Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD3165
2005-07-31 20:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON CZECH REPORT OF ATTACK ON DIPLOMATIC

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL MOPS IZ EZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003165 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL MOPS IZ EZ
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CZECH REPORT OF ATTACK ON DIPLOMATIC
CONVOY

REF: PRAGUE 1106

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons

1.4 (a),(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003165

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL MOPS IZ EZ
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CZECH REPORT OF ATTACK ON DIPLOMATIC
CONVOY

REF: PRAGUE 1106

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons

1.4 (a),(b) and (d)


1. (C) Embassy, working with MNF-I and 3rd Infantry
Division, has still been unable to ascertain whether any U.S.
or Coalition Forces witnessed or were aware of the incident
reported by the Czech government, reftel. MNF-I at the level
of Deputy Chief of Staff for Political, Military, and
Economic Affairs, has made every possible effort to determine
what took place, but no new facts have come to light. No
report of any such incident was filed by U.S. forces and
efforts to poll soldiers in the field at that time and place
have proved negative. In the event more details of the
incident become available, Embassy will advise.


2. (C) Embassy Prague and Washington may wish to explain to
the Czechs that rules of engagement for U.S. convoys, set
forth in Convoy Security Force Protection Measures, state
that "Convoy commanders are responsible for the
self-protection capability within their convoy."
Accordingly, even if a U.S. convoy was aware of the attack,
with no prior communication or coordination with the Czechs,
the convoy commander would have no way to positively identify
the status of the vehicles trailing the convoy. Without such
positive identification of either the trailing vehicles or
the source of an attack, the convoy would be in no position
to take action under the standing rules of engagement. In
addition, if the mission of the convoy was, for example, to
transport VIPs, the convoy commander would potentially be
endangering the successful completion of his own mission by
stopping to engage in a firefight -- without knowing who he
was defending or who he was fighting -- that would expose his
passengers to harm.


3. (C) Embassy Prague and Washington officials should not
hesitate to invite Czech diplomats in Baghdad to call on
Embassy so that we can discuss with them ways to enhance
cooperation and coordination in order to avoid such incidents
in the future. Moreover, Embassy plans to host a meeting
this week with all Embassies in Baghdad (with whom the U.S.
has diplomatic relations) to discuss security procedures and
strategies. We would welcome the Czechs and be more than
willing to discuss this incident further with them at that
time.
Khalilzad