SUNNI ARABS MAKE A COUNTER-OFFER ON FEDERALISM AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003133

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARABS MAKE A COUNTER-OFFER ON FEDERALISM AS
SHIA SHOW AMBIVALENCE


Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Sunni Arab negotiators have put
forward a detailed response to the draft constitution
that marks their first substantive engagement on the
issue of federalism. Iraqi Islamic Party leader Ayad
al-Samara'i told us July 27 that he supports a federal
system that maintains the status quo in Kurdistan and
puts off regional entity formation elsewhere. There
could be a one-year moratorium on creating regional
entities or such mergers could move forward
immediately but be subject to approval from a special
commission, the National Assembly, and a national
referendum. Meanwhile independent Shia
parliamentarian Qasim Daoud also entertained the idea
of a four-year delay on entity formation as a possible
compromise so long as planning and regional
constitution drafting could begin immediately. Both
men were still vague on the authorities that regional
entities would enjoy. Samara'i was otherwise fairly
upbeat on the draft constitution text. An open
Islamist, Samara'i supported the Sharia restrictions
as written but said he would have no problem amending
them to avoid any indication that Islam was being
imposed on Iraqis. We pushed hard for Samara'i to
think through the issues carefully with an eye to the
hopes of his fellow negotiators and the international
community. END SUMMARY.

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The Sunni Counter-Offer
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2. (C) Sunni Arab Constitution Committee member Ayad
al-Samara'i, a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party,
presented us the substance of the Sunni Arab reaction
to the constitution draft released over the weekend.
He went through the following key points:

- KEPING IRAQ'S NAME SIMPLE: Samara'i objected to
using the words "federal" or "Islamic" in naming Iraq.
He said both terms were unnecessary and carried
certain bad connotations for some. Instead he argued
for "The Iraqi Republic," a slight variation on the
Saddam-era name "The Republic of Iraq."

-- BAN BA'ATH PRACTICE, NOT THOUGHT: Samara'i said he
opposed the current language in Article 11 banning the
Ba'ath Party because it bans "thought" rather than
action. It is only practical to ban action, he
argued, and allowing a government to ban thought, even
in the form of the Ba'ath, is to open the door to
oppression. Samara'i added that he believed the
Ba'ath Party ought to be legalized because he felt it
would be more easily controlled if out in the open.
Current laws have not weakened it; they have only
forced it underground and made it harder to combat.

-- ENSURING NO FORCE ON ISLAM LANGUAGE: Himself an
Islamist, Samara'i had few objections to the Islamist
tone of the draft document, except for language that
seemed to promote Shiism, like references to the
marja'iya and "Persian" minority. We warned Samara'i
that declaring Islam "the principal source of law" and
putting a Sharia restriction on women's rights would
send an intolerant message to non-Muslims, secular
Muslims, and the world community. Samara'i said he
would support amending the draft to ensure that
women's rights are equal and Islam is not forced on
anybody. He cautioned however that Iraqi society
itself is very largely Muslim and references to Islam
in the text appeal to most Iraqis regardless of
Western worries.

-- NAMING FEDERALISM: Samara'i argued for shifting all
references to federalism to the word unionism, a
synonym in Arabic without the term federalism's
complications. Instead of saying "federaliyya," the
document would reference "itihadiyya."

-- BANNING SECESSION EXPLICITLY: Samara'i said he
considered draft language in Article 8 affirming
Iraq's unity to be too weak. He had suggested, at
Kurdish protest, adding a reference that refers to the
sanctity of Iraq's "international and UN-recognized
borders." He also argued for a clause banning
"secession under any circumstances." (Comment: Kurds
have argued that he has made the constitution sound
more like a forced march than a national compact, he
said. End Comment)

-- KEEPING THE KURDISTAN STATUS QUO: Samara'i said he
considered Kurdish semi-autonomy to be a "fact," not a
negotiating point. He proposed allowing Kurds to
maintain most of their current authorities.

-- KEEPING THE THREE-PROVINCE LIMIT: Samara'i and
other Sunni negotiators have strongly advocated
limiting future mergers to three provinces at most.
Allowing the formation of larger entities would create
conditions too favorable and tempting to secession, he
claimed.

-- ENSURING EQUALITY BETWEEN GOVERNORATES AND REGIONAL
ENTITIES: Samara'i said he would push for the
constitution to delineate the authorities of regional
entities and the central government without actually
drawing the borders. He would then push for regional
entities and governorates in Iraq to have the same
authorities. If regional entities have authorities
that single governorates do not possess, he said, then
there will be a natural incentive for governorates to
merge to gain power. Samara'i does not protest
mergers, but he does object to building a system that
actual incentivizes them.

-- REGIONAL AUTHORITIES: Samara'i said he thought
police force control should be further decentralized.
He believed some federally controlled forces should
also be in place, however. He opposed the idea of
allowing regions to have a veto on the entry of the
armed forces into their borders. Such forces would
need to transit the country regularly for training, he
said. It would also be too great a limit on the
sovereignty of the national government.

-- KEEPING KIRKUK SEPARATE: Samara'i said he would
only support TAL Article 58 if Article 53 remains in
place. (TAL Article 53 bans Kirkuk from joining with
any other provinces to form a regional entity.) He
said he believed that a special status for Kirkuk,
like that for Baghdad, was most appropriate. He said
he could only envision a referendum in the province if
only 1957 residents and their descendants were allowed
to vote. After 1957, too many political changes were
introduced to the area, he said. Furthermore, he said
that Chamchamal residents, now part of Suleimaniyya,
would not be allowed to participate in the referendum
even though their city fell within the boundaries of
Kirkuk province in 1954. To allow them back into the
province simply to vote when they have successfully
integrated with Kurdistan would be to deliberately
prejudice the vote. (Note: The TAL anticipates the
completion of a new, fair and transparent census of
Kirkuk among other disputed territories. End note)

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Two Views on Delaying Federalism
--------------


3. (C) Samara'i and Shia Arab Constitution Committee
negotiator Qasim Daoud both put forward visions on
postponing full federalism in separate conversations
with us July 27. Samara'i offered three possible ways
to delay entity formation. Samara'i said he felt it
was premature to allow entities to form outside
Kurdistan immediately following ratification or the
next elections. He proposed three paths to a final
federal map:

-- OPTION A, 4-YEAR DELAY: No regional entities
outside Kurdistan may be formed for one four-year
election cycle. Samara'i said this would allow time
"for a calm and full discussion."

-- OPTION B, LETTING A COMMISSION DECIDE: Samara'i
said he thought the wisest option would be for the
next National Assembly to form a commission to study
the issue of federalism, Iraq's resources and
geography, and propose a map that lays out an
appropriate structure. He envisioned a national
referendum to approve the commission's plan. This
option would be quicker than the 4 year delay he said.

-- OPTION C, SEVERAL LAYERS OF APPROVAL: Samara'i said
alternatively this commission could be formed as a
binding arbitrator on federalism proposals. For
example, if Basra sought to merge into a regional
entity, the commission would review the proposal and
hear out concerns from those affected. For example,
the Sunni community in Basra, now a strong 30 percent
minority, would find its voice significantly diluted
if Basra were to join with other neighboring Shia
provinces. The commission would be able to study this
concern and set conditions ensuring that the future
structure and constitution of the province has
adequate safeguards for minority rights. Samara'i
acknowledged that the commission would also have the
right to conclude that the circumstances were simply
not right for merger and regional entity formation in
that area in any form. Following a positive judgment,
however, he said the amended proposal would go to the
National Assembly for vote and to the country at large
for referendum. Samara'i was specific, contrary to
the TAL, in envisioning a national referendum on any
regional entity proposal. The TAL would merely
require a referendum of the people in those provinces
directly involved in the merger.


4. (C) Qasem Daoud, meeting with Poloff and Roman
Martinez, advisor to the Ambassador on constitutional
issues, acknowledged that even the Shia Arab delegates
are ambivalent on federalism. He said Da'wa and
Sadr's faction are significantly less enthusiastic
about federalism, and are divided as to whether
Southern Iraq should be divided into one or more
regions at all.


5. (C) Daoud said that requiring a "Transitional
Period" before new federal regions could formally take
shape might be an acceptable compromise. The
constitution would recognize the status quo in
Kurdistan while allowing - in principle - the
formation of new regions from other provinces
elsewhere in Iraq. Provinces could begin discussions
and planning on new regions immediately, and could
take tangible steps to draft regional constitutions
and create the administrative infrastructure needed to
assume additional authorities as a region. No new
regions would actually be created, however, until
after the completion of the first election cycle in
four years. Daoud explained that this approach would
meet the Shi'a demand for parity with Kurdistan while
assuaging Sunni fears about the immediate dissolution
of Iraq.


6. (C) Daoud emphasized, however, that the U.S. would
need to play a strong role in urging Iraqis - and
particularly Sunni Arabs - to agree to the formula. He
also made clear that new regions would need to have
the same range of authorities exercised by the Kurdish
Regional Government (including control over the police
forces),and may also need to be given a share of the
natural resources located within the region.

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COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) The federalism discussion is turning more
practical and detailed, which itself is cause for
minor celebration. The Sunnis are saying the word;
itself progress, and the proposals listed above were
put forwarded in a written paper. These negotiators,
Daoud included, have still not come head to head with
the issue of regional authorities. Divided opinion
among Shia Arab representatives may lead to an
unlikely Fadila-Da'wa-Sunni Arab alliance aimed at
pushing a full federalist vision off for the time
being. This possibility has already frustrated some
participants to the talks who have a bolder federalist
imagination. Independent Shia negotiator Ali Dabagh
left the room and passed Poloff grumbling that the
constitution would "say the word" federalism, but
nothing more.


8. (C) We are pushing the sides to continue to delve
deeper and are making clear that any moves that
threaten Iraq's unity or pull resource ownership out
of the hands of the federal government are steps too
far. That mantra, plus our presence on the sidelines
as each side emerges from the room, is adding an
urgency and realism to a discussion that seems to be
picking up steam.


9. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO
KIRKUK, minimize considered.

Khalilzad