IRAQI MINISTER OF DEFENSE AGREES TO UNDERTAKE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002959

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PBTS PGOV PINS MOPS MARR IZ SY IR
SUBJECT: IRAQI MINISTER OF DEFENSE AGREES TO UNDERTAKE
OUTREACH TO TRIBES IN RAMADI, BRIEFED ON COMING OPERATIONS

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(a),(b),and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: In order to support upcoming military
operations in western Iraq, Minister of Defense Dulaymi
agreed to help obtain consent and cooperation from local
tribes in the region, especially ar-Ramadi. He will prepare a
meeting in ar-Ramadi, with MNF-I Commander George Casey
accompanying, inviting 40-50 tribal notables to garner their
support for the ITG and the coalition. Dulaymi also
recommended trying to work with four specific hard-line
rejectionists, who could be very helpful if convinced to
support the government's efforts. The son of one of them, he
asserted, headed a group responsible for recent diplomatic
kidnappings. He will also help in efforts to obtain support
from tribal leaders along the border near al-Qaim in
preparation to return the border area to Iraq government
control. Casey recommended additional Iraqi measures to
secure the border, including urging Syrian cooperation.
Dulaymi said Talabani would be traveling to Syria within 10
days at the SARG's invitation. The ITG is also preparing a
way ahead for "rescuing" Tall Afar from terrorists. As a
first step, a delegation including TNA members will travel to
Tall Afar to prepare recommendations to the ITG. Regarding
Prime Minister Jaafari's upcoming visit to Iran, Min Def
asserted that Jaafari intended to spend 7-10 days, including
travel around the country. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) MNF-I Commander Casey met with MinDef Saadun Dulaymi
July 13 to brief the minister on upcoming operations in
Western Iraq and to solicit his assistance in engaging key
leaders in the province to support the operations. Casey has
accompanied by PolMil Counselor Litt, MG Rick Lynch, and IRMO
MOD advisor John Noble. Joining Dulaymi was BG Hatem Majil.
Casey reviewed in broad terms the upcoming operations in the
northern Tall Afar region, central al-Qaim/al Rawa area, and
Ramadi/Fallujah. He stated that our objective is to restore
Iraqi control over the border with Syria in those areas by
November.

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SITUATION IN TALL AFAR
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3. (S) With respect to Tall Afar, Casey recalled Prime
Minister Jaafari's request to him for a status report on that
area, and a determination whether it is necessary to "rescue"
Tall Afar. Dulaymi retorted that Jaafari was responding to
TNA pressure regarding the situation in Tall Afar, especially
from the four TNA representatives from that area. The Min Def
stated that Jaafari told the TNA that the ITG would "rescue"
Tall Afar within three weeks, and make it a safe place. The
government intends to send a delegation including the TNA
reps to Tall Afar, and to report practical steps that might
be taken to restore order and control by legitimate
authorities.


4. (S) General Casey cautioned that damage in the city could
be significant if force is required since the targets -
especially foreign terrorists - are hiding in the city. Casey
said the delegation's role is important since the ITG should
demonstrate that all political means will have been exhausted
before resorting to force. Besides, the delegation could be a
valuable link to government activities and eventual military
operations.

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AL-QAIM AND AR-RAMADI
--------------


5. (S) Regarding the al Qaim region, Casey described the
objective of the operation to push westward from al-Rawa and
eventually to have Iraqi security forces reoccupy the borders
around Qaim. With the additional construction of fortified
outposts, the border in that region could be under Iraqi
control by November. Casey sought the MOD's assistance with
local tribal leaders in support of these operations, and
provided our assessment of which tribes might be cooperative.
Dulaymi agreed to help, and commented that he had just met
the shaykh of one of the tribes noted in our assessment, who
was committed to supporting the government. The shaykh
reportedly gave Dulaymi significant intelligence information,
which MOD will convey to us as well.


6. (S) Casey added that it is essential that the Iraqi
government consider other steps to help secure the border,
for example, creating a "weapons-free" zone, imposing a
strict curfew, and pressing the SARG regarding border
security. Dulaymi noted that Talabani would be traveling to
Damascus within 10 days at Asad's invitation, and with the
SARG's assertions that it is committed to close cooperation
on these issues.


7. (S) Ramadi, Casey observed, requires a political
approach. He mentioned 2 MarDiv Commander MG Huck's
discussions with intermediaries in Ramadi that apparently are
bearing fruit. For example, the intermediaries seem to have
delivered on their commitments to reduce substantially the
emplacement of IEDs in specified areas over a period of a
week. This has led to a second meeting that will take place
in a few days. Casey would now like to prepare the next level
of engagement by following up on Dulaymi's suggestion to
visit Ramadi and meet with leaders.

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OUTREACH TO TRIBES
--------------


8. (S) Dulaymi said he would like to travel together with
Casey for such an effort. He recommended bringing together
some 40-50 tribal leaders, to listen to what they require
participate in the political process. If they were to argue
for the withdrawal of coalition forces, he said, he would
counter that they themselves would then have to assume
responsibility to calm the city and have their sons join the
government's security forces. Otherwise, the departure of
the coalition would leave a dangerous vacuum. He observed
that some 37 groups operate in Ramadi, most of them criminal
organizations flaunting Islamic or political slogans, and all
claiming to be leaders. In fact, he said, none lead more
than 5 percent or so of the population - and Zarqawi is
trying to move into the real leadership vacuum. Dulaymi said
that securing the border around al Qaim would go a long way
toward pacifying ar-Ramadi - and vice versa. Therefore, the
al Qaim operations should not be delayed.


9. (S) Dulaymi also indicated that the following leaders of
four of the 37 groups are worth talking to to bring them to
collaborate with the Iraqi authorities: Abd al Latif al
Humaym, Mohammad Mahmud Latif al-Fahdawi, Mudhir Abd al Karim
al-Kharbit, and Khalaf 'Ulyan. Perhaps by coincidence,
'Ulayan was leaving Dulaymi's office when we arrived. Dulaymi
politely introduced us, and after 'Ulayan's departure,
Dulaymi explained that 'Ulayan had just informed him that he
is ready to help the government - but MinDef did not specify
further. Dulaymi said that 'Ulayan's son (possibly Muhammad
Khalaf 'Ulyan al Dulaymi) headed a criminal group with
alleged involvement in the recent kidnapping of the Egyptian
diplomat, and the attempt on the Bahraini. He did not
elaborate. Dulaymi also stated that al Humaym and al Kharbit
were in Syria, after the Jordanian government asked them to
leave Jordan.


10. (S) Dulaymi cautioned that while the four leaders named
above might be very helpful, we should not give them any
sense that we recognize them as local political leaders.
Casey strongly concurred, and commented that we had had
similar offers from Kharbit, but that both Allawi and we
doubt his influence and ability to deliver on commitments.


11. (S) Returning to the proposed meeting with tribal
representatives in Ramadi, Dulaymi said we should not try to
impose any political leaders on them, but let them identify
their own. He suggested two incentives to help such a
gathering succeed: release some of their sons who are in
prison (with a guarantor),and open the two bridges whose
closing he said has caused significant suffering in the city.
The latter, he opined, would do more good than any economic
project we could come up with. These gestures would go a
long way toward encouraging the tribal representatives to
cooperate. Dulaymi said the MOD would make the preparations
necessary for the conclave in Ramadi, including finding a
safe location. (COMMENT: MNF-I will not commit to a meeting
before conditions in the city and arrangements for the
gathering are secure, and prospects for success reasonably
high. END COMMENT)


12. (S) Casey concluded the discussion by noting that we
will need to protect those who want to promote reconciliation
from the terrorists and extremists who are determined to
prevent it. To Dulaymi's repeated suggestion that local
shaykhs themselves temporarily provide local, tribal security
personnel, Casey warned that any protective force must be
under the umbrella and control of the ITG, not a separate and
independent militia.

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MORE ON VISITS TO IRAN
--------------


13. (S) Regarding Dulaymi's recent visit to Tehran, he
contended, as we have heard before, that his objective was
only to deliver a simple message that the two countries must
cooperate as neighbors, especially at the border. He demurred
when asked whether the Iranians had any particular message
for him. He volunteered that MinDef Shamkhani was "shocked"
(he had previously told Charge that other Iranian leaders
were similarly astounded) at Ahmedinejad's victory, partly
blaming "the West" for having closed the window on the
Khatami government's overtures. Shamkhani reportedly stated
that Iran could not afford to lose reform as a strategy.
Dulaymi also said that in his new capacity as head of a
council on Islamic dialogue, Khatami would be traveling to
Najaf in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and other Islamic
countries. The MinDef said that interfaith dialogue is a
strength that Khatami could bring to Islam. Finally, Dulaymi
asserted that Jaafari intends to spend a week to ten days in
Iran, traveling around the country (for example to Isfahan),
in addition to meetings in Tehran. (COMMENT: Ten days would
be an excessively long time to be away in Iran. Jaafari told
Charge July 15 he would travel only to Teheran and that the
trip would be brief. END COMMENT). Jaafari could ask
Dulaymi to join him, but he does not want to go, and hopes
the work ahead on the Western operations will convince
Jaafari to leave him in Iraq.
Satterfield