Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD3092
2005-07-26 13:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NORTHERN OIL COMPANY MOVING FORWARD DESPITE

Tags:  EFIN PGOV EAID PREF PHUM ECIN ECON IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003092 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: EFIN PGOV EAID PREF PHUM ECIN ECON IZ ECON
SUBJECT: NORTHERN OIL COMPANY MOVING FORWARD DESPITE
PIPELINE ATTACKS

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for Reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003092

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: EFIN PGOV EAID PREF PHUM ECIN ECON IZ ECON
SUBJECT: NORTHERN OIL COMPANY MOVING FORWARD DESPITE
PIPELINE ATTACKS

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for Reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On 13 July, Charge d'Affaires David
Satterfield and Emboffs met with North Oil Company (NOC)
Director General (DG) Adil Al-Qazzaz to discuss pipeline
security and plans for expanding oil production in Northern
Iraq. Pipeline attacks and dilapidated infrastructure
continue to hamper northern oil production. The NOC is
aggressively reconfiguring its pipeline network to deliver as
much oil as possible. If security obstacles can be overcome,
the NOC expects rapid oil production increases and as much as
500,000 barrels per day that Iraq could export from northern
Iraq by the beginning of next year. DG Qazzaz also commented
on problems hindering NOC such as difficulties in
procurement, escalating wages, and weak middle and lower
management, as well as NOC's need for foreign investment to
reach its full potential. END SUMMARY

-------------- --------------
Oil Flows Hampered by Insurgents and Infrastructure
-------------- --------------

2. (SBU) Responding to Charge's questions regarding attacks
against the oil pipelines running from the Kirkuk oilfields
to the Bayji refinery and the Iraq-Turkey (IT) export
pipeline, NOC DG expressed dismay over the frequency of
attacks and its effect on oil production. He said that oil
production on 13 July was 380,000 b/d, but the NOC could only
move 220,000 b/d because only the smallest of the four
existing pipelines is useable. Moreover, that pipeline is
badly corroded and can only operate at 300 pounds per square
inch (PSI) of pressure vice its designed 1200 PSI rating. He
stated that recently the insurgents were using heavy
artillery shells to penetrate into the earth to breach buried
pipelines. While his company can do little about insurgent
attacks, the NOC has built redundancy into the pipeline

network by rigging an elaborate series of loops and
connections so oil can be quickly diverted from one pipeline
to another as attacks occur.


3. (C) One such workaround, scheduled to be completed in
about three weeks, will allow the NOC to send crude oil to
Baghdad using the existing Strategic Pipeline, which can
transport oil from southern Iraq to northern Iraq and vice
versa. By doing so, Iraq can avoid using the oft-targeted
lines running south from Bayji to Baghdad and near the towns
of Tikrit and Samarra. The NOC has modified one of two key
pump stations on the Iraq side of the IT pipeline so that it
can pump oil south through the Strategic Pipeline. The oil
will be transported via a 10-inch pipeline spur directly to
Baghdad's Ad Dawrah Refinery. The modifications would allow
the pump station to move as much 250,000 b/d.


4. (SBU) DG Qazzaz hoped that the pipeline security would
improve soon because he foresees great oil potential in
Northern Iraq. He estimates current production capability at
about 600,000 barrels per day, roughly equivalent to the
current pipeline capacity, though actual production was much
less due to pipeline sabotage. He anticipates that if
planned reconstruction projects were finished on time, NOC
could produce 780,000 b/d by the first quarter of next year
and export as much as 500,000 b/d after domestic demand was
met. Moreover, once Iraq's oil development policy is
established, NOC could begin to develop four eastern fields,
Kormor, Qamar, Palkaneh and another small field, with the
help of foreign investors. Once fully developed, he
estimated that the NOC could produce in excess of one million
b/d, although it will take several years to complete all the
necessary work.


5. (SBU) DG Qazzaz stated that NOC would need the help of
foreign companies because it was so difficult to purchase
equipment from outside of Iraq, and he had limited resources
to dedicate to costly investment. While he could authorize
domestic expenditures up to 200 million Iraqi Dinar (ID) (USD
134,000),he lacked the ability to execute even small
international contracts. Another problem cited by DG Qazzaz
was the high cost of paying his employees. He noted that
while his annual operating budget had risen from a 2003 level
of 10 billion ID (USD 6,700,000) to 50 billion ID (USD
33,500,000),most of that increase was due to escalating wage
costs. This left little room for NOC to make new investments
and the DG expected that foreign investment would be
necessary for Iraq's northern fields to reach their full
potential. Finally, the NOC DG expressed some concerns over
the lack of management depth in his organization, stating
that there were 10 crucial people who ran the company -- if
they left the NOC would grind to a halt.


6. (C) COMMENT: NOC DG Qazzaz seems to be running the
northern oil fields competently within its current
limitations. Securing oil pipelines is the first step to
increasing oil production in northern Iraq, but additional
investment will be needed to surpass 780,000 barrels per day.
He recognizes the importance of modernizing and
rehabilitating existing infrastructure, increasing system
robustness, and developing new sources of oil and gas. He
anticipates a large role for foreign companies in this
process, but needs the Iraqi Government to lead this effort.
END COMMENT
Khalilzad







Khalilzad