Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD2994
2005-07-19 12:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 12, 2005 MEETING

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KDEM IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002994 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 12, 2005 MEETING
WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT JALAL TALABANI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2897

B. BAGHDAD 2872

C. BAGHDAD 2863

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002994

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S JULY 12, 2005 MEETING
WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT JALAL TALABANI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2897

B. BAGHDAD 2872

C. BAGHDAD 2863

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary: In a July 12 lunch meeting, President
Jalal Talabani was optimistic that the Sunni Arabs in the
constitution drafting committee will reach consensus with
other committee members. He predicted the next elections
will use provincial electoral districts rather than a single
national electoral district system. Talabani noted his
interest in restoring pensions to retired military and
"cleaning up" the Presidency Council. Citing Syria and Iran
as the biggest security concerns, he pressed the need for a
U.S.-Iraqi security strategy. Talabani believes Arabs who
arrived in Kirkuk under Saddam's arabization campaign should
be allowed to remain in Kirkuk but not vote on its future
status. The Deputy Secretary conveyed the President's
appreciation for Talabani's efforts to bring Sunni Arabs
aboard the constitutional drafting process and indicated a
visit to Washington by Talabani will be welcome after the
constitution is completed. End Summary


2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick
Charge d' Affaires David Satterfield
D Executive Assistant Ambassador Ross Wilson
S/I Deputy Director Robert Deutsch
Adam Ereli, PA
NSC Senior Director Meghan O'Sullivan
Political Minister Counselor Robert Ford
Poloff (notetaker)

IRAQ

President Jalal Talabani
Chief of Staff Kamaron Karadaghi

--------------
Sunnis to Reach Consensus on Constitution
--------------


3. (C/NF) Sharing his amusement over the internal squabbling
of the 15 Sunni Arabs who joined the constitution drafting
committee, President Talabani assured the Deputy Secretary
that the Sunnis will reach consensus and compromise with
other committee members. Talabani countered some Sunnis
assertions that the 15 additional Sunnis in the committee do
not represent Sunni Arab diversity. "There are
representatives from the Sunni Endowment, the Iraqi Islamic

Party (IIP),and Sunni tribes," he argued.


4. (C/NF) The Deputy Secretary conveyed the President's
appreciation for Talabani's efforts to bring Sunni Arabs
aboard the constitutional drafting process and said the
President looks forward to Talabani's visiting Washington
after the Constitution is completed. He remarked that in his
meeting with Sunni committee members Adanan al-Janabi and
Mujbil Shaykh Issa (the latter from Kirkuk),they listed
federalism, Kirkuk, Iraq's definition as an Arab nation, and
dual nationality as the remaining sticking points in the
drafting process.

--------------
Provincial Districts for Next Elections?
--------------


5. (C/NF) Responding to the delegation's query over the most
likely electoral system for the December elections, Talabani
said he supported the increasingly popular proposal to have
provincial electoral districts rather than the single
national district system that was used in January. Though
Kurds might lose a few votes in the south, they would still
be well represented in the northern and central areas of the
country, he predicted. Sunni Arabs, most Shia, even
Ayatollah Sistani, appear to support the idea of provincial
lists, except Moqtada al-Sadr's group, he said.

--------------
Cleaning up the Presidency Council
--------------


6. (C/NF) Talabani prided himself in his initiative to clean
up and organize the Presidency Council. Talabani arrived at
the Presidency to find no records of expenditures. "Members
of the Council received USD 2 million per month each, but we
have no idea how they spent it," observed Talabani. He said
Deputy VP Abd Abdul al-Mehdi has prepared operating norms,
but Deputy VP Gazi al-Yawr disagrees with some of the points.
Talabani had given his deputies an ultimatum to reach
consensus by July 13.

--------------
Addressing Military Pensions
--------------


7. (C/NF) To Talabani, restoring pensions to the thousands of
retired Iraqi military veterans poses an immediate challenge.
Given that many of the retirees are Sunni Arabs, the fact
that most have not received pensions in over two years is a
sore issue for the Sunni community, explained Talabani. The
300,000 military retirees (of them, some 6,000 Saddam-era
generals and field marshals) at least deserve to receive what
they contributed to the system, Talabani reasoned. (Note:
Talabani estimates the combined number of active and retired
government employees at three million people.)

-------------- --------------
Aggressive Syria A Threat, Subtle Iranians Another
-------------- --------------


8. (C/NF) Commenting that Syria and Iran pose the most
serious neighborhood threats to Iraq's security, Talabani
said that of the two countries, the Iranians take a more
subtle approach. Syria was allowing some 70 insurgents per
day to cross into Iraqi territory, estimated Talabani. The
Syrian government's recent arrest of some 1,400 insurgents is
a good start, but not enough. "Hundreds of thousands had
come over," claimed Talabani.


9. (C/NF) Though Iranian involvement in Iraq is harder to
detect than Syria's, continued Talabani, the Iraqi government
has evidence of ties between the Iranian government and the
terrorist groups Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna. These
groups are stirring up trouble in Sunni Arab and Kurdish
areas of Iraq. The Iranians have instructed them to refrain
from activities in Iraqi Shia areas to make Iraqis believe
that the Sunni and Kurdish areas are restive while the Shia
populations are peaceful, asserted Talabani.


10. (C/NF) Talabani observed that former President Khatami
had been reasonable and easy to work with. Khatami allowed
Kurds on both sides of the border to visit one another and
had encouraged their culture. Khatami also allowed Shia
Kurds to participate in his government, including his oil
minister. Talabani is uncertain how relations will evolve
with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, observing that
Ahmadjinejad once headed Iran's Iranian-Kurdish Affairs
Office, which organized "operations" against Iranian Kurds.
He said Ahmadinejad was very close to Ayatollah Khamani.

-------------- ---
Insurgency a Problem, but Less So, Says Talabani
-------------- ---


11. (C/NF) To the Deputy Secretary's query over the current
level of insurgency and its strength relative to the past,
Talabani listed the two categories of insurgency confronting
Iraq: Al Qaeda, al-Zarkawi, Ansar Islam and Wahabbi outsiders
on the one hand and
disgruntled Iraqi Sunni Arabs on the other. Talabani
explained that the strength of the insurgents has diminished
for three reasons: Iraqi security forces are now better able
to fight them; people are tired of the violence, and many of
their key leaders have been killed or captured. After the
January elections, many Iraqi Sunnis realized violence was a
"dead end" and are coming around to political participation.
As people grew disenchanted with the insurgency, they began
collaborating with the security forces. Partisans are like
fish and the people are the water. If the water dries up,
the fish die, he mused.

--------------
We Need Your Help on Security
--------------


12. (C/NF) Reiterating his interest in establishing a joint
U.S.- Iraqi security strategy, Talabani underscored the need
for U.S. help to secure the Baghdad-Najaf, Baghdad-Baquba,
and Baghdad-Kirkuk roadways; protect the Kirkuk pipeline; and
deal with insurgency problems in Tal Afar and Mosul. He also
sought our support to remove the Baquba police chief, who
Talabani alleges is too close to the insurgents.

--------------
Give Kirkuk Some Time, Suggests Talabani
--------------


13. (C/NF) On Kirkuk, Talabani said he expects to reach
agreement with the Turkmen and the Shia Arabs on Kirkuk. The
Front of Turkmen of Kirkuk and the Shia Arabs, including a
Sistani representative, support his initiative. Talabani
said Kirkuk's longstanding Arab population should be allowed
to remain in Kirkuk and vote on Kirkuk's future status, while
Arabs who arrived through Saddam's Arabization of Kirkuk
could also remain in Kikurk, but not vote on its future. The
"Saddam" Arabs could register and vote in their places of
origin and remain in Kirkuk, Talabani explained. Alleging
that Barzani is less flexible on Kirkuk, Talabani promised to
try to convince him to support this "national solution." The
decision on Kirkuk should not occur immediately, however;
only after one to three years, to allow time for Kirkuk to
normalize, for its residents to reconcile, he suggested.


14. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Satterfield