ITG RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER LEGAL DETENTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003004

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: ITG RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER LEGAL DETENTION
AUTHORITIES

Classified By: Classified by David C. Litt, Political-
Military Affairs Counselor, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) Iraqi participation and input improved at the
third USG-ITG meeting to discuss legal authorities for
the proposed transition of Coalition detention
operations to the Iraqi government. Representatives
from the Ministries of Human Rights, Interior,
Justice, and Ministry of State for National Security
joined TNA member Sharwan al-Waely in a spirited if
unfocused discussion on detainee issues.


2. (S) All Iraqi participants were adamant that no
legal authorities for Iraqi security detention exist
today, and none showed interest in developing such
authorities in the future. Discussion focused instead
on the transfer of greater numbers of detainees to the
Iraqi court system, and al-Waely's plan to introduce a
shadow committee to "help" the Combined Review and
Release Board (CRRB),which he views critically.

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DEFINING THE PROBLEM
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3. (S) Al-Waely's opening comments indicated he had
been receptive to last week's briefing on the profile
and threat level of the Coalition detainee population.
In reviewing the issue for new members of the
group, he accurately explained the roles of the CRRB
and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI),and
noted that "both we and the Americans are afraid" of
the consequences of releasing many detainees currently
in custody.


4. (S) MoHR Prisons Director Saad Sultan echoed this
assessment, telling the group that his extensive
contacts with Coalition detainees (Sultan is
a regular presence at Abu Ghraib) had convinced him
that many were criminals who had committed serious
crimes under the previous regime. "If the Iraqi people
knew who these people were," he said, "they would come
forward and complain against them".


5. (S) A discussion of the best means by which to
identify court-worthy criminals amongst the security
internee population ensued, with the MOI
representative offering to check detainee names
against files in the MOI criminal record department
for past offenses, and several Iraqi participants
suggesting that detainee names be publicly advertised
in order to solicit legal complaints from the Iraqi
public about past criminal acts.


6. (S) (Note: a number of these propositions may
prove useful if they come to fruition; the
collection of additional information on past
criminal acts by detainees could, in theory, assist
in the discovery of outstanding warrants. End note.)

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LEGAL AUTHORITIES
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7. (S) All Iraqi participants responded with a firm
negative to Embassy counsel's inquiry as to whether
they believed the Iraqi government currently possessed
any rights to impose security detention. "If I
find someone who has been in custody longer than
twenty-four hours and has not seen a judge," said
Sultan, "I tell MOI or MOJ to let him go".


8. (S) The Director General of the Ministry of
National Security did note, as an aside, that in
reality he often saw people who had been detained
in Iraqi custody "for months" without appearing before
a judge, but no one else commented on the issue
of current Iraqi extra-judicial detention.


9. (S) When Embassy counsel raised the disposition of
dangerous detainees in Coalition custody against whom
- for reasons of witness intimidation, sensitive
intelligence, or other causes - court cases could not
be brought, the group was unmoved. "If you have a case
where you have no source, no evidence, no crime, no
case, that person should be released," said Raad Alim,
representing the Ministry of Justice.


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CHANGING THE SUBJECT
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10. (S) Pol-MilOff raised a hypothetical scenario,
asking whether the in future, Iraqi Security Forces
in the midst of a five-day fight against insurgents
in an enemy-occupied town would be expected to choose
between bringing a judge into the midst of the
fighting to mount investigative hearings or releasing
disarmed fighters twenty-four hours after their
capture, into a live battle.


11. (S) Al-Waely ignored the scenario and quickly
changed the subject. "Let us talk about a practical
proposal", he said, outlining a plan to form another
committee - and several sub-committees - to "extend"
the work of the CRRB, which reviews detainee files
and recommends release or continued detention. (Note:
al-Waely has previously been vocal in his opinion
that the CRRB recommends insufficient numbers of
detainees for release.)


12. (Note: One Iraqi idea - to have the CRRB's
Iraqi participants examine detainee files closely
for missed evidence of relevant criminal offenses,
given their greater familiarity with Iraqi idiom
and law - was clearly productive, although already
in practice at the CRRB.)


12. (S) An animated discussion followed among the
Iraqi participants as to the proposed committee's scope.
It is not clear that consensus was reached - the MOI
representative proposed that detainee names be checked
against criminal records, MoHR was intent upon
publishing names to attract witnesses, and al-Waely
announced that lists would be screened for former
regime figures and "names that are innocent".


13. (S) Embassy counsel proposed at the close of the
meeting that we return next week to the subject of Iraqi
legal detention authorities for security detention;
the Iraqi participants agreed politely, and said that
they would also update Embassy and MNF-I representatives
of the formation and progress of the new (and as yet
unnamed) committee.

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COMMENT
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14. (S) Our Iraqi interlocutors are enthusiastic
about increasing the proportion of detainees funneled
into the criminal justice system, which they blame for
a perceived backlog in prosecutions. (Enthusiasm for
adequately funding and securing the court is less
apparent.) Many of their proposals are practical and
positive, and these will be developed as a priority.


15. (S) Our partners show little interest, however,
in the consequences for internal Iraqi security of
releasing large numbers of detainees who the Iraqi-
majority CRRB has judged pose an imperative threat
to security, but who the Iraqi courts are unable to
charge. We will discuss these security concerns in
detail next week, with a focus on real-word examples
illustrating the gravity of the problem, but note
that this disengagement is common across the ITG.


16. (S) Should al-Waely's conception of the newly-
formed committee prevail, we expect it will function
as a source of detainee release requests rather than a
forum for discussion of legal and political issues
raised by the proposed transfer of Coalition detention
operations. We will need to monitor carefully its
interaction with and influence on the current CRRB.
Satterfield