldiers entered the city. In total, according to
MNF, the combat operations led to the death of 152
insurgents, the capture of 703, and the discovery of 68
caches. Notably, of all those killed or captured, only two
were positively identified as foreign fighters. Coalition and
Iraqi casualties between August 26 and September 15 totaled 4
CF killed, 11 CF wounded, 4 ISF killed, and 21 ISF wounded.
Only 6 civilians reportedly were killed or wounded during the
operation.


5. (C) The performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
both IA and MOI commandos, was mostly encouraging. The IA
assumed a lead role in the fighting and performed extremely
well in combined operations with CF. They sustained
casualties and still continued to pursue the enemy
aggressively. However, they required more than limited
support. With regard to MOI forces, there were allegations
that the predominately Shia 4th Special Police Commando
Brigade harassed, abused, and stole from Sunni citizens as
they fled. Twelve specific allegations were investigated and
two were found to be substantiated; the others were not. The
Sunni sheiks were upset with the appearance of the Commando
Brigade because they believed the ITG had promised to send a
more balanced unit instead. The Commando Brigade, which has
a dubious reputation among Sunnis, was withdrawn at the
earliest possible time to improve the situation and lower
tensions. A plan to replace them with Public Order
Battalions is currently on hold for the same reason.

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HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
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6. (C) During the several months leading up to the
operation, an increasing number of people left Tal Afar as
economic and security conditions there worsened. The exact
number who fled over the months and days preceding the
operation is hard to determine, but a reasonable total
estimate ranges between 20,000 and 40,000 people. Most of
these people sought shelter with relatives or friends in
other cities throughout Iraq. Many more fled as shaping
operations commenced in the days immediately preceding the
assault. Just after the launch of decisive operations, the
tribal sheiks encouraged their people to leave. Although
there was not an ITG plan for humanitarian assistance, one of
the Prime Minister's special assistants headed a team that
met frequently in the days prior to the operation to
coordinate the efforts of various Iraqi ministries. In
addition, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM)
established an operations center to coordinate relief
activity, which -- despite being temporarily displaced by a
fire -- proved to be highly effective and will serve as a
model for future operations.


7. (C) By the time combat operations began, it was estimated
that at least 20,000 people had fled the city in the
immediately preceding days. Again, many sought and received
refuge with other families in the area, but many were
sheltered in tents provided by USAID's Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA),the Iraqi Red Crescent, and other
NGOs. OFDA, with its implementing partners International
Medical Corps (IMC) and International Organization for
Migration (IOM),worked closely with the 3rd ACR and provided
assistance to more than 20,000 internally displaced persons.
OFDA spent approximately $1,150,000. (See septel for further
information on OFDA accomplishments.) The Turkish
Government, which was concerned that the sizeable Turkmen
population would not receive its fair share of relief
supplies from the Kurds, also offered and delivered aid.


8. (C) Despite initial difficulties in arranging transport
for food and other supplies, the Embassy deems the relief
operation a success. There were no major problems with
widespread hunger or disease. The displacement lasted
relatively briefly, and as of September 27 MNF-I reports that
more than 21,000 internally displaced persons have returned.
They were provided with food and water as they passed through
U.S.-manned checkpoints on their way back. None of the local
sheiks who were at meetings attended by PolOff on September
27-28 complained of issues regarding health conditions, food,
water, or sanitation. The sheiks were encouraging all of
their people to return to their homes. The MODM predicts
that regular food distribution and city services will resume
in approximately one week. Emergency food distribution
within Tal Afar has all but ended. Some difficulties were
encountered with the Red Crescent. For this reason, POL,
IRMO, and OFDA are seeking a meeting with the President of
the Iraqi Red Crescent to discuss the importance of adhering
to international standards of humanitarian response
(especially sanitation) and to urge the Red Crescent to
coordinate better with other humanitarian assistance entities
in the future.

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RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES
--------------


9. (C) U.S. forces initiated reconstruction efforts
immediately following the completion of decisive combat
operations. MNF-I has funded 58 current projects in Tal
Afar, totaling more than $11 million. These projects address
the needs of security, electricity, medical services, water,
sanitation, education, transportation, and construction. The
scheduled completion date for all projects is March 2006. In
addition, MNF-I is compensating Tal Afar residents $200 to
$2,000 per qualifying family for homes damaged by the
operation. By October 1, MNF-I will have paid out over
$850,000 in compensation.


10. (C) In contrast, the ITG has yet to pay a single dinar
in compensation, despite continued pledges to do so and
continued entreaties by MNF-I and Embassy officers. The ITG
initially agreed to make $50 million available for
reconstruction and compensation. The Minister of Defense
said that each family would be paid $1,000, but more recently
the Prime Minister's aide for Tal Afar said the ITG would pay
each family an initial payment that amounts to $34. In
addition to the promised compensation, the ITG has a "Phase
1" proposal that calls for spending $47 million (including
$10 million for compensation) during the next 90 days.
However, there was no discussion of this plan during a
September 27 meeting between the sheiks and the ITG.


11. (C) The reasons for the Iraqi delays appear to be
bureaucratic. The office of the Prime Minister (PM)
initially tasked the Ministry of Planning and Development
(MOPD) to submit a reconstruction plan for Tal Afar, which it
quickly did. Subsequently, the Minister of Industry and
Minerals (MIM),a Sunni Arab from nearby Mosul who vocally
opposed military action, was tasked to implement the plan, in
response to complaints from senior ITG Sunni leaders
(including Vice President Ghazi al-Yawar and Deputy Prime
Minister Abed Mutlaq al-Jiburi) that "Shia" were in charge of
Tal Afar reconstruction. The PM's office has advised IRMO
that the order has been issued by the PM to allocate $50
million. However, for reasons unknown to us, the PM's office
does not want all the money to go through the MIM. Finally,
the Ministry of Finance (MOF),which will ultimately disburse
the funds, has written to the Council of Ministers to
indicate that it will not do so until it receives certain
information, including the number of people killed and
injured and the number of homes demolished and destroyed.
Since the MOF has not yet received this information or
further instructions from the Council, they are not moving
the funds.


12. (C) MNF-I and Embassy both believe that unless the ITG
quickly begins to fulfill its commitments, the people of Tal
Afar will feel betrayed and turn to continued reliance on the
MNF-I for assistance. It is crucial that the ITG maintain
the momentum and quickly produce tangible results by paying
compensation and commencing construction projects. Embassy
and MNF-I will continue to press the ITG on this.

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POLITICAL OUTCOME AND RECONCILIATION
--------------


13. (C) A major reason the situation in Tal Afar
deteriorated was the historical animosities and suspicions
among the disparate ethnic communities who live there. Sunni
Arabs, Shia, Kurds, and Turkmen are all vying for their share
(and then some). These problems continue and must be
resolved as much as possible if Tal Afar is to move forward.
Initially, there was great suspicion on the part of the
Sunnis and Turkmen that the Shia were seeking dominance and
that the military operation was conducted on a pretext to put
down the Sunni and gain power. Upon the commencement of the
combat operation, several nationally prominent Sunnis,
including members of the Government, spoke out in harsh terms
about the situation. Meetings between local sheiks of
different sectarian backgrounds, as well as meetings by
local, provincial, and national officials, often ended with
shouting and walkouts. On a positive note, the majority of
the sheiks seemed to be in agreement at the beginning of the
operation that force must be used. However, at a meeting one
week ago, the Sunni sheiks refused to enter the same room as
the Shias.


14. (C) Nonetheless, on September 27, sheiks from all groups
met for the first time since the operation. They all agreed
that foreign fighters had brought on the problems. Only the
chief of police dissented, claiming that 95 percent of the
combatants were locals. Distrust and suspicion remains. PM
Jaafari recently received a letter from a trusted friend in
Tal Afar alleging that atrocities and attacks on Shia homes
were still taking place. Minister of Defense Dulime says
he's received similar complaints from Sunnis. MNF-I is
unable to either confirm or deny these reports.


15. (C) A major source of tension in the city was the
composition of the police force, which was perceived to be
too Shia. In the months prior to the operation, the chief of
police was a Shia who purged the force of all Sunnis and then
began to target members of the Sunni community. The police
in Tal Afar began to be perceived as an extension of the Badr
Corps, the armed wing of the SCIRI party. The chief was
fired by the Provincial Chief of Police but refused to go
quietly. When he finally was forced out, he was replaced by
a chief who was seen to be effective, impartial, and
professional. The new chief eventually was appointed to be
the mayor. To further remedy the problems with the police,
it was agreed before the operation began that a new police
force would be recruited from across Tal Afar's population to
reflect the town's diversity. Each sheik was to nominate an
equal number of tribesmen to be included in the force.
Efforts to reconstitute the force are ongoing, with a
majority of the recruits coming from the Sunni community.
This process remains controversial as some Turkmen candidates
have been disqualified by their failure to meet the
requirement that they speak, read, and write Arabic. Other
leaders accuse their rivals of nominating "terrorists" to
serve in the force. Rigorous vetting procedures will be
followed in an attempt to avoid recruiting unsuitable
candidates. The recruiting effort is a joint MNF-I and MOI
effort. A mobile MOI recruiting team has arrived to sign up
additional candidates. An 8-week course for 200 new recruits
from all tribes begins on October 3, and a 2-week course for
150 current officers has already begun. CF and IA soldiers,
along with a number of the city's existing police officers,
are currently providing police protection for Tal Afar.


16. (C) At the national level, ITG leadership took a visible
and lead role in the operation. The PM appeared on
television to announce and justify the operation. This was
followed by several briefings by the Ministers of Defense and
Interior in which they strongly defended the need for
military action and called for unity against terrorists. The
statements and role of the Minister of Defense, who in the
past was hesitant to take a public role during military
operations against predominantly Sunni insurgents, were
particularly positive. The ITG leadership clearly views the
Tal Afar operation as a success. Their confidence in
participating in necessary military operations has increased
along with the capabilities of the ISF.

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COMMENT
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17. (C) Positives include: insurgents routed, low Coalition
and ISF casualties, nearly negligible civilian injuries,
minimal battle damage, no major humanitarian problems, and an
emboldened Iraqi leadership and military. Negatives include:
a low number of foreign fighters confirmed killed or
captured, difficulties getting the ITG to execute without
constant mentoring, some difficulties coordinating the
activities of NGOs during the humanitarian assistance phase,
and ITG foot-dragging during the critical reconstruction and
reconciliation process. Continued sectarian suspicions and
political animosities remain important challenges. Also not
to be discounted is the continued presence of insurgents in
the area, as demonstrated by the highly unusual use of a
female suicide bomber to attack and kill police applicants in
Tal Afar on September 28. Post will continue to push the ITG
to maintain the momentum so that a short-term victory does
not become a long-term loss. END COMMENT.
Satterfield