Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD3144
2005-07-30 06:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

VICE PRESIDENT ABDEL MEHDI PLEDGES COOPERATION ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003144 

SIPDIS

REL/GBR AUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT ABDEL MEHDI PLEDGES COOPERATION ON
CONSTITUTION AND SECURITY ISSUES

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003144

SIPDIS

REL/GBR AUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT ABDEL MEHDI PLEDGES COOPERATION ON
CONSTITUTION AND SECURITY ISSUES

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY. Vice President Abdel
Mehdi told the Ambassador during their July 25 meeting
that, in the negotiations on the constitution, all
sides were upping their demands, making it difficult
to reach a final consensus. Ambassador reiterated USG
willingness to help a summit of political leaders to
negotiate a final draft of the constitution. The
Ambassador promised to consult with the Iraqi
leadership and with the Vice President as the two
nations consider the gradual drawdown of Coalition
Forces. Abdel Mehdi suggested that a Status of Forces
Agreement be discussed at a later date. Ambassador
and Abdel Mehdi agreed that continued U.S.-Iraq
cooperation is necessary for a peaceful and prosperous
Iraq. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Lost In Translation
--------------


2. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM
and PolCouns met with Vice President Abdel Mehdi on
July 25. Abdel Mehdi began by discussing a
translation problem with constitution ratification
rules (the text of the referendum law uses
"nakhibeen," which could be interpreted either as
actual voters or as theoretical registered electors,
vice "musawwateen," which would have clearly referred
to actual voters). The controversy is whether the
Iraqi constitution must be ratified by half of all the
Iraqis who vote in the referendum, or by half of all
registered Iraqi voters. Ambassador reiterated U.S.
support for the former. Abdel Mehdi agreed that this
was the better choice, and said the Presidency Council
would issue a statement clarifying this language so
that it clearly is understood to mean half of those
voting only.

--------------
Constitutional Negotiations
--------------


3. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Abdel Mehdi told the Ambassador
that, in the negotiations on the constitution, all
sides were upping their demands, making it difficult
to reach a final consensus. The Deputy President
mentioned that the July 21 draft the Shia had put
forward basically was the Shia opening line. Abdel
Mehdi and Ambassador agreed compromises would need to
be reached and that all sides simply want to

strengthen their positions by having as many
bargaining chips as possible.


4. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Ambassador inquired about a
possible summit involving political leaders to help
finalize decisions on a constitution. The dates most
often mentioned are that the meeting in Baghdad would
start around August 2 or 3. Abdel Mehdi agreed this
meeting would be very useful. He commented that there
is still a question about who among the Sunni Arabs to
invite, as they have no obvious leadership.

--------------
Security Issues
--------------


5. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Ambassador stressed to Abdel
Mehdi that U.S. soldiers will be in Iraq only until
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) could "stand on their
own." Both Abdel Mehdi and the Ambassador agreed that
arrangements regarding the presence of Coalition/U.S.
forces would need to be discussed. In response to
Abdel Mehdi's expression of concern regarding conduct
of Coalition forces in entering mosques, the
Ambassador said that the U.S. military commanders have
policies on the issue which could be reviewed.

--------------
Impact of the Sharm Al Sheikh Attacks
--------------


6. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Speculating on the Egyptian
reaction to the recent terrorist attacks at Sharm al
Sheikh, DCM gave two possible scenarios: this attack
could either galvanize the Mubarak and mobilize
Egyptian action on a broad regional front to confront
terror, including in Iraq, or Mubarak could turn
inward and be even more resistant to building ties
with the Iraqi government, out of concern at
inflammation of the domestic situation post-Sharm. It
would be important to encourage the former course.
Ambassador suggested the Iraqis should call the
Egyptian President to keep lines of communication
open. He also suggested the Iraqis should host the
Jordanian Prime Minister as a way of expanding Iraq's
relations with Arab states. By contrast, the
Ambassador urged Iraq to maintain pressure on Syria to
shut down terrorist training camps and police the
Iraqi-Syrian border better. Abdel Mehdi agreed
readily.
--------------
Armed Militias, Or Neighborhood Watch?
--------------


7. (C/NF REL GBR AUS) Abdel Mehdi highlighted that the
main issue worrying the Shia now is security. He said
the daily killing of Shia civilians could not go
indefinitely without Shia retaliation. They cannot
wait several years for the ISF to come into its own,
he added. The Ambassador praised Shia restraint
first. Abdel Mehdi said the Shia civilian population
wants a role in protecting itself. Ambassador
repeated U.S. opposition to militias. Instead, the
U.S. wants to focus on building up the ISF. He noted
that giving free rein to militias now might help an
immediate security problem but lay the groundwork for
big problems later. Abdel Mehdi did not push hard on
militias; he conceded that Article 91 of the TAL
abolished militias. He then proposed an unarmed
"neighborhood watch" system. He said they could serve
as informants for the ISF and would help keep the
streets safe.


8. (U) REO Hillah, REO Basrah, REO Mosul, and REO
Kirkuk, minimize considered.

Khalilzad