SADRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN WORRIES ABOUT NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003438

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2025
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: SADRIST PARLIAMENTARIAN WORRIES ABOUT NATIONAL
UNITY

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) Sadrist Parliamentarian Sami Jasim Attiyah al-Askari
told PolCouns on August 20 that no more than three provinces
should be permitted to form a region. Askeri, who is from
An-Nasiriyah, said that many Shia fear that Najaf and Karbala
would dominate a single region encompassing all Shia-majority
provinces. Southern Iraqis would want more local rule. He
further argued that it would be easier for Iran to exert its
influence over one Shia region rather than several. He
evinced skepticism about the utility of regional units in
general, a viewpoint he said many in the Shia Coalition
share. He also conceded that much of the pressure from
Basrah to form a region was easing now that it was clear it
would not mean an immediate oil revenue bonanza. (Comment:
Sadr-associated groups organized small demonstrations in
Baghdad and Samawa against federalism on August 20. End
Comment.)


2. (C) In response to our probing about the importance to
the Shia Coalition of keeping de-Baathification language in
the constitution, Askeri at first called it essential. Many
Shia, he said, worry that without the permanent constitution
legalizing the de-Baath commission, it might disappear.
PolCouns noted that the existing transitional national
assembly could also just pass a law defining the status of
the de-Baath commission. This would enable the constitution
to avoid mentioning the de-Baath commission while keeping the
body functioning. In this way, it might be possible to
attract some more Sunni Arab support for the draft
constitution. Askeri understood the logic and concluded this
might be workable for the Shia. (Comment: Askeri is one of
the most vehement anti-Baathists in the current assembly.
End Comment.)


3. (C) Askeri mentioned there is also some unease among the
Shia about the general direction of Iraq and the risks of the
country coming apart. Kurdish insistence on control of oil
does not bode well, he mentioned. Pointing to the Kurdish
insistance on the continuation of the pesh merga, Askeri
observed that regional security forces under local control
would merit careful treatment. He anticipated that a Shia
region would quickly follow the Kurdish lead and form "local
security forces" loyal not to Baghdad but to the regional
government center. These forces might be little more than
political-party based militias, he speculated. Any disputes
between regions, such as border and water disputes, could
lead to local armed clashes. He was especially concerned
about the disputed border between Sunni-dominated Al-Anbar
and neighboring Shia provinces, highlighting problems between
Anbar and Karbala and Babil. He discounted the possibility
of armed conflict between different Shia "local security"
groups, saying that there are no important border disputes
among Shia-majority provinces.


4. (C) Askeri recommended that it would be important to
limit the size and shape of regional security forces,
allowing them to have only weapons needed for "internal
security." He said that regional militias should not be
allowed to possess tanks, artillery and aircraft. He claimed
to believe that local security forces should be loyal to
regional governments, not political parties. (COMMENT: He
made no specific reference to the future of the Sadrist
"Mahdi Militia." END COMMENT)


Khalilzad