SUNNI ARAB LEADER ON REFERENDUM PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003887

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB LEADER ON REFERENDUM PROSPECTS

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 3718

B. B) BAGHDAD 3758

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)
leader Ayad Samarai said September 18 that while
constitution language on Arab identity is now
sufficient, further language changes will need to be
made on federalism and other national issues before
Sunni Arab leaders could consider asking their backers
to vote for the constitution in the October 15
referendum. Samarai said that they are not in contact
with the Shia Coalition to discuss changes to the
text. Instead, efforts to form an anti-constitution
alliance with Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr have been
rebuffed but continue - though most Sadr backers will
probably vote in favor of the constitution. He said
that violence in Sunni Arab areas could be reduced by
incorporating locals into Army and Police units and
investigating alleged human rights violations. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) leader Ayad al-
Samarai told Poloff at a September 18 meeting that
Sunni Arab leaders were very disappointed when the
final draft constitution was announced September 14.
He complained that changes "agreed" to with Kurdish
leader Barzani at Irbil a week earlier were not
incorporated into the draft. (Note: Per reftels,
accounts of what was agreed to in Irbil differ. End
note.) Samarai argued that the USG has a
responsibility to do more to ensure that Sunnis are
not disenfranchised in the process. While the
language on Arab identity is now acceptable to the
IIP, federalism and other national interest issues
remain. Poloff countered that the USG has gone to
great lengths to facilitate Sunni Arab participation
in the process yet the Sunni leadership had fallen
short on timelines and specifics time and time again.
Samarai said he was one of four members of an IIP
committee that in a few days will list 3 to 4 changes
to the draft Constitution that would have to be made
before the IIP could support its passage in the Oct.
15 referendum. He noted, however, that party leaders
could not agree on a common position on the
constitution. While a joint statement is still
possible, it is likely that each party will issue
separate statements encouraging people to vote no.
(Note: Sunni Arab leaders continue to preach unity but
act individually - Consitutional Committee expert
Hussein Al-Faluji is calling for a boycott of the vote
while National Dialogue leader Saleh Al-Mutlak held a
press conference on September 20 to announce a
petition drive to secure 5 million signatures opposing
the Constitution. However, Shia Coalition negotiator
Ali Debbagh told PolCouns on September 20 that Mutlak
was also trying to meet him to negotiate two parts of
the text again. End Note.)

Mood of the People
--------------


3. (C) Samarai said that the mood of the Sunni Arabs
is to reject the Constitution but to take part in the
process. People will accept the result if the
constitution is approved by a moderate margin, giving
Sunni Arabs hope for changes to it through the
political process. Otherwise, there will be
bitterness and violence. Sunni Arabs also fear that
the Shia and Kurds will try to prevent them from
participating in the referendum, even if that means
supoting terrorism.

4 (C) Smara turne to he isse of violece in
Iraq, which increases at critical points. He said
that having outsiders, who are not trusted and often
mistreat the locals, police Sunni Arab areas increases
violence. There is little confidence in the current
recruit vetting process that, because of the
dishonesty of local officials, ultimately rejects all
Sunni Arab applicants. It is important that local
people be recruited to serve in the Army and Police
units in Sunni Arab areas, even if that means
forgiving some past insurgent activity, especially for
the officer corps. Poloff told Samarai that the best
way to reduce violence is for Sunni leaders to work
with their communities to stem support for the
insurgency.


5. (C) Sammarai said that Sunni Arab leaders are also
unhappy that while they are constantly pressured to
make statements condemning terrorist murders of Shias,
no statements have been made by Shia condemning the
mistreatment and murder of Sunni Arabs. Further, he
alleged that incidents of Sunni abuse, including those
committed by people in Army or Police uniforms, go
uninvestigated by authorities. Action against these
people will help reduce violence, he said.

Coalition for "no" Vote with Sadr?
--------------


6. (C) Commenting on reports of a possible coalition
with Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, rumored to be
opposed to the constitution, Samarai confirmed that
discussions are being held. Samarai said that Sadr
recently rebuffed a visit by ten Sunnis (scholars,
tribal leaders and 2 party officials) saying he needs
to think about it. Samarai believes that Sadr only
wants with top Sunni Arab officials and negotiations
are continuing on setting up a meeting. Sadrists are
extreme, not very well organized, and cannot be
trusted because of the danger of Iranian infiltration.
Dealing with Sadr would not be popular with the Sunni
Arab street - thus top Sunni political leaders are
hesitant and a public rebuff would be humiliating.


7. (C) It is likely, according to Samarai, that Sadr
will not support the constitution but will leave the
decision on how to vote to his supporters. In this
way, Sadr will maintain good relations with all sides.
Sammarai predicted that most Sadrists will vote for
the constitution.

Satterfield