KURDISH PARTIES FIRE BLAST AT THEIR COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003790

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: KURDISH PARTIES FIRE BLAST AT THEIR COALITION
PARTNER, PRIME MINISTER JAFARI


Classified By: (U) Classified by PolCouns Robert Ford,
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Recent letters from President Talabani
and Kurdish President Barzani show the extent of
unhappiness inside the ruling coalition of Kurdish and Shia
Islamist parties. The Kurds in their latest letter hinted
at withdrawing from the coalition, although the author of
the letter, Deputy Prime Minister Shaways, said such a
withdrawal is unlikely in the immediate future. End
Summary.


2. (C) There are new signs of unhappiness in the Kurdish
political marriage with the Shia Islamist Coalition that
comprises the Iraqi Government. Deputy Prime Minister
Rowsch Shaways shared with us September 11 a copy of letter
he said Iraqi President Talabani and Kurdish Regional
Government President Barzani had sent to Prime Minister
Jafari. Rowsch said the letter had been sent to Jafari
earlier this month. In the list the Kurdish leaders allege
that the Jafari government has ignored the April 2005
agreement between the Shia and Kurdish political
coalitions, in particular by:

-- not including the Kurdish ministers in developing
consensus on important political, economic and security
policy decisions;

-- appointing top government jobs all from the Prime
Minister's party, including the Secretary General of the
Cabinet, the Government spokesman, directors general and
counselors at the Prime Ministry and top employees in the
ministries;

-- not ensuring "balance" in the composition of
delegations sent abroad;

-- not ensuring "balance" in the distribution of
development projects and not consulting the Kurdish
Alliance on how government reconstruction funds would be
spent;

-- not bringing the Presidency Council, leadership of the
Transitional National Assembly and the Prime Ministry
together for consultative meetings;

-- not developing consensus on the policies adopted by
independent commissions, such as the de-Baathification
commission and the Iraq Property Claims Commission;

-- not stopping "crimes" committed against Sunni Arabs
even while combatting terrorism vigorously;

-- not "normalizing" the situation in Kirkuk and not
providing funds for the Kirkuk Committee to do its work.


3. (C) The letter concludes with the ominous threat that
if these problems continue, the Kurds will need to take
"another step" in line with their agreement from April.
PolCouns asked Shaways if he thought the Kurdish Alliance
would actually withdraw from the governing coalition.
Shaways said that such a withdrawal is not imminent, but he
would not rule it out eventually.


4. (C) This letter follows two others earlier this year
from President Talabani (not co-signed by Barzani) to
Jafari. Jafari aide Adnan Ali al-Kadhimi on August 29
showed PolCouns the second letter, sent August 27, in which
Talabani told Jafari that Talabani should speak at both
high-level events at the UN in New York this month.
(Comment: Talabani's language in the letter was quite
blunt, telling Jafari that since Jafari had not organized
his own trip in early August, Talabani had organized his
own visit to the UN instead and Jafari should stay away
from the UN. End Comment.) According to Kadhimi, the
letter's tone had infuriated Jafari. For this reason,
Kadhimi said, Jafari had refused to attend the August 29
ceremony hosted by Talabani to mark the formal presentation
of the draft constitution to the Transitional National
Assembly. Kadhimi noted that Talabani has to understand
that his role is a distant second to that of the Prime
Minister, according to the Transition Law. PolCouns
underlined that the two men must coordinate and their
failure to do so frequently causes problems not only for
Iraq but for Iraq's friends. PolCouns in particular chided
Kadhimi for the Prime Minister not attending the
constitution ceremony at a time when leadership unity is
especially urgent. Kadhimi accepted the points but
promised no change.


5. (C) Comment: As we have reported, the political
marriage between the Kurdish Alliance and the Shia
Coalition was never a happy one. The Kurds were especially
unenthusiastic about Jafari being Prime Minister. In
addition, Talabani is especially sensitive to perceived
slights, and his relationship with Jafari is very
difficult; the two men hardly speak and even their aides
hardly speak. This new letter from Talabani and Barzani
probably angered Jafari and his team further but probably
won't change the dynamics of the Iraqi Transitional
Government very much.
Satterfield