Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD2944
2005-07-13 12:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

US-IRAQI DETAINEE OPERATIONS TRANSITION

Tags:  MOPS PHUM PTER PINS XF IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002944 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PTER PINS XF IZ
SUBJECT: US-IRAQI DETAINEE OPERATIONS TRANSITION
DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE, DESPITE ITG'S BEST EFFORTS

REF: BAGHDAD 2858

Classified By: This cable was classified by Ambassador
David Litt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002944

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2015
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PTER PINS XF IZ
SUBJECT: US-IRAQI DETAINEE OPERATIONS TRANSITION
DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE, DESPITE ITG'S BEST EFFORTS

REF: BAGHDAD 2858

Classified By: This cable was classified by Ambassador
David Litt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Embassy and MNF-I representatives held a
second meeting with ITG detainee-transition point-of-
contact Sharwan al-Waely on July 11, 2005. As noted
in Reftel, Mr. al-Waely was reluctant at our July 5
meeting to concede that security internment played a
valuable role in the fight against the insurgency
inside Iraq; as a result, we presented a detailed
briefing on the demographics and threat profile of
Coalition detainees at this second meeting.


2. (C) Mr. al-Waely was quiet throughout the brief,
and showed little interest or confidence in MNF-I's
assessment of the current detainee population. He did,
however, note that it was the position of the ITG that
MNF-I was "releasing detainees too slowly". Mr. al-
Waely did not veto our proposal that we return at the
next meeting to the discussion of Iraqi legal
authorities for detention, but showed no enthusiasm at
the prospect.

--------------
AVOIDING THE SUBJECT
--------------


3. (C) Iraqi participation in this second meeting of
the joint US-Iraqi working group tasked with
determining possible legal authorities for Iraqi
security detention upon the expiration of UNSCR 1546
was limited, largely because Mr. al-Waely, who had
agreed previously to identify and invite appropriate
Iraqi interlocutors, telephoned MNF-I shortly before
the meeting to ask that MNF-I do so instead.


4. (C) Mr. al-Waely arrived an hour-and-a-half late,
explaining that he believed the meeting had been
scheduled for four o'clock that afternoon. (The same
misunderstanding caused the cancellation of our July 4
meeting, despite the fact that both meetings were
arranged and confirmed for nine o'clock in the morning
by a native Iraqi linguist.)


5. (C) Mr. al-Waely suggested that this second
meeting be cancelled as well, noting that it was 10:30
and that he had other appointments; however, he agreed

to stay for a short briefing by MNF-I Detainee
Operations, in which MNF-I presented release
statistics, legal procedures, and threat profiles of
the Coalition's 10,000-strong, increasingly dangerous
detainee population.

--------------
COMPLAINTS ABOUT SPEED OF DETAINEE RELEASES
--------------


6. (C) At the conclusion of the brief, Mr. al-Waely
sighed and said it was the position of the Iraqi
government that detainee releases were "too slow". He
did not respond to PolMilOff and MNF-I's review of the
expedited release processes for low-threat detainees,
nor to the presentation of statistics showing that
over 2,500 detainees had been released from local and
theater-level facilities in June.


7. (C) Mr. al-Waely commented he had received "many
reports" that "the Americans" were seeding Wahhabi
extremists amongst Shi'a detainees in Coalition
facilities. PolMilOff explained MNF-I's practice of
identifying and isolating extremist detainees, to
which Mr. al-Waely responded "still, there are
reports". PolMilOff asked if Mr. al-Waely could pass
us specifics which could be investigated. He shrugged.


8. (C) Mr. al-Waely appeared to concede in the brief
ensuing conversation that some detainees were
unsuitable for immediate release, saying he did not
object to the detention of individuals "when there is
real evidence against them". However, his demeanor
indicated that he gave little credence to MNF-I's
assessment that 86% of those detained since January
2005 pose an extreme or high threat to Iraqi security
if released today.


9. (C) Throughout the conversation, Mr. al-Waely
demonstrated a striking isolation from other Iraqi
governmental bodies. He was unaware that MNF-I
presented the Ministry of Justice with monthly
detainee rosters, that the Ministry of the Interior
was informed of detainee releases, and that Ministry
of Human Rights employees were present as advisors
inside Coalition detention facilities.


10. (C) Mr. al-Waely was also dismissive of the
security assessments and release-and-retain judgments
of the Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB),
saying "we need a better system". He did, however,
repeat his inquiries as to the names and identities of
the CRRB's Iraqi members, for which PolMilOff referred
him to the ministries which staff the Board.

--------------
THE WAY AHEAD
--------------


11. (C) While Mr. al-Waely is clearly reluctant to
engage seriously on this topic, he remains the Prime
Minister's designate. Moreover, his unwillingness to
accept the security implications of the unilateral
release of detainees assessed as dangerous by
the Iraqi-majority CRRB is not uncommon amongst
senior ITG leadership.


12. (C) We plan to schedule another meeting for July
18, and will again encourage Mr. al-Waely to invite
appropriate Iraqi interlocutors. We intend to return
in the next meeting to the subject of current or
potential Iraqi legal authorities to hold security
internees upon the expiration of Coalition detention
authorities, and will report the results.
Satterfield