CHARGE MEETS WITH VISITING UN/EAD PIRELLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003869

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ UN
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH VISITING UN/EAD PIRELLI


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DAVID M. SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 (
b) AND (d).


1. (U) This is an action message. Please see para 6.


2. (C) Summary. Charge and UN Electoral Assistance Division
(EAD) Chief Carina Pirelli agreed during a September 17
meeting that Iraq's December 15 elections must be seen as
credible. Charge advised that the EAD and the IECI must seek
to address Sunni perceptions of bias, real or imagined,
through vigorous engagement in educational outreach;
additional allocation of electoral resources; serious
consideration of all options, including same-day registration
and polling; and extensions to the voter and political entity
registration periods. Pirelli requested USG assistance in
pressing UN leadership to allow her to remain longer in
Baghdad, to grant UN Commissioner-designate LeChevalier a
security training waiver, and to restore the UN electoral
staff ceiling to 25 from its current 15 positions. End
Summary.


3. (C) Charge and UN EAD Pirelli agreed during a September 17
meeting that Iraq's December 15 elections will be held to a
much higher standard of credibility than that of January

2005. Pirelli emphasized that no matter the outcome, the
results of the election will certainly be challenged. Charge
agreed but told Pirelli that nonetheless the referendum must
be credible and transparent. He said that pre-election
outreach efforts must target the Sunni areas. He added that
Sunni concerns need to be addressed, such as IECI staff
composition, public education in Sunni areas, and extended
voter support to provide the Sunnis every possible
opportunity to participate in the elections.


4. (C) Charge emphasized that the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI) cannot wait until the last moment
to request MNF-I assistance and support. IECI needs to
develop a good logistics and security plan now. Similarly,
Charge stressed that IECI needs to immediately develop a
detailed budget that stands up to Ministry of Finance
scrutiny and will allow donor countries to make contributions
based on accurate numbers. To further establish the IECI's
credibility, Charge advised Pirelli that the IECI should look
expeditiously into the unusually high numbers in the recent
Kirkuk voter registration update. Charge urged that UN EAD
and the IECI be sensitive to Sunni perceptions of bias, real
or imagined, through additional allocation of electoral
resources if needed. He suggested that the IECI should
seriously consider all options to enfranchise Sunnis,
including same-day registration and polling and extensions to
the voter and political entity registration periods. Similar
IECI attention, Charge added, needs to go to the Christians
in western Ninewa who were denied full ability to vote in
January.


5. (C) In response to Charge's question regarding specific
USG support, Pirelli stated that the IECI is moving forward
on work that previously had been languishing. This includes
budget preparation and drafting of regulations now that the
election law is finished. She said she was able and willing
to remain in Baghdad until at least October 15 to allow
overlap with UN IECI Commissioner-designate LeChevalier and
prevent the IECI from losing momentum. However, she said the
UN Secretariat in New York is unwilling to support extension
of her stay. She also pointed out that UNAMI has a 90-person
staff ceiling, with 15 of those positions filled by the
electoral staff. The UNAMI ceiling needs to be raised, she
said, for the electoral staff to return to the same 25
positions they enjoyed during the January elections.
Finally, she requested USG backing, if possible, to shorten
LeChevalier's security training period in Amman so he can
arrive in Baghdad as soon as possible. Any loss in training,
she suggested, could be made up during his first break in
Amman.


6. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests that Department ask USUN
to approach the UN Secretariat at an appropriate level to
stress the need for a sustained high-level EAD presence in
Iraq up through the December elections. We should press the
UN to get LeChevalier here as early as possible or ensure
that an adequate substitute is in Baghdad in his stead. We
defer to our colleagues in New York as to whether the best
substitute would be Pirelli or someone with comparable
background in electoral matters. Our bottom line is that
there must be a senior UN representative with the appropriate
skills in Iraq to help ensure the success of the referendum
and the December elections. Post also requests that we ask
the UN Secretariat to increase the current electoral staff
positions in Iraq from 15 to 25. Finally, we should continue
to press for LeChevalier's earliest possible arrival in
Baghdad.
Satterfield