CONSTITUTION REFERENDUM PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003898

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTION REFERENDUM PROSPECTS

REF: BAGHDAD 3887

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Most of our contacts anticipate that
the draft constitution will pass in the October 15
national referendum, but that some predominantly Sunni
Arab provinces may vote against it. The results of a
recent UN poll, passed to POL on a confidential basis,
suggest that three provinces, Anbar, Ninewa and
Salahaddin, might vote against the draft constitution
by sufficient margins to defeat the draft entirely in
the referendum. The poll was based on a small sample
group and cannot be viewed as authoritative. That
said, with the exception of a few moderates, Arab
Sunni leaders are urging voters to reject the draft
constitution. Shia and Kurd leaders, by contrast,
generally are urging voters to approve the draft. The
UN poll, and our contacts, indicate there is strong
support for the draft so far in predominantly Shia and
Kurdish provinces. Intimidation of Sunni Arab voters,
the public stance of influential Shia cleric Muqtada
al-Sadr, and the votes of Turcomen, Christian and
other minority group votes in key governorates are key
variables that could affect the referendum outcome.
END SUMMARY.

In Opposition - The Arab Sunnis
--------------


2. (C) With few exceptions, most Arab Sunni leaders
are opposed to the draft constitution. Sunni members
added to the Constitutional Committee continue to meet
but have not compiled a short list of desired changes
to the draft constitution. They have also been unable
to agree on a common position on the draft. One of
the most influential Sunni Arab political parties, the
Iraqi Islamic Party, on September 21 issued a public
statement urging Iraqis to reject the draft
constitution. The IIP said the constitution threatens
Iraqi unity. Meanwhile, Salah Mutlak of the National
Dialogue has pledged to collect 5 million signatures
on a petition opposing the constitution.


3. (C) In contrast, Saad al-Janabi of the Iraqi
Republican Group has called on voters to approve the
draft and to pursue changes in the next national
assembly. The position of key Sunni Arab tribal
figures is still uncertain. It is expected that most
Sunni Arab politicians will call for a "no" vote but
some, like National Assembly member Sheikh Abd al-
Rahman Al-Nuaimi is calling for a "yes" vote and is
organizing conferences to discuss the issue in his key
Mosul district.

In Support - The Shia
--------------


4. (C) Most Shia Arabs strongly support the
constitution. Prominent Da'wa party leader Jawad al-
Maliki said there should be no surprises with the
referendum. Even if some of the Shia are not happy
with all parts of the draft, they will vote for it, he
predicted to Poloff on September 19. Nabil al-
Mousawi, a Shia ally of Ahmed Chalabi from List 169,
told PolOff on September 19 that he did not think
opponents would be able to stop approval of the
constitution in the referendum. People want to move
forward, he claimed.

In Support - The Kurds
--------------


4. (C) We expect the Kurds almost all will vote in
favor, and their leaders are confident the draft will
pass in the referendum. Kurdish leader Fa'iq Ahmed
Sha'ban al-Hag of the KDP said that there are no
worries about the referendum passing but he does
expect more violence by Sunni Arabs. Another KDP
leader, Kamaran Khairi Saeed, predicted to us
September 19 that there would not be enough
disgruntled Shia and angry Sunnis to reject the
constitution. In his view, passing the referendum
will decrease the violence. PUK constitution
negotiator Fuad Masum has consistently predicted that
while Anbar province and even Salah ad-Din province
might vote against the draft in large numbers, the
Sunni Arabs cannot assemble a 2/3 vote against the
draft in any other governorate.

Projections by Governorate
--------------


5. (C) Below is a governorate by governorate review
of ethnic/religious makeup and projected vote in the
Constitution Referendum based on UN polling data:
Governorate Ethnic/Rel Referendum
Groups Projection (No)
-------------- -------------- --------------
Anbar Sunni Arab No **
Babil Shia Yes
Baghdad Mixed Yes
Basra Shia Yes
Diyala Mixed Arab leaning no (36%)
Turcoman
Dohuk Kurd Yes
Christian
Erbil Kurd Yes
Turcoman
Sunni Arab
Karbala Shia Yes
Misan Shia Yes
Muthanna Shia Yes
Sunni Arab
Najaf Shia Yes
Ninewa Sunni Arab No (95%)
Yezidi
Christian
Some Kurd
Qadissiya Shia Yes
Salahaddin Sunni Arab No (64%)
Kurd
Suleimaniya Kurd Yes
Sunni Arab
Tameem Kurd Yes
(Kirkuk) Turcomen
Sunni Arab
Dhi Qar Shia Yes
Wasit Shia Yes

** - not polled because of security concerns.


6. (C) We are very suspicious of the percentages of
yes and no votes cited in the UN poll because the
sample in each governorate was only about 200 poll
respondents. Such a figure likely has a high margin
of error in governorates where the populations are
particularly diverse, such as Ninewa and Diyala.
Thus, we are very dubious that 95 percent of voters in
Ninewa, with its substantial Kurdish vote, will come
out against the draft in the referendum. That said,
the yes/no inclination tracks with what we hear
anecdotally from our contacts and from assessments of
Sunni Arab/Shia/Kurd sentiment tracked by IRI and
State/INR polls. The geographic analysis above
suggests that since Sunni Arab opposition to the
constitution is concentrated in a few governorates,
some of which also have ambivalent minority group
voters, the overall referendum outcome may be closer
than the very confident Shia Islamists and Kurds
anticipate.

Wild Cards - Minority Groups
--------------


7. (C) Ethnic and religious minority groups, such as
Turcomen, Assyrians and even Shebaks are concentrated
mainly in Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala - provinces where
the draft's passage is relatively more uncertain. Our
soundings among contacts in these areas suggests that
their political leaders worry about a fully empowered
Kurdish region. We have heard worries expressed by
some TNA members from these communities that the draft
does not protect minority rights sufficiently. Most
of these communities leaders have not yet taken a
formal position on the constitution but may urge their
supporters to reject the draft, thus boosting "no"
votes. Reflecting the ambivalence that many of these
minority groups feel, Yonadam Kanna of the Christian
Assyrian Democratic Movement, told Poloff that he is
unhappy with the constitution in principle.

Another Wild Card - Muqtada Sadr
--------------


8. (C) While we anticipate the mainstream of the
Shia Islamist Coalition will vote for the draft
constitution, there are rumblings about some Shia
Islamists. Prime Minister Jafari has been notably
cool in public about the draft. Perhaps more
important is the influential Shia hard-line cleric,
Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr is especially influential in
Baghdad and the southern part of Iraq. Abid Faisal
Ahmaid al-Sahlani, a Shia secular parliamentarian from
the southern city of Nasiriyah, cautioned Poloff on
September 19 that Muqtada may highlight the water
issue, calling for his supporters to reject the
referendum. There have been reports of Sunni efforts
to form an anti-constitution coalition with Muqtada
but these efforts have for now, been rebuffed by the
Shia leader (reftel).


9. (C) The draft text's treatment of control of
water itself remains controversial. National Assembly
member Jawad Bulani, from the Shia Islamist Coalition,
predicted to Poloff September 19 that many Shia would
vote against the draft precisely because they perceive
the Kurds received too much authority over water
passing through Kurdistan. He showed Poloff a
petition with 100 National Assembly members'
signatures calling for changes to the draft's language
on water resources.

Voter Intimidation - Another Unknown
--------------


10. (C) Finally, Sunni Arab leaders' efforts to
amass a 2/3 rejection vote in provinces such as
Ninewa, Salah ad-Din and Diyala depend on large
turnouts. In January 2005 threats of attacks on
voters and polling stations greatly diminished the
turnout. (As cited in the chart above, only 17
percent of eligible voters cast ballots in Ninewa in
January 2005, and only 29 percent in Salah ad-Din.) A
reduced Sunni Arab voter turnout will raise the likely
proportion of Shia and Kurdish votes in these
provinces and hence reduce the likelihood of a 2/3
rejection vote in these mixed population governorates.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) If we take the UN poll at face value, the
outcome would be passage - barely, since the "no" vote
in Salah ad-Din would just barely miss the cut-off of
TAL article 61(c). As we emphasized above, we do
not/not take the numbers at face value. Instead, we
can imagine strong "no" votes in Sunni Arab areas,
such as Anbar and large parts of Ninewa, Salah ad-Din
and Diyala. Reaching the 2/3 threshold would appear
to be much harder. Unless Sadr urges rejection of the
draft constitution, the key governorates to watch are
Ninewa, Salah ad-Din and Diyala. If Sadr were to come
out against the draft, then we might need to consider
Baghdad as well, given the two million people living
in Sadr City and the Sunni Arab concentration in north
and western Baghdad. Septel will address our thoughts
on the most likely outcomes after the referendum.
Satterfield