Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD2972
2005-07-17 12:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRIME MINISTER PREVIEWS IRAN TRIP, PLEDGES

Tags:  PREL PTER PINS ETRD IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002972 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2025
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS ETRD IZ
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PREVIEWS IRAN TRIP, PLEDGES
MOVEMENT ON DETAINEES

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002972

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2025
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS ETRD IZ
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PREVIEWS IRAN TRIP, PLEDGES
MOVEMENT ON DETAINEES

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Prime Minister Jafari told us July 15
that his main message in Iran would be to urge that they
tighten controls over the common border while he also warned
them away from interference in Iraqi internal affairs. He
said he would also raise bilateral agreements on supply of
essential services to Iraq, such as electricity and water,
and also raise the return of Iraqi aircraft impounded in
Iran. Jafari welcomed word of better coordination on
intelligence issues with the Coalition, but he cautioned that
he would be the ultimate decision-maker on the Iraqi side.
He indicated he might let Iraqi National Intelligence
director Shahwani go for political expediency. Jafari also
pledged to work more closely with us to prepare the transfer
of detainees from Coalition control to Iraqi control and
named a lead on the Iraqi side. End Summary.


--------------
Iran Trip: Borders and More
--------------


2. (S/NF) Prime Minister Jafari told Charge and MNF-I CG
Casey over dinner July 14 that he would take a large
delegation to Iran for a three-day visit starting July 15.
The most important issue he would raise, he said, would be
the need for Iran to control its border more tightly. Unlike
Syria, he didn't think that the Iranians were intentionally
facilitating anti-Iraqi forces' entry into Iraq. They had to
do more however. Casey and the Charge cautioned that the
Iranian Government might be consciously helping AIF elements
in Iraq, and they promised more detailed information before
the PM's departure. (MNF-I did deliver the information
before the Prime Minister departure.) Jafari stressed that
there are two "red-lines" that he will highlight to the
authorities in Tehran. First, they must control the borders
and stop infiltration. In addition, they must not try to
interfere in Iraqi internal politics. The Prime Minister
observed that he would have to deliver this message across a
range of the Iranian leadership to be sure that everyone in
what he called a divided Iranian government understands.



3. (C) Jafari added that he would take a long list of Iraqi
requests, including agreements on essential services such as
electricity and water. Jafari said he would also seek the
return of Iraqi military and civilian aircraft that have long
been held in Iran. (Jafari also mentioned in passing that
the two sides would discuss an oil agreement.) The Prime
Minister doubted he would get everything on his list, but
raising the issues might start the Iranians working on
positive responses later. Charge told the Prime Minister
that we understand Iraq's need to have good relations with
its neighbors, but urged him to be careful to secure
agreements with the Iranians that were clearly in Iraq's
interest - not just Iran's. Jafari agreed.

--------------
Jafari Sensitive on Intel Authorities
--------------


4. (S/NF) The Prime Minister welcomed word from General
Casey that the National Intelligence Committee had met for
the first time on July 14 with the Ministers of Defense and
Interior, National Security Advisor Rubai'e and MNF-I
representatives. The Prime Minister launched into a lengthy
discussion about the Iraqi side needing to coordinate with
MNF-I but he was adamant that their authority to coordinate
did not give them the authority to make important decisions.
They would need to come to him for that, he emphasized.
Jafari also emphasized that the relationship between the
intelligence services and the Prime Ministry was a sensitive
one; he was fielding questions from parliamentarians about
it. He indicated that while he had nothing against Iraqi
National Intelligence Service director Shahwani, he probably
would have to let him go given concerns about him in the
National Assembly.

--------------
Detainees - Jafari Agrees to Move
--------------


6. (C) The Charge and General Casey urged the Prime Minister
to appoint Iraqi officials with whom we could start planning
the transfer of detainees from Coalition to Iraqi control.
When he understood the issue, Jafari readily agreed. The
government is under pressure to release innocent detainees
but also under pressure to sternly punish those guilty of
terrorist acts. The government would operate under the
premise that the greater the crime, the greater the
punishment. He said would have Interior Ministry
Undersecretary Adnan Assadi to be the lead Iraqi contact. He
would be charged with collecting the details and ensuring
coordinating between the Iraqi Interior and Justice
ministries and the Coalition. Jafari stressed that Assadi
had his "total confidence."

--------------
Israel Boycott and Iraqi Politics
--------------


7. (C) Charge also raised Pepsi-Cola's problem registering
its trademark in Baghdad because Trade Ministry officials
were imposing old Israel boycott laws against the company.
Charge underlined that the CPA abolished those laws. Trade
Minister Abdel Basset wants approval from the Prime Minister
to issue a ministerial circular reminding the staff that the
boycott laws are no longer in effect. Charge urged the PM to
give the Minister that approval.


8. (C) Jafari was reluctant because it would carry heavy
political risks. He pointed to the political gamemanship in
the National Assembly and said his intervening could make him
an easier target in an emotional debate. He opined that the
Trade Minister could issue the circular without seeking
permission from the Prime Ministry. "He does that everyday,"
Jafari quipped. Jafari told Charge to go back to the Trade
Minister and get him to issue the circular.


9. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Satterfield