SISTANI REPRESENTATIVE TAKES DIM VIEW OF U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003121

SIPDIS

NOFORN
CENTCOM FOR POLAD - AMB HOLZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2025
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KISL IR IZ
SUBJECT: SISTANI REPRESENTATIVE TAKES DIM VIEW OF U.S.
POLICY, DENIES IMPEDING WOMEN'S RIGHTS

REF: BAGHDAD 3044

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: TNA Constitution Committee member
and Ayatollah Ali Sistani's aide Ahmad al-Safi
complained about American efforts to secure Iraq and
decried what he perceives as needless American
suspicions of Iraqi Shia in his July 25 meeting with
Poloff. Al-Safi and Poloff vigorously debated
America's effort to improve security in Iraq; al-Safi
could not believe as powerful a nation as the U.S.
could not secure Iraq's border. On political issues,
al-Safi stated that the Sunnis had already shown their
reluctance to participate in the political process by
boycotting the January elections. He claimed that the
Shia, meanwhile, were trying to compromise as much as
possible. He also complained that the American
Congress was fixated on the Sunnis, showing no sign
that it understood that the Shia were in the majority.
Al-Safi said he was concerned that the U.S.
policymakers saw the Shia as a threat. Western media
made this problem worse. He cautioned that Iraq's
Shia would not follow the example of the Iranian
religious state. Poloff raised the importance of
women's rights. This is an issue where the U.S. was
worried about Shia Islamist influence. Al-Safi denied
that the Shia were limiting women's rights; he did not
feel he could order other women to cover their heads
in public, he observed. However, whether right or
wrong, Iraqis had the right to decide the rights of
its women, he noted. A constitution was a very
private thing for a nation, he remarked pointedly, and
each country needed to do this on its own to reflect
its own beliefs. Safi anticipated that the
constitution process would proceed on schedule. END
SUMMARY.

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A Litany of Complaints
--------------


2. (C/NF) TNA Constitution Committee member and
Ayatollah Ali Sistani's close aide Ahmad al-Safi
discussed the security and political situation in Iraq
with Poloff for almost two hours on July 25. After a
few introductory comments about the importance of
understanding one another, al-Safi immediately went on
the offensive. He stated that the Sunnis had already
shown their reluctance to participate in the political
process by boycotting the January elections, while the
Shia were trying to compromise as much as possible. He
also complained that Congress was fixated on the
Sunnis, showing no sign that it understood that the
Shia were in the majority. (Comment: Safi was
probably unhappy with several Codels' meetings with
Sunni groups earlier this month. End Comment.)

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Failure to Defeat Terrorism
--------------


3. (C/NF) Al-Safi went on to state that the problem
with Iraq was not that the different groups were
upping their political demands. Rather, MNF-I and the
U.S. had failed to defeat terrorists and had failed to
listen to reliable sources of information. Al-Safi
confided that he once asked the UK Ambassador if it
was possible to believe that the West, with all its
abilities and resources, was unable to stop the
violence and had asked if it begged the question of
whether the West was in league with the terrorists.
Iraq is surrounded on all sides by terrorists imported
mainly through Jordan and Syria, while countries like
Turkey, Iran, and Kuwait were safe. He said the
Ambassador declined to answer the question, and
chaleged Poloff to respond. Poloff rejected the
assertion, stating that the U.S. was devoting much of
its energies to fighting the war on terrorism,
particularly in Iraq.


4. (C/NF) Safi responded by asking why there were
such difficulties monitoring Iraq's borders. Although
the U.S. has been occupying Iraq for two years, he
said, it has failed to stop the flood of foreign
terrorists and appears to have stopped even trying
accurately to identify the terrorists from the average
citizens. This breeds fear in the different political
groups, he claimed, and is the primary reason the
Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds are seeking strong guarantees
for their protection in the Constitution.

--------------
Concerns About Shia Image in the US
--------------


5. (C/NF) Al-Safi also faulted U.S. diplomats and
politicians for meeting indiscriminately with too many
questionable sources. When asked if he could indicate
whom he considered to be reliable sources, he
suggested seeking those who had a large crowd of
followers, including him. Al-Safi noted that the U.S.
always behaved as though what the Shia was saying and
what they meant were two separate things. In the end,
he chided, this was the Americans' problem.


6. (C/NF) Al-Safi suddenly shifted gears and asked
how Embassy Baghdad was informing Washington about the
realities in Iraq. He was concerned that U.S.
policymakers saw the Shia as a threat, and asked why
this was the case. When told that the primary concern
was the emphasis on an Islamic state, he replied sadly
that he remembered what Western media were
broadcasting during the Iranian revolution. He claimed
to know that President Carter had asked the CIA to do
a study on the Shia, which poisoned U.S. perceptions
toward the Shia by linking them to the Iranian
prototype.


7. (C/NF) The Iranian example was not broadly
applicable, he continued. He cautioned that the West
had to learn to distinguish not only between the Sunni
and the Shia, but also between Iraqi Shia and those of
other countries. For example, Ayatollah Sistani was
working to push democracy in Iraq while holding the
state together, al-Safi said. In response to Poloff,
al-Safi also admitted that the Shia themselves were
responsible for creating some of the negative
impressions but he adamantly claimed the Western media
were mostly to blame.


8. (C/NF) Al-Safi went on to state that it was wrong
to judge people on their beliefs. Indians, even
educated ones, believe that a cow is divine and that
even a cow's urine should be held sacred. We do not
have the right to correct people on their beliefs, he
stated. He indicated that some people outside Baghdad
were more extremist in their beliefs, but he said he
was not going to try and change what Qy believed.
Poloff countered, stating that it was in these areas
that the moderate moral leadership of Sistani and al-
Safi were needed, especially to combat the negative
image of Islamists in the media.

--------------
Women's Rights
--------------


9. (C/NF) Poloff pressed Safi on human rights,
pointing to concerns many Iraqi women have about the
constitution being drafted. Safi claimed that, while
he personally believed a woman should be covered in
public, he had no right to impose his belief on
others. (Comment: It was unclear, however, whether he
meant he could not impose this on other countries, or
other women in Iraq. End Comment.) Again, he blamed
the media for the negative images of Shia clerics
abroad on this issue. Iraqis are writing the
constitution, he said, and whether it is right or
wrong, Iraqis had the right to decide the rights of
its women. Poloff emphasized the importance of
ensuring the rights and freedoms of all Iraqi women
and reminded al-Safi it would be too late to pressure
the drafters on the constitution after they had
completed it.

--------------
On the Constitution
--------------

10. (C/NF) Finally, al-Safi briefly spoke on the
progress with the constitution. He confirmed that the
process would continue on schedule and added that a
constitution was a very private thing. Each country
needed to do this on its own, he said pointedly, to
reflect its own beliefs.


11. (C/NF) He claimed that part of the problem was
that the Sunnis appointed to the Constitution
Committee did not represent the Sunni population. When
asked why he accepted them in that case, he said it
was not the Shia's right to decide who would
participate from the Sunni group. It just meant that
the Sunnis would have some form of participation, and
while the Shia rejected some of the names, the Shia
had no choice but to accept the majority of them in
the interests of adhering to the timeline. If the
Sunnis themselves were not satisfied with their
representation, they could ask for replacements -- as
long as it does not hold up the drafting process.


12. (C/NF) The meeting ended with al-Safi explaining
why he did not meet with U.S. officials. He countered
the claim that he was reluctant to meet with Poloff
because she was a woman, saying instead that, as a
matter of principle, he refused to meet with
representatives of what he termed an "occupying
force." He did not, however, reject his Chief of
Staff's offer to set up meeting with Shia leaders in
Karbala for Poloff and did not reject hints for
further meetings. When asked if this meant we had his
approval, he laughed in assent.

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C/NF) While al-Safi had only promised a 30-
minute meeting, it ran to two hours and he appeared to
become more comfortable and frank with his comments as
the session progressed. Although he spoke mainly in
Arabic, he did use some English phrases and several
times corrected the interpreter. He ignored three
summons to join a Constitution Committee meeting and
joked that this meeting was more important since the
report would be going straight to Washington within
the hour. This was only the second time that al-Safi
had met with Embassy staff; the first meeting was with
PolCouns on May 24, during which al-Safi had rejected
any overtures for more meetings. His unhappiness and
suspicions about American efforts on security, and his
worries about Western perceptions of the Shia are
illuminating in what they suggest about the viewpoints
of the higher-level Shia religious leadership. END
COMMENT.


14. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO
KIRKUK, minimize considered.


Khalilzad