SHIA POLITICAL INSIDER QASSIM DAOUD WORRIES ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003046

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA POLITICAL INSIDER QASSIM DAOUD WORRIES ABOUT
THE KURDS AND PONDERS A MODERATE IRAQI PATH FORWARD

REF: BAGHDAD 2909

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Constitutional Committee member Qassim
Daoud told NSC Senior Director for Iraq Meghan
O'Sullivan on July 15 that he is optimistic about the
progress of the committee and believes a draft
constitution will be ready by July 31. Daoud felt his
attempts to integrate Sunnis into the committee have
been successful. Federalism and resource distribution
remain the major sticking points, with regional
boundaries also contentious. Daoud continued to
criticize (reftel) the Kurdish role in the
constitution drafting process and aggressive Kurdish
moves to resolve the status of Kirkuk. He also
provided a pessimistic assessment of the chances of
moderate parties and politicians in the upcoming
elections. END SUMMARY.

--------------
SUNNIS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE
--------------


2. (C) Meghan O'Sullivan, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Iraq at the National
Security Council, met with Qassim Daoud, TNA
Constitution Committee and Institutions of the
Regional Government Sub-Committee member, on July 15
to discuss the drafting of Iraq's constitution. Daoud
began by highlighting his efforts to bring Sunnis into
the constitutional process -- an effort he feels
generally has been successful. Daoud said federalism
is the major sticking point for the Sunnis in the
constitutional drafting process.


3. (C) As a group, Daoud said, the Sunnis are united
during the sessions of the Committee, but in private,
Sunni members approach him to complain and vigorously
criticize their colleagues.

--------------
FEDERALISM AND RESOURCES
--------------


4. (C) With the time for drafting a constitution
coming to a close, O'Sullivan asked Daoud to summarize
the federalism concerns of the Committee members.
Daoud responded that he feels that the Constitutional
Committee has been able to neutralize Sunni extremism;
the Kurds' "maximalist" demands pose a greater problem
to the work of the Committee.


5. (C) Daoud sees the Kurdish position as reflecting a
willful desire to dissolve the unity of Iraq and
cement Kurdish claims on the city of Kirkuk. Daoud
highlighted the Kurdish push to change the
demographics of the city in their favor. On several
occasions during the meeting, Daoud stressed that the
Kurds are pushing the limits of the TAL and must
become less aggressive in representing their views.
O'Sullivan responded that Kurds--and other parties--
view this negotiation as a time to place their maximum
demands on the table and that, in the coming days and
weeks, serious negotiations will need to ensue. The
USG, however, continues to press the Kurds not to take
actions that would predetermine the status of the
city. O' Sullivan underscored the need for the
constitution to be a "national document." The U.S.
Government supports TAL Article 58 as the appropriate
venue for resolving the Kirkuk-related issues, said
O'Sullivan. She noted that she was heartened by an
apparent movement in the direction of recognizing that
the final administrative status of Kirkuk would be
difficult to resolve in the short amount of time
before August 15, and may best be dealt with after the
constitutional process is complete. This
constitution, perhaps, may best be regarded as a
framework document that does not seek to resolve every
contentious political issue definitively.


6. (C) Turning to Sunni federalism concerns, Daoud
described Sunni resistance to Kurdish assertiveness
over control of resources. Sunni support of any
federal arrangement is contingent on resources being
managed by the central government, not the regions, he
said. While Kurds continue to insist that resources
be divided regionally, Sunni representatives remain
steadfast in their opposition. O'Sullivan repeated
U.S. support for the TAL provisions, which state that
Iraq's resources belong to the all the people of Iraq,
not to one specific region. Daoud said he senses
Kurdish willingness to compromise on this issue.
While Daoud emphasized the importance of resource
issues, he also pointed out the broader significance
of Kirkuk for Sunnis and Kurds alike. Daoud disagreed
with O'Sullivan that difficulties over the final
status of Kirkuk might be minimized by separating the
resource issue from the question of the administrative
status of the region, and he paraphrased the position
of his Sunni interlocutors, as "Kirkuk is our city."
It is a psychological issue for both sides.

--------------
CONSTITUTIONAL TIMEFRAME: THE ROAD AHEAD
--------------

7. (C) Daoud is confident that that his Committee will
resolve the outstanding issues and present a draft to
the national assembly by July 31. When asked about
potential roadblocks, Daoud responded that he
considers the Shi'a in the Government -- who seem to
be motivated by a desire to keep power they already
hold -- a threat to the timely completion of a draft.
However, Daoud deemed SCIRI's involvement in the
Constitutional Committee to be positive, as was
SCIRI's commitment to producing a document on time.


8. (C) O'Sullivan inquired about the possibility of
changes to the draft constitution during the period
between its submission to the TNA and the
constitutional referendum scheduled for October 15.
Daoud said he expects the constitution to remain 'as
is' during the interim period, as the work of his
Committee has been transparent and accessible. His
efforts -- and the efforts of the TNA -- will focus on
gaining approval for the constitution in the form
approved by the TNA. O'Sullivan and Daoud agreed on
the importance of public outreach during the interim
period leading up to the referendum.


9. (C) Daoud also addressed Ayatollah SISTANI's
insistence that the Shi'a provinces in the South be
merged into one (Shi'a) entity. According to Daoud,
SISTANI argues that dividing the South into multiple
regions will "encourage interference from neighbors."
Daoud told SISTANI that interference from neighbors
(Iran) already exists, regardless of he umbr of
regions. In the end, Daoud predicted, the South will
be divided into two or three regions. O'Sullivan and
Daoud both agreed on the symbolic importance of this
issue, and the potential negative effects of creating
a monolithic Shi'a entity in the South.

-------------- --------------
THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK: TOUGH TIMES FOR MODERATES AND
THE END OF ALLAWI
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Daoud analyzed the current political situation
in Iraq and the challenges ahead. Despite the
abundance of polarizing issues that face Iraq, the
political process is, in his opinion, irreversible.
However, this political process will continue to
polarize the country. Sunnis, in Daoud's opinion,
will eventually develop parties similar to those of
the Shi'a. Daoud agreed that the development of Sunni
leadership is critical.


11. (C) Daoud also predicted a decline in the
influence of the "liberal national strain" in Iraqi
politics. He pointed to violence against and
assassination of Shi'a politicians as contributing to
the polarization of Iraqi politics. Daoud also opined
that the Sunnis see the (Coalition and Iraqi) military
offensive against terrorists as "revenge of the Shi'a
on the Sunni." The violence and polarization has
nearly eliminated the space for truly national
parties, according to Daoud.


12. (C) Daoud said he sees his role as one of building
coalitions with "Islamists that we can deal with." He
pointed to SCIRI as a key player and praised its
constructive role in settling last year's Najaf
crisis. Daoud explained the focus on SCIRI by saying
that SCIRI would prefer to work with moderate groups
because it "does not like to be alone." He intimated
that he would likely leave Allawi's coalition to join
the better funded and organized SCIRI in the next
election. (COMMENT: The interest of Daoud -- a
moderate, non-sectarian leader -- in shifting his
political allegiance to SCIRI is an indication of the
real weakness of national, cross-sectarian parties in
the current political spectrum.)


13. (C) Daoud also touched briefly on SISTANI's
insistence that there be multiple electoral districts
for the upcoming December elections. Daoud insisted
that it is unreasonable to expect the electoral
commission to implement multiple districts in place of
the current single national electoral district before
December.


14. (C) Turning to the role of former PM Allawi, Daoud
pointed to his reluctance to engage moderate Islamists
as one reason for his decline. He also mentioned his
unwillingness to compromise, lack of flexibility, and
alleged focus on high-level meetings and phone calls
as other contributing factors. Daoud predicted Allawi
would fare very poorly in December's election. Daoud
contrasted Allawi's high-handed approach with his own,
noting how he has sought to be a constructive player
at every level, despite being in the opposition.

15 (C) Daoud closed by mentioning his ongoing concern
over the unhelpful role of Syria and Iran in Iraq's
internal affairs. He disclosed that he had been
officially invited to Teheran. He also agreed that,
although normal bilateral relations with Iran are
desirable, Iraq must remain wary of its neighbor.


16. (U) This cable has been cleared by NSC Senior
Director O'Sullivan.


17. (U) REOs Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Mosul
minimize considered.


Satterfield