Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD3565
2005-08-31 17:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQI PRIME MINISTER REINVIGORATES MILITIA

Tags:  PINS PREL MCAP MOPS PGOV IZ IR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003565 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015
TAGS: PINS PREL MCAP MOPS PGOV IZ IR
SUBJECT: IRAQI PRIME MINISTER REINVIGORATES MILITIA
REINTEGRATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 254 04

B. BAGHDAD 656

C. BAGHDAD 1408

D. BAGHDAD 2641

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM DAVID C. LITT FOR REASONS 1.4 (
b) AND (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003565

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015
TAGS: PINS PREL MCAP MOPS PGOV IZ IR
SUBJECT: IRAQI PRIME MINISTER REINVIGORATES MILITIA
REINTEGRATION

REF: A. BAGHDAD 254 04

B. BAGHDAD 656

C. BAGHDAD 1408

D. BAGHDAD 2641

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ACTING DCM DAVID C. LITT FOR REASONS 1.4 (
b) AND (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. At a meeting with the Commanding General of
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq on 21
August 2005, Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr gave LTG
Petraeus a copy of a 10 August Prime Minister memorandum,
which directs the Minister to implement CPA Order 91. CPA 91
prohibits militia "not under the command structure of the
Iraqi Transitional Government...except as provided by federal
law." The Prime Minister's memorandum may represent initial
action to reinvigorate the Iraqi Transitional Government's
process for militia reintegration, which has been moribund
since the transition of sovereignty last June. The
Transition and Reintegration Implementation Committee (TRIC)
was also established by CPA 91, and the Minister intends to
use the TRIC to execute the directive. After seeing the PM
memo, key TRIC members stated that they are wary as to the
motivation behind the renewed interest in the implementation
of CPA 91. In his weekly meeting with LTG Petraeus on 28
August, Minister Jabr promised to address TRIC concerns in
execution of the process. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) At a meeting with LTG Petraeus and Senior IRMO-MOI
Advisor AMB Yellin on 21 August 2005, Minister of Interior
Jabr presented a copy of a directive from Prime Minister
al-Jafari, instructing the Minister to implement the
provisions of CPA Order 91. Order 91, the "Regulation of
Armed Forces and Militias within Iraq," was signed into force
by CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer in June 2004. It defines
the process of militia transition and reintegration (T&R) for
a set of nine politically-affiliated militia groups deemed to
have supported the resistance against the Ba'athist regime
(REFTEL A). At face value, the Prime Minister's memorandum
potentially revitalizes the T&R program, which had stopped
dead in the water from lack of political interest by the ITG

and the political parties themselves (REFTEL D).

--------------
MAKING A RUN FOR THE MONEY
--------------


3. (C) What seemed to be a positive development was met with
wary skepticism by senior members of the TRIC. The directive
is viewed by these members as a possible ploy for Shia-backed
militias to accrue transition benefits without actually
disarming. At a meeting of the TRIC on 24 August, Chairman
Saad al-Obeidi of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) stated that
the committee, in response to PM al-Jafari's order, had
resubmitted its proposal for energizing the T&R program to
the Ministerial Council on National Security (MCNS). The
proposal included the committee's request for operational
funds, stronger organizational structure and greater
authority to enforce compliance. In a subsequent conversation
with PolMilOff, Saad stated he was witness to an earlier
meeting between Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri and PM
al-Jafari regarding militia integration. Saad claimed PM
al-Jafari was under pressure from al-Ameri and SCIRI's Abdul
Aziz al-Hakim to effect pension benefits for aging Badr
militiamen, ostensibly to ease the financial burden now
carried by the Badr Organization.


4. (C) Saad also indicated that Minister Jabr's principal
concern upon receiving the order was the availability of
funds for the T&R program. Saad was subsequently tasked by
the Minister to draft a request for the ITG to allot $60
million to the MOI for T&R. Saad stated that the figure of
$60 million did not stem from any estimates developed by the
TRIC or other ministerial or Coalition advisors, making him
suspect ulterior motives.

--------------
A DANGEROUS AMBIGUITY
--------------


5. (C) General Nabil Khalil al-Obeidi, Director General of
the Iraqi Veterans Agency (IVA) and member of the TRIC, met
with PolMilOff on 27 August to discuss the PM directive. He
was alarmed at the possibility that T&R funds of this
magnitude could be allotted to the MOI. He stated that such
an action would effectively eliminate transparency in the
process and surmised that much of the funds would be used to
support manpower positions in the MOI for 'integrated' Badr
militiamen. According to General Nabil, any process for
militia pension disbursement would be administered by the
IVA, and it would be unlikely that the IVA could develop the
administrative systems and procedures to begin processing
applications before the year-end elections.


6. (C) General Nabil also expressed some trepidation about
ambiguity in the PM's directive. According to Nabil, the
directive's statement that CPA Order 91 bans all militias
"...except those under government control" is a deliberate
weakening of the order, leaving open the possibility of
legitimized militia activity nominally under the control of a
politically-affiliated government Minister. (NOTE. The memo
accurately reflects CPA 91, which prohibits militia "not
under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional
Government...except as provided by federal law." END NOTE.)
Nabil's comments are symptomatic of growing anxiety over a
developing armed "neighborhood watch" concept promoted by
several Shia ministers. (NOTE. Minister Jabr has several
times expressed his opposition to this proposal, seeing the
"neighborhood watches" as little more than incipient
militias. END NOTE.)

--------------
MINISTER JABR CLARIFIES HIS VIEWS
--------------


7. (C) On 28 August 2005, LTG Petraeus and AMB Yellin again
met with Minister Jabr and discussed militias. Minister Jabr
quickly stated that the $60 million estimate was not
scientifically calculated (although it does equate to the
monies that are budgeted for the MOI Qualifying Committee --
tasked to update accurately the MOI employment rolls -- which
could be considered a complementary process). The Minister
mentioned an initial allocation of $9.7 million, which he
found to be totally inadequate. Minister Jabr agreed that
success with militia T&R depends on ITG commitment to
eliminating militia, not to subsidizing them. He also agreed
that the process must address all militia, which made him
unhappy to be the head of the process, since he will be
accused of partisanship by all involved. Minister Jabr
further said that he would address the TRIC transparency
issue by fencing the money allotted to MOI for use by TRIC
alone. After studying militia reintegration in Afghanistan
and Lebanon, Minister Jabr concluded that there will be no
problem integrating individual militia into the Iraqi
military and police. He intends to spread former militiamen
throughout the force so they will not be able to interact
easily with their former comrades. He expressed his concerns
about how he can be sure people leave the militia and what
happens if there are more militia members than his budget can
accommodate. As his closing comment on 28 August, Minister
Jabr said, "We must totally finish the militia."

--------------
COMMENT: TAKING CAREFUL STEPS FORWARD
--------------


8. (C) The suspicions of the TRIC members are rooted in the
intractability of the militia issue. From the perspective of
the TRIC, with the Kurdish Peshmerga effectively legitimized,
there is no incentive for Shia militias to entertain
dissolution. As such, any interest in the process from the
current Shia-dominated ITG appears - at least to the TRIC -
to be dubious. Nonetheless, the possibility for tangible
results cannot be discounted, and this heightened interest on
the part of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior
should be encouraged with the following considerations: (1)
The government must be effectively committed to eliminating
militia groups, and (2) any initiated program must genuinely
serve to eliminate them and not recast them in some other
form. We will monitor the actions of the PM and the Minister
to ensure they remain true to the policy of individual - not
unit - integration of militia. END COMMENT.
Khalilzad