POLISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ INDICATED DIMINISHED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002938

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS PL IZ
SUBJECT: POLISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ INDICATED DIMINISHED
ROLE FOR POLISH FORCES

REF: WARSAW 2786

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(a)
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Polish Ambassador to Baghdad Ryszard
Krystosik told Charge d'Affaires July 10 that Poland will be
phasing down its participation in MNF-I after December. The
decision is not so much because of the expiration of UNSC
resolutions as it is because the duration and scope of the
deployment is beginning to strain the Polish military,
particularly at a time of great change to the military. In
addition, he confirmed that Poland's prime minister plans to
visit Iraq later this month, and requested support for the
visit. END SUMMARY.

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POLES PLAN TO REDUCE PRESENCE IN IRAQ
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2. (C) Poland's Ambassador to Iraq Ryszard Krystosik,
recently returned to Baghdad from a Polish chiefs of Mission
conference in Warsaw, called on Charge d'Affaires on July 10
to discuss Poland's continued engagement in Iraq. He began
by saying that Poland intends to change the nature of its
military posture in Iraq. He recounted how Poland has been
with the U.S. in Iraq since the beginning and is proud that
the situation has been improving gradually in the sector it
commands, Multi-National Division - Central-South (MND-CS).
However, the Polish government believes it is time to begin
to slowly reduce its presence in Iraq.


3. (C) Ambassador Krystosik hastened to point out that this
change does not mean that the Poles will withdraw completely.
Rather, they prefer to see the focus of their mission
change. At first, it was to stabilize the situation. Now it
is shifting more toward an emphasis on training the new Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) to do the job themselves. The Poles
would rather concentrate on this training mission, which they
believe will mean the commitment of fewer troops. The
Ambassador assured Charge that although the Poles may
ultimately be here in smaller numbers than before, their
commitment will remain strong and the mission will continue.
He estimated that there are 1,700 Polish troops in Iraq and
speculated that the number will decrease to 1,500 by
September. A further downsizing is likely to follow.


4. (C) Charge asked Ambassador Krystosik if the impending
expiration in December of UNSCR 1546 is the reason for this
change in approach, and whether the Polish view would be
different were the resolution to be extended. The Ambassador
replied that the plan to reduce Poland's presence would be
the same. He explained that Warsaw's decision is not based
solely on the status of the mandate, but mainly on the fact
that it is becoming more and more difficult for Poland to
maintain command of MND-CS. Some of its troops have served
multiple tours of duty and the continued deployment is making
it increasingly difficult to maintain the army's equipment.
This is happening at a time when the Polish military is
undergoing far-reaching and necessary reforms and changes due
to its NATO commitments. Once a military force dependent
heavily on conscription, it is now becoming an all-volunteer
armed force. In addition, the Polish military has
commitments elsewhere, such as Afghanistan. Its men and
equipment simply cannot stand the strain of continued
deployment in Iraq.


5. (4) Ambassador Krystosik added his own personal view that
Poland's continued role in Iraq is likely to be influenced by
domestic politics. He believes that the government in Warsaw
may possibly change later in the year, and observed that the
opposition parties are dissatisfied with the country's
engagement in Iraq. In short, social ideals in Poland do not
support the war. Nevertheless, said Krystosik, Poland is
sending some very good units and an excellent commander this
month to relieve the forces that are in Iraq. And, of
course, he could not predict with certainty the outcome of
elections. Krystosik made it clear that Poland's commitment
remains strong, even if its future role will focus on
training than is now the case.

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VISIT OF POLISH PRIME MINISTER
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Krystosik confirmed that Polish Prime
Minister Belka will lead a high-level delegation to Iraq on
July 26 (reftel). The purpose of the visit is to further
develop political and economic relations with Iraq and also
to bolster the Iraqi leadership. Other members of the
delegation tentatively include the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Defense, National Economy, Finance, and Culture. In
addition, the government spokesperson, journalists, and a
number of businessmen primarily from the power and oil
sectors will also accompany the delegation. The itinerary
for the visit matches the one outlined reftel.


7. (C) The Prime Minister plans to meet with Iraqi PM
Ja'afari and then engage in a plenary session focusing on
broader issues to cement the Polish-Iraqi relationship. The
ministers will meet with their counterparts. The Prime
Minister also hopes to meet with the speaker of the
Transitional National Assembly, President Talabani, and to
hold a joint news conference. In the afternoon, the
delegation plans to fly to Diwaniyah to witness the MND-CS
change of command ceremony. On July 27, they will return to
Baghdad, then fly on to Irbil where the PM Belka will meet
with President Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
They will then depart Iraq.


8. (C) Charge advised Krystosik that PM Belka should press
the Iraqi government officials he meets to increase their
public outreach activities. With Barzani, PM Belka should
counsel him against taking any provocative steps in Kirkuk.
Krystosik confirmed that the accent of the visit will be on
affirming Polish support for a unified Iraq and its
territorial integrity. He renewed the request made reftel
for logistical support for the visit, and Charge assured him
that the U.S. Mission in Iraq will do everything possible to
help.


9. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Satterfield