DULAME AND RUBAIE DISUCSS IRAQI SECURITY WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003113

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: MOPS PINS MARR IZ PRESL
SUBJECT: DULAME AND RUBAIE DISUCSS IRAQI SECURITY WITH
AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (a),(b) and

(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. On July 24 at the dinner table,
Ambassador discussed Iraq's short-term security challenges
with Iraq's National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie and
Minister of Defense Sadoun al-Dulame. The latter identified
the ITG's primary objectives as delivering security to Iraq's
citizens, implementing a powerful public relations campaign,
pursuing economic development, and ensuring that the
electoral process advances on time at an appropriate level of
security. While the Ambassador and his guests concurred in
this list of goals, opinions varied on how best to achieve
them. Major debate centered on the role of militias and
"neighborhood watch" groups, elimination of government
subsidies to meet IMF conditionality, and the likelihood of
Sunni Arabs voting in the constitutional referendum and
elections.


2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT continued: The lack of trust between
Dulame, a Sunni, and Rubaie, a Shia, was evident. While both
were forthcoming when questioned, Dulame seemed particularly
reticent to speak frankly on issues like the meager defense
budget and MoD's failure to pay troop life support costs. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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ADVANCING SECURITY
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3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad hosted a dinner at his residence
for Iraq's National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie and
Minister of Defense Sadoun al-Dulame on July 24. In
attendance were DCM Satterfield, MFN-I CG Casey, MG Findley,
IRMO Senior Advisor Yellin, and Pol-Mil Counselor Litt.


4. (C) Rubaie said a newly formed joint committee, which he
chairs and which is charged with developing a
conditions-based strategy for transferring security
responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces, is key to
improving security in Iraq. He asserted that the gradual
withdrawal of Coalition Forces from secure Iraqi
neighborhoods will inspire citizens in the less secure areas
to cease their support of insurgents in order to free
themselves also from the Coalition Forces. The Ambassador
and General Casey agreed and offered appropriate assistance.


5. (C) Rubaie acknowledged the importance of disbanding the
militias, but said it is politically difficult to do so. As
an alternative, he is considering the feasibility of
recommending armed or unarmed "neighborhood watch" groups.
General Casey expressed his doubts about such groups, and the
Ambassador asked what might be done to ensure that these
groups not last forever. The Ambassador recalled the negative
consequences that had flowed from warlordism in Afghanistan.
They proved to be the infrastructure for a civil war and an
obstacle to building a sucessful Afghanistan. Pol-Mil
Counselor added that the ITG's refusal to address the militia
problem forthrightly might send the unintended message to the
public that the government is not capable of protecting the
people.


6. (C) Having arrived late for the dinner, Dulame was not
present for this part of the evening's discussion. However,
before departing, he pulled DCM Satterfield aside and warned
that the ITG's failure to deal with the militias, coupled
with ongoing Operation Thunder inside Baghdad, could be the
last straw for many Sunni Arabs. The same can be said for
armed or unarmed "neighborhood watches". Too many Sunni
Arabs, he argued, are convinced that the USG and the ITF are
blatantly anti-Sunni Arab. Earlier that day, Dulame had
confided to Pol-Mil Counselor that he will resign from the
ministry if the problem of militias is not resolved.

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Bringing the Message to the People
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7. (C) Rubaie emphasized the Iraqi government's need to
undertake a serious information outreach/public relations
campaign. He opined that the Iraqis, including the leaders,
rely solely on the media for information, and the media
report only disasters, not progress. According to Rubaie,
the media distortion is so bad that even the PM believes
"he's on the verge of loosing control." Rubaie has ordered
his staff to find ways to give Iraqi citizens an accurate
picture.


8. (C) Rubaie's strategy would require each of the fifty
ministers and top-level officials in the ITG to give
televised speeches every week. The Ambassador responded
positively and asked why Iraq's leaders do not speak out
publicly. Rubaie replied that many of the leaders do not
want to associate themselves with the fledgling government.
In addition, the ITG's media outreach capacity is limited.
Although Dulame is now bringing media reps along with him on
troop visits to report on progress, he mused that media
embeds perhaps do more harm than good, judging from current
television coverage.


9. (C) General Casey reaffirmed the importance of getting
accurate information out not only to the Iraqi citizens, but
also to the Iraqi leaders. With that in mind, he said his
staff will begin to provide a daily operations and
intelligence update to the PM's Chief of Staff, Dr. Abdul
Aziz al-Tamimi, to keep al-Ja'aferi informed. He recommended
that Rubaie invite the PM to his office once or twice a week
to learn directly from Rubaie what is going on in the field.
Rubaie agreed, noting that he currently provides a daily
intel report to the PM, and oversees intergovernmental bodies
to ensure that information is coordinated and disseminated to
senior officials.

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MoD Update
--------------


10. (C) Ambassador asked Dulame for a status report on the
Iraqi security forces. Dulame, appreciating the Coalition's
support, said their capability is improving, but he foresees
a long road ahead. When asked if paying life support and
salaries remained a problem, he answered "no" and insisted
payments continue to be made on time. Responding to General
Casey's glance of playful skepticism, he quickly added, "at
least for the next two months."


11. (C) Asked how many former regime officers serve in the
MoD, Dulame replied about 20 percent of its personnel. He
added that the CPA policy of dismissing all Iraqis in the
military had only added to the insurgency. Dulame estimates
that about 50 percent of the insurgents are former military
personnel who are clearly running the insurgency operations.
Dulame predicted that the number of insurgents will drop by
50 percent once a pension program for military veterans is
approved by the TNA and implemented. Rubaie concurred, but
thought the percentage a bit high.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
--------------


12. (C) Dulame and Rubaie agree that advancing economic
development is critical to undermining the insurgency. DCM
Satterfield raised the importance of infrastructure security,
pointing out that the northern pipeline could handle between
400,000 - 600,000 barrels a day if it were secured and
operating at full capacity. When asked why many Iraqis fail
to make the connection between the lack of electric power or
income from oil and the insurgents' sabotage, Rabaie answered
Iraq's culture explains the disconnect. After decades of
tyranny and abuse, Iraqis have come to distrust and despise
government. Resolving these problems, whatever the cause, is
the government's responsibility. It has not done so, and so
it is to blame.


13. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of the desirability
of reducing fuel and food subsidies to meet IMF conditions
for a stand-by agreement. The DCM pointed to the IMF's
September deadline and the need for formal ITG approval of
these measures, although it is not clear to what extent the
Iraqi Transitional National Assembly has to act on them.
Dulame and Rubaie rejoined by strongly opposing a revision or
a public discussion of the fuel or food subsidies before
January 2006. Both argued that doing so would be political
dynamite, would feed the insurgency, and would retard the
electoral process. Rubaie wondered whether monetizing the
subsidies might give Iraq breathing space. The DCM responded
that the concept merits consideration.

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ELECTORAL PROCESS
--------------


14. (C) All agreed on the importance of keeping the electoral
process on track. General Casey and MoD Dulame warned that
the intimidation campaign leading up to the elections will be
intense. The Coalition and Iraqi Forces are formulating a
plan of action to counter it. Dulame conjectured that there
will not be enough security for all areas, a point General
Casey disagreed with. The ITG should renew the emergency
measures that had helped secure last January's election, he
said.


15. (C) General Casey discussed the strategy for the election
period, which entails isolating the foreign terrorists and
extremists from the fractious and restive Sunni Arab
rejectionists, and countering the former Ba'athist
hardliners. Dulame and Rubaie agreed with this strategy, but
Dulame cautioned that former Ba'athists will be very active.
He explained that their objective is to disrupt the coming
elections at all costs, particularly because they failed so
miserably last time. He went on that the stated goal of the
Ba'athists is to make the country so ungovernable that the
USG, out of frustration, will turn to them as the only group
that can bring peace to Iraq. Rubaie concurred.


16. (C) Dulame, reflecting the minority opinion, argued that
the Sunni Arabs will not turn out to vote. While many Sunnis
may be telling Mission and Coalition representatives that
many Sunnis will vote, many more will stay home out of fear.
Rubaie countered by saying that Sunni Arabs will not vote
"no" on the constitutional referendum; therefore, any Sunni
absence will be immaterial. The electoral system will favor
whoever shows up to vote even if the absolute numbers are
small.


17. (C) COMMENT: The difference in views and the lack of
trust between Dulame and Rubaie was evident. While both men
engaged in the dinner discussion, Dulame, a Sunni Arab from
Ar-Ramadi, seemed particularly reticent to answer questions
in the presence of his Shi'a colleague. Dulame has also been
reluctant to appear before the media to publicize the need
to end the insurgency and unite the nation. Deeply committed
to this idea, he nonetheless is among the staunchest
opponents of Sunni Arab violence and extremism. He feels
equally strong about the need to eliminate independent Shia
and Kurd militias. END COMMENT
Khalilzad