INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) PHYSICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003894

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/5015
TAGS: IZ KNNP PGOV PREL IAEA
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) PHYSICAL
INVENTORY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR
MATERIALS STORAGE COMPLEX

REF: A. STATE 151568

B. STATE 167787

Classified By: Acting Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Evan G.
Reade for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) An IAEA Safeguards team out of Vienna conducted
their required safeguard physical inventory verification of
the Tuwaitha nuclear materials storage facility from 17-18
September, in coordination with Iraqi Ministry of Science and
Technology officials and scientists. The team consisted of
five inspectors from the IAEA Department of Safeguards,
accompanied by Alexander Riedy, Technology Integration
Manager for the Nuclear Science and Technology Division of
Oak Ridge National Laboratory.


2. (U) As directed by reftels, PolMilOff coordinated with
MNF-I Corps Chemical Officers, UNAMI officials and MNF-I
Liaison Officers to UNAMI to ensure that all security,
transport and miscellaneous exigencies were taken care of.
PolMilOff accompanied the inspection team and Mr. Riedy to
the Tuwaitha Storage Complex to ensure that any unforeseen
issues could be resolved. Poor planning by Iraqi officials
from the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) made
coordination difficult, especially because they were not
prepared for the visit.


3. (C) Upon arrival at the storage facility, PolMilOff and
the IAEA delegation discovered that the Iraqi government had
placed 12-foot high concrete barriers around the two storage
facilities, such that no one could enter. It was apparent
that the Iraqi government had not properly maintained the
facility, and had made no preparations for the IAEA
inspection. Their failure to have machinery available to move
the concrete barriers was a delay to the inspection.
Additionally, their lack of upkeep of the facility was shown
because several of the locks for the storage facility doors
were rusted shut. MNF-I assets provided the generator, which
powered lights still within the facility, because the Iraqis
claimed that they had no resources for electricity to the
site.


4. (C) In addition to verifying the inventory located at
Location C, another goal of the inspection was to make
progress toward ultimately transitioning control of the
Tuwaitha storage facility to Iraqi officials. The Iraqi MoST
delegation of 7 persons included personnel from the National
Monitoring Directorate and the Hazardous Materials
Directorate, as well as a photographer with a video camera.
The seven gentlemen from MoST did very little in the way of
interacting with the team, predominantly sitting off to the
side in the shade and smoking cigarettes. At one point they
decided to assist the IAEA team, but disregarded all safety
precautions and did not dress in protective clothing. At the
end of the inspection the head IAEA representative
purposefully reprimanded the head of the MoST team for the
general state of disrepair of the facility, as well for the
unwillingness of the Iraqi officials to take part in the
inspection. The head of the Iraqi MoST team protested that
the general state of disrepair was not his fault as he had
pushed for funding, but none had been received.


5. (U) The mission was a success despite the lack of
assistance from the Iraqi MoST team, and the IAEA team was
able to conduct their verification inspection, replace the
seals to the facility and collect sufficient information for
their mandatory report about the state of Iraq,s nuclear
material in storage at the Tuwaitha storage facility.
Satterfield