SUNNI CONSTITUTION DRAFTERS COMMITTED TO AUGUST 15

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003007

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2025
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI CONSTITUTION DRAFTERS COMMITTED TO AUGUST 15
DEADLINE: THE BIG ISSUE IS FEDERALISM

REF: BAGHDAD 3000

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Satterfield.
Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Two principal members of the newly
appointed members to the Constitutional Committee told
us July 18 that they are committed to finishing a
draft by August 15 if possible but they are opposed to
a federalist vision of Iraq. An influential member
(who was subsequently murdered on July 19) of the 15-
member Sunni negotiating team has suggested either
decentralizing authority to the provinces. Another
tactic that all Sunnis agree on is delaying resolution
of the most contentious questions until the convening
of the next assembly after December's elections. We
are urging them to stay in the game (which may prove
difficult; both an UN advisor and representative of
the Sunni Waqf report the Sunni drafters will withdraw
from the committee),continue to promote solutions to
ensure the unity of Iraq and seek compromise on the
type of federalism all parties can live with. It
appears unlikely that the Kurds will negotiate their
existing regional government authorities. The Shia
are unlikely to accept regional Shia conglomerations
having fewer authorities than the Kurds already enjoy.
In this situation, it will be easier for the Kurds and
Shia to repeat the experience of last spring's cabinet
formation and make a separate deal and then presenting
a fait-accompli to the more rigid Sunni Arabs. We
will continue our efforts to convince the Sunni Arabs
that federalism would be a vehicle to protect their
interests. END SUMMARY.

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Sunnis Lay Out Dispute with Federalist Vision
--------------


2. (C) Sunni supplemental member of the
Constitutional Drafting Committee, Mujbil Ali Haseen
al Shaykh Issa told PolCouns on July 18 (prior to his
assassination) that the Kurds were pushing their
version of federalism for the south. He appeared
resolutely opposed to language allowing any provinces
to form a regional government aka the KRG model. He
laid out two key reasons. First, he said that regions
that control security, court systems and all economic
policy would have the attributes of states and sooner
or later would succeed from Iraq. They would also be
subject to greater influence from outside powers.
Shaykh Issa postulated the Shi'ite citizenry was not
even in favor of this interpretation of federalism.
Al Issa accused the Kurds of pursuing 'confederalism'
rather than 'federalism' and described their demands
as 'asking for the moon'.


3. (C) PolCouns countered that the international
community supported the vision of a federal Iraqi
state in UNSCR 1546. There would be no going back to
the old style of the Iraqi state. He asked Shaykh
Issa if it would be really better for residents of
Anbar or Ninewa to have governors appointed by a
(likely) Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, for
example. Shaykh Issa said he approved the concept of
decentralization, but not federalism. Administrative
authorities, such as management of electricity, water,
roads and health could be left to provincial or even
regional authorities. Political authorities, such as
the power to legislate or to manage the judicial
system, had to be left to the central government.
Shaykh Issa claimed that left alone to legislate every
province in southern Iraq, and most of the Sunni
provinces as well, would become entirely religious
governments. If an issue like social policy were left
to these governments, in the southern provinces "it'd
be like under the Taliban - you wouldn't see a woman's
face". In addition, he feared the Sunni Arabs would
be left with little revenue. He welcomed PolCouns'
note that the U.S. was urging ownership of natural
resource revenues remain with the national government.
PolCouns added that strong constitutional protections
of individual and community rights could minimize the
problem of extremists' dominating local politics.
Shaykh Issa shot back that Iraq has no history of
respecting rule of law, and the Sunni Arabs' current
experience is not encouraging.


4. (C) Shaykh Issa said that if the Shia and Kurds
want governorates to have legislative and judicial
powers, the Sunni Arabs would agree as long as
governorates are not allowed to join into regions.
This way they would not be tempted to break away into
independent states.


5. (C) The Iraqi Islamic Party's Dr. Ayad Samarra'i,
also a member of the 15 person Sunni team, asserted to
Poloff July 18 that the southern Shi'ites were being
manipulated by 'others' into forming a Southern
Regional Government amid conditions that were not
'permissive'. (Comment: Samarra'i was most likely
pointing to pro-Iranian political parties. End
Comment.) Samarra'i further stipulated that the
formation of any regional government should be subject
to a national (rather than regional) referendum.
Also, there should be a clause allowing provinces that
become disenchanted with their regional bloc to
secede.


6. (C) Samarra'i cautioned he was not opposed to
future regionalization in principle. Should, for
example, Maysan and Basra one-day wish to join that
would be 'an administrative question' for the National
Assembly. Nonetheless, at this stage it is simply too
dangerous to the unity of the nation. He noted
ethnic/sectarian tensions and/or intimidation is
already leading to the displacement of ethnic or
sectarian minorities. The application of further
regionalization, based on 'geographic' or ethnic
basis, e.g. could fuel the flight of Sunnis from
Basra. The formation of a Southern Regional
Government, consisting of either a minimum of three to
a maximum of all of the nine Shi'ite provinces would
lead to a similar (reactive) Sunni initiative. The de
facto result would be three states: Shia, Sunni and
Kurdish. He also observed a nine-province Southern
Regional Government (an idea he claimed was supported
by Ayatollah Sistani) would exert too much influence
on the central government.

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Moving Forward, Sunni Endgame?
--------------


7. (C) Shaykh Issa told us that the border issue was
exceptionally sensitive. He had seen the Kurdish map
mentioned in ref A and scoffed at its seriousness. A
resident of Kirkuk himself, he said Kirkuk should be
addressed later and outside the constitution,
including the tough issue of Kirkuk's borders. His
conclusion was that the toughest issues in general
should be postponed until after the December 2005
elections.


8. (C) Samarra'i noted the individual members (from
all factions) of Constitutional Drafting committee had
clearly established their ideological positions over a
week beforehand. Now -- for the last three days --
drafters were simply reiterating their stances. He
advocated getting down to the business of drafting the
text and then turn over the issues that are unresolved
to their political party leaders. While he noted, "a
bad constitution (by August 15) was better than no
constitution", he indicated the Sunnis do have a
contingency plan if they are dissatisfied with the
final draft. Observing "that many" may change their
position during the two month period for discussion
(August 15 - October 15),Samarra'i said the Sunni
Arabs would use this period to poll their
constituents, consult internally and then make a
decision whether to urge their supporters to vote for
or against. He refuted the possibility of a Sunni
walk-out from the drafting process, but left open the
possibility that if the Sunni Arab politicos cannot
convince their constituents that the document was the
best compromise possible -- and that it was superior
to the Transitional Administrative Law -- they'd
oppose the passage of the referendum.

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Other Problem Areas
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9. (C) Shaykh Issa listed several other points of
contention. He thought they could be resolved, but
there is no immediate resolution in sight. These
include

-- whether to call the country the Republic or Federal
Republic of Iraq;

-- how to handle the issue of the Arab identity of
Iraq;

-- whether to allow dual nationality (the Sunnis
oppose);

-- whether Kurdish should be a national language with
Arabic;


10. (C) COMMENT: Samarra'i, his usual dour, but
sharp-witted self was nervous about the course of
negotiations; he was dubious that an agreement
suitable to the Sunni Arabs could be found. Shaykh
Issa was less visibly downbeat. He displayed
ideological rigidity, but his recognition of
decentralization may leave some room to negotiate up.
The problem is that the Kurds won't negotiate down,
and the Shia are unlikely to accept regional Shia
conglomerations having fewer authorities than the
Kurds already enjoy. In this situation, it will be
easier for the Kurds and Shia to repeat the experience
of last spring's cabinet formation and make a separate
deal and then present a fait-accompli to the more
rigid Sunni Arabs. It is hard to see how the Sunni
Arabs would in turn accept such a negotiating tactic
and return to their own bases and try to sell the
Shia/Kurdish position. We will continue to explain to
the Sunni Arab community how federalism will protect
their interests and urge the Interior Ministry to
start addressing the allegations of human rights
abuses that lie just beneath the surface of almost any
conversation we have with Sunni Arabs now.


11. (C) COMMENT/BIO CONTINUED. Mujbil Ali Haseen al
Shaykh Issa was born July 1, 1957 and maintained a
home in his native village (and insurgent stronghold)
Hawija as well as in Kirkuk. He was assassinated on
July 19. (Ref A) He said he once served at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He noted that he, with
Dhamin Hasan Aleiwi (a member of the Sunni
Constitutional 'expert' committee, assassinated
alongside Shaykh Issa) and an Akhmet Horshi started
the Kirkuk University's faculty of law. He said
shortly after the arrival of the CF the Kurds passed
false information to the American military leading to
his detention. He was released after one week. He
also served as legal council to several Amman-based
international firms and claimed an income of 10-15,000
USD per month. He said his name was proposed as a
candidate for the Governing Council and Iraqi Interim
Government Minister of Industry and Minerals. We
heard his name mentioned a possible minister during
the messy government formation in May. As with his
nomination to the Constitution Committee there was
significant Kurdish opposition to his candidacy. He
admitted, smiling, they classified him as 'anti-
federalist'. Issa said he'd recently formed a
political party called al Qarar, the 'Decision,' with
fellow National Dialog member, Professor D. Nabeal
M.S. Younis (of International Relations and Public
Policies, Baghdad University.) Issa reported he was
single and was a blog afficiando, honing his English
through chatting. He, in the consistent manner of
most Sunni politicos, ridiculed his colleagues. He
mentioned if Hatem Mukhlis tried to hitchhike in his
hometown of Tikrit, no one would pick him up (he's so
little known). Extremely tall (approximately 6'5")
and fashionably dressed, Issa confessed his profound
indignity of incarceration with common criminals by
the Americans. Nonetheless, he energetically urged we
'rebuild' the bridges between the Sunnis and the USG,
and offered to serve as a facilitator with new
influential and legitimate representatives of the
minority. Outwardly secular and liberal, his death
may lead to shift toward the hard-line element in the
nascent Sunni leadership. Already, (Ref A) the two
moderate Sunnis who left the committee were replaced
by conservative ideologues with likely strong ties to
the insurgency.


12. (C) COMMENT/BIO CONTINUED. Shaykh Muhammad Tahir
al-Abid Rabbo al-Jaburi, another added Sunni Arab
member of the Constitution Drafting Committee was born
in 1956 in Mosul and is a leading shaykh of the Jaburi
tribe. He holds a law degree and is currently
enrolled as a student at the Sharia Academy in Mosul.
He served as an officer in the Iraqi Army for over a
decade before being arrested in 1996 on charges of
plotting a coup. Jaburi acknowledges now that the
charges were true, but says the plan never came close
to fruition. Jaburi says he adamantly refused for
years to put a picture of Saddam Husayn in his home, a
small rebellion seen as suspicious at the time, and he
let his Ba'ath Party membership lapse in 1993 after
joining in a pro forma fashion. After the charge of
treason, he was sent to one of the Ba'athist state's
most notorious prisons, al-Hakimiyya, which he claims
makes the feared "Palace of the End" prison seem "like
tourism." Jaburi spent about 6 months in prison
before using connections to the prison warden to
secure his release. He returned to Mosul and decided
to run for the "People's Assembly," the former Saddam-
era parliament, in 2000. Jaburi says Revolutionary
Council Deputy Chairman Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri saw his
candidacy and the popular support he was drawing as a
threat and saw to it that Jaburi's name was pulled off
the ballot. By that point, Jaburi said, he had come
to the conviction that Saddam Husayn needed to go
"even if Satan himself came to replace him." It was
in that spirit that he welcomed U.S. forces to Mosul
in 2003 and served on the first city government in
May, 2003. Jaburi also holds a degree in engineering
but appears to derive his income from his assets and
influence as a tribal leader in Mosul. He prides
himself on his independence and is considering running
in the next elections on a slate with other leaders
without formally joining any political party. A self-
professed lover of women, he is married with four
wives and claimed to be single while chatting up a
female Rashid Hotel employee after a recent meeting
with PolOff. END COMMENT.


Satterfield