IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER'S IRAN VISIT: AN OLIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002933

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2025
TAGS: MARR PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER'S IRAN VISIT: AN OLIVE
BRANCH

REF: BAGHDAD 2874

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Iraqi Defense Minister Al-Dulaimi
confirmed to Charge on July 10 that he had signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran during his
official visit to Tehran on July 5. Al-Dulaimi told Charge
that his discussions with Iran centered on the need for Iran
to monitor its borders with Iraq. It was an initial effort to
establish better relations with an important neighbor. The
planning for the trip appears to have been haphazard. End
Summary.


2. (C/NF) Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi confirmed
to Charge at a dinner hosted by General Casey on July 10 that
he had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran
during his official visit to Tehran on July 5, and provided a
copy of the signed document. The MOU comprises five main
points:

-- formation of a joint committee to ensure border security
and prevent terrorist infiltration;

-- exchange of information on location of minefields on both
sides of the Iran-Iraq border;

-- cooperation in searching for remains of war victims;

-- an Iranian offer to set aside a portion of Iranian
reconstruction donations to the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense(MOD);

-- and a proposed conference with Iraq's neighbors on
regional coordination and cooperation on security and
trust-building.


3. (S/NF) Planning for al-Dulaimi's trip appears to have been
haphazard and it appears may not have been fully coordinated
with PM Jafari, who told Charge he had originally planned to
take al-Dulaimi with him to Iran July 16, but al-Dulaimi "had
decided to go on his own separately." Al-Dulaimi changed his
mind several times on whether he would take a large group
with him to Iran, and eventually decided to bring the Chief
of the Armed Forces, the Chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and
Navy, a member of the Joint Staff, a bodyguard, a member of
the media, and his private secretary. Even the travel
arrangements were uncertain. The Iranians sent a plane to fly
the Minister and his party to Tehran, but when it came time
for al-Dulaimi to return home he was informed that the plane
was no longer available. He requested that an Iraqi Air
Force C-130 be sent to retrieve him, but this was not
possible due to the fact that the Iraqi aircraft are still
crewed by U.S. military instructor pilots. As a result, his
return home was via Amman and took two days.


4. (C/NF) Al-Dulaimi told Charge that his discussions with
the Iranians focused mainly on the need for "practical,
non-political" arrangements to control the border and take
home small Iraq-Iran War-related CBMs. This is in line with
what he told Charge and General Casey on July 2 when he
informed them of his intention to visit Tehran (REFTEL).
Al-Dulaimi underscored that the MOU's scope was very limited,
and asserted that some small steps were necessary to break
the ice with Tehran before tackling more difficult issues,
including concerns over Iranian interference in Iraqi
affairs. Al-Dulaimi assured Charge, however, that the Iraqis
had no intention of allowing Tehran to "train Iraqi forces,"
as the Iranian MinDef had claimed to the press.


5. (C/NF)Al-Dulaimi recounted to Charge his meetings in
Teheran with President Khatami and FM Kharazi, claiming they
and others in the current government were "stunned" at the
outcome of the presidential elections. The new President,
whom al-Dulaimi did not meet, was said by Khatami to "be very
tough". Charge cautioned this only underscored our repeated
counsel for the ITG to be very careful in how it approached
expanded relations with Iran.


6. (C//NF) A copy of the MOU has been electronically sent
to NEA/I.


7. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Satterfield