SUNNI ARAB OUTREACH IN IRAQ: MISSION PLANS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003642

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS R

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS ELAB PINS EAID KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB OUTREACH IN IRAQ: MISSION PLANS


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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INTRODUCTION
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1. (U) The US Mission Baghdad, including MNF-I, is
committed to achieving broad Sunni Arab support for a
democratic Iraq. The Mission is aware of the beginnings of a
psychological shift in the tide since the January elections
regarding participation in the electoral process, and we will
use a range of resources, programs and contacts throughout
Iraq to accelerate Sunni Arab buy-in, and to weaken the
insurgency. This cable will lay out the causes of Sunni Arab
discontent, our goals and the strategies for achieving them,
and a sampling of initiatives designed to address the causes
of dissatisfaction.

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CAUSES OF SUNNI DISCONTENT
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2. (S) First, we note at the outset that some Iraqi Sunni
Arabs will never agree to participate in a democratic Iraq,
and are irreconcilably wedded to violent opposition. They are
principally Saddamists who will settle for nothing but the
return of the former Baath party; "takfiri" and other radical
religious extremists calling for the return of the Caliphate;
and the partisans of terrorist groups like Zarqawi's. We must
help the Iraqis isolate these groups and individuals from the
rest of society, and either detain or destroy them. We also
note that some of Sunni Arab behavior is explained by sheer
intimidation and terror at the hands of insurgents and others
in their neighborhoods and towns. Much of this waxes and
wanes, such that an improved security environment and growing
political momentum in favor of participation will help dispel
personal fear.


3. (S) Our focus will be on the rest of the Sunni Arab
population and its deep seated anxieties. For the vast
majority, their discontent and the factors that contribute to
their support for the insurgency are:
-the fear of political disenfranchisement;
-the lack of economic opportunity;
-conflicting views on the role of central government;
-Coalition Force and Iraqi Security Forces operations,
including holding Sunni Arab detainees; and,
-concern over Iranian influence in Iraq.


4. (S) Political Disenfranchisement: A segment of Iraq's
Sunni Arabs, who constitute 20 percent of the country's
population, equate the introduction of democratic
institutions with domination and subjugation by the Shia.
Sunni political disenfranchisement has to a degree become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. The decision of the vast majority
of Sunni voters to boycott January 2005 elections weakened
their community's role in the emerging political process.
This has contributed to increased Sunni skepticism about the
Iraqi Transitional Government and the new draft constitution.
At the same time, other Sunni have openly indicated readiness
to participate in the new Iraq. Examples include Deputy
President Al-Yawr, Deputy Prime Minister Al-Jaburi, Minister
of Defense Al-Duleimi, and Minister of Industry Najafi. Many
such Sunni identify themselves as "secular" or "liberal" and
have openly indicated readiness to work with Shia and Kurds
in building the new Iraq. The political future of such
individuals depends upon the constructive involvement of the
majority of Sunnis in Iraq's political process.


5. (S) Economic Disempowerment: Many Sunnis lost their
livelihood in 2003 with the disbandment of the army and the
collapse of Saddam's governmental institutions. Since then,
many perceive that the doors have been locked to their
reentry into the work force, often owing to their former
Baath party affiliation. In some locations, unemployment of
40 to 70 percent and lack of hope for economic recovery have
caused significant backlash among the Sunnis. Sunnis at all
levels highlight lack of jobs and training as a major reason
for discontent, especially because government jobs offer the
most secure form of employment in Iraq.


6. (S) The Role of the Central Government: For historical
reasons, dating back 13 centuries, many Sunni Arabs view
themselves as Iraq's natural leaders. (NOTE: Some Sunni even
continue to maintain that they constitute the country's
majority population, despite evidence to the contrary.) In
contrast to the Kurds and Shia who have suffered at the hands
of a series of central governments, the Sunni population
strongly leans in favor of concentrated decision-making in
the hands of Baghdad officials. They fear that the Kurds, and
potentially the Shia, will use the federalism provisions in
the new constitution to pull the country into three separate
entities. Many Sunni further worry that they would then be
left as the poor stepchild, as the oil wealth of the country
lies beneath the Kurdish and Shia regions in the north and
south.


7. (S) Chafing at Foreign Occupation/Lower Representation
in Security Forces: For many Sunnis, the presence of Western
military troops in Iraq is a great humiliation. Stories of
intimidation, dishonor and abuse at the hands of coalition
forces easily make the rounds among Sunni Arabs, on websites
and in the street. At the same time, the dissolution of the
Iraqi military of Saddam's regime removed Sunnis from the
security apparatus of the Iraqi government, especially the
Police Forces. Now, many Sunni fear that Shia-dominated
police forces have targeted members of their community for
arrest, torture and even murder with impunity. Until this
year, the MOD and MOI had significant difficulty recruiting
Sunnis - who were fearful of reprisals against themselves and
their families - into their ranks. A strong public stance by
some religious and tribal leaders advocating participation in
the security forces changed that psychology to some extent,
especially for army recruitment.


8. (S) Perceptions of Targeted Detentions: Closely related
to the problem of the military occupation, Sunni Arabs are
extremely dissatisfied with the perceived Coalition Forces
(CF) and ITG handling of the detainee issue. Many believe
that CF detain massive numbers of innocent Sunnis without
charge. Stories often mutate into Coalition arrests of Sunnis
as a result of perniciously false accusations by Shia
security and intelligence.


9. (S) Fear of Iranian Domination: There is a pervasive and
elemental fear throughout the Sunni population of growing
Iranian influence in the Shia-dominated south and the Iraqi
Transitional Government in Baghdad. (NOTE: Many Iraqi Arab
Shia, especially secular moderates, also share this concern.)

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STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH SUNNI CONCERNS
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10. (S) Ambassador has established a Mission task force to
develop the USG strategy to address these causes of Sunni
Arab discontent, and has examined USG-wide programs that
promote that strategy. The overarching strategic outcome we
seek is to weaken the insurgency by achieving broad Sunni
Arab support for a democratic Iraq. First we will seek to
separate the irreconcilable extremists from Sunni Arabs who
desire a better future. Second, we will work to promote the
importance of their participation in their political and
economic lives, and to raise awareness of the extent and
impact of USG/ITG programs in their communities. A main goal
here is to elevate the confidence and hope of Sunni Arabs in
their future, inextricably tied to political, economic, and
social participation, and not destructive violence. The task
force will work with Sunni Arabs throughout Iraq, but
specifically will focus on tribal leaders, the unemployed and
underemployed, veterans and military personnel, Islamists,
urban intellectuals
and secular moderates.


12. (S) Essential to the success of this outreach strategy
is to enlist the assistance of influential Iraqi
organizations and individuals, such as various political,
economic and social opinion makers; Iraqi NGOs; religious
leaders; military and veterans' leaders; and the media
organizations that can distribute messages to Sunni Arabs
across the country. Each of these Iraqi entities will be able
to influence various Sunni groups, and working through all of
them will spread the broader message of encouraging Sunni
Arab support for a democratic Iraq.


13. (S) The task force also believes that centers of Sunni
influence outside of Iraq should be engaged to reach out to
Iraqi Sunni Arabs. These would include Egypt, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, UAE, Algeria, and Arab organizations such as the Arab
League. The group envisions encouraging political and
religious centers of influence in these countries to engage
Sunnis in Iraq, exhorting them to participate fully and
peacefully in the developing political process in Iraq. To
this end we recommend the Ambassador's direct involvement
with leaders in the region in support of Iraq and its Sunni
Arab population. We also believe other actors in the region
are capable of affecting the Sunni community, such as Turkey,
Syria and Iran. These nations have the capability to stem the
flow of unhelpful and disruptive elements into Iraq, and have
an abiding interest in seeing the development of a stable and
democratic Iraq.

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SPECIFIC INTIATIVES
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15. (S) Post has developed a matrix of program initiatives,
both ongoing and in the planning stages, to achieve the
following objectives, each matched to dispel a source of
discontent:

i. Political participation and empowerment
ii. Employment and economic opportunity
iii. Understanding and appreciating the role of the national
government in a federal system
iv. Participation in and support for Iraq's security forces
and its allies
v. Preventing undue Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs

A sample list of some of the major initiatives follows, keyed
to the principal objectives each contains (of course, many
projects can directly and indirectly satisfy several
objectives):

-Maximize Sunni Arab voter registration throughout the
nation, but with major focus on the four provinces with a
Sunni majority (i,iii);

-Prepare and execute substantial, meaningful detainee
releases to gain Sunni Arab credence in our bona fides,
increase confidence in the rule of law, and diminish their
perception of the risks of political participation (i,iv);

-Mobilize external regional Sunni support for Iraq's
political and economic growth, in favor of Iraqi Sunni Arab
participation and reconciliation, and against terrorist
infiltration and murder (the Ambassador, along with the U.K.
Ambassador, to travel to regional states to develop support
for this initiative) (i,ii,iv,v);

-Engage Sunni leaders in a direct dialogue to develop ideas
to stabilize predominantly Sunni Arab regions (ii,iv)

-Reach out and develop links with tribal elements to give
them a role in the political, economic and security processes
(i,ii,iv);

-Speak with the Waqf to influence mosque sermons towards
moderation, participation (including in the security forces)
and non-violence (i,iv);

-Substantially reduce the risk of Coalition military
operations offsetting and counteracting Sunni Arab outreach
efforts (i,iv);

-Focus efforts to recruit military and police personnel from
Sunni Arab regions (ii,iii,iv,v);

-Reach out to veterans groups to ensure that they have a
stake in the system, and are provided for by the Iraqi
government (i,ii,iii,iv);

-Continue USAID employment programs and explore additional
opportunities to create job opportunities in Sunni regions
(ii,iii);

-Publicize reconstruction projects in Sunni areas, developing
public relations campaigns that highlight efforts underway
(ii,iii);

-Publicize critical infrastructure security attacks,
explaining the impact of sabotage operations, reducing
insurgency support (i,iv);

-Educate Sunni groups regarding their rights and
opportunities with regards to the political process,
encouraging participation in the October constitutional
referendum and December election (i,iii);

-Mediate an understanding between Sunni and Iraqi government
leaders regarding the staffing and practices of Iraqi
Security Forces in order to ensure that all communities can
have confidence in these institutions (iii,iv);

-Examine Sunni concerns regarding the level of Iranian
influence in key Iraqi institutions and regions (v);
-Encourage involvement by Sunni leaders in a moderate,
cross-ethnic, cross-sectarian political coalition for the
December election (i).
Khalilzad