CHALABI DISCUSSED SUNNI INCLUSION, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002878

SIPDIS

KHARTOUM, PLEASE PASS TO D DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015
TAGS: PREL ECON PINS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: CHALABI DISCUSSED SUNNI INCLUSION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND ISF WITH CODEL LEVIN

REF: BAGHDAD 2713

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. According to Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed
Chalabi, who met with Codel Levin and Charge July 7, attacks
on Baghdad's infrastructure have increased. Chalabi
attributes these attacks to better protection of the
Kirkuk-Fadha oil pipeline, making it less vulnerable to
attack. Chalabi also blames the insurgents, primarily former
Ba'athists, for these attacks, noting that they have access
to the security plans developed during the Saddam regime and
are using this intelligence to implement the plan in reverse.
Chalabi claims that the insurgents have "better intelligence
than we do," pointing out that the intelligence service has
no budget and that this issue has not been raised in the
Government. To Chalabi, the fact that the USG entirely funds
Iraqi intelligence is problematic. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) During a July 7 meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed
Chalabi told Codel Levin, who was accompanied by Charge, that
attacks on Baghdad's infrastructure had increased. Chalabi
speculated the reason is because the oil pipeline from Kirkuk
to Fadha is now more protected and less vulnerable to attack.
Chalabi said that insurgents -- primarily former Ba'athists
-- are responsible for these attacks, noting that they have
access to the security plans developed during the Saddam
regime and are using this intelligence to implement the plan
in reverse. Chalabi complained that the insurgents have
"better intelligence than we do," pointing out that the
intelligence service has no budget and that this issue has
not been raised in the Government. Instead, he asserted, the
USG entirely funds Iraqi intelligence, which is causing some
problems. (NOTE: Chalabi did not clarify what he meant by
problems. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Chalabi told Levin that the Iraqi military is a "mixed
bag," observing that the rate of improvement could be better.
He said the Iraqis are unprepared to take on their own
security and that it needs 45 individual battalions before
Coalition Forces (CF) could be significantly drawn down.
Until then, reasoned Chalabi, CF must partner with Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and endeavor to pull out of urban
areas. Chalabi said a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is
necessary, insisting that the TNA would agree to this. Such
an agreement would make it clear that the U.S. is not an
occupier, but an "invitee."


4. (C) Chalabi emphasized that equipping the Iraqi military
remains a "sore point" as does the issue of utilizing
generals from the former army. Chalabi insisted that the
Iraqi Government should work more with these generals in an
advisory -- not command -- capacity, saying that this would
be politically feasible. He also suggested that providing
these former officers, as well as other low-level Ba'athists,
with a pension would be helpful. Chalabi estimated
approximately 7,000 individuals would be eligible and that
the annual cost of such a step would be USD 11 million.
Regarding the disbanding of the army after liberation,
Chalabi said the barracks had emptied and there was no army
to speak of at that time -- many simply left their weapons
and walked away. Chalabi estimated that 90 percent did not
want to be there and said nothing would have brought them
back.


5. (C) Chalabi pointed out that corruption in the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) under the previous Government had done much to
undermine the morale of the military. According to the
results of an audit by the Supreme Board of Audits during
the period from January 2004 to February 2005, MOD let 89
contracts worth USD 1.27 billion. Of those contracts, 43
worth USD 949 million went to one individual -- who was not
named in any of them. USD 759 million was paid in cash for
goods and services that have still not been received.
Current Minister of Defense Dulaimey estimates corruption
during that period to be in excess of USD 600 million. The
good news, said Chalabi, is that many of these former MOD
officials are currently under judicial review. (Comment:
Chalabi regularly accents the real problems with procurement
at the Defense Ministry. The Supreme Board of Audits recent
review and the removal of an official suspected of improper
actions are steps forward. Two officials are being
investigated carefully and may well be tried for criminal
activities. Chalabi himself chairs a new committee that
reviews contracts above USD 2 million. Much more remains to
be done, and Coalition officials are working with the Defense
Minister to improve procurement practices. End Comment.)

6. (C) Chalabi said that Sunni leaders, such as the National
Dialogue's Saleh Mutlak and Abdel Nasser al-Janabi and the
Iraqi Islamic Party's Tariq al-Hashemi and Ayed Samarai'e,
are a subset of the right people with whom to meet on Sunni
issues and suggested that everyone, including the Americans,
should meet with them more. He described the Sunni community
as multi-faceted and without clear leadership, saying that
Saddam made it impossible for them to betray him and still
maintain a power structure. As a result, the power structure
collapsed with Saddam.


7. (C) Chalabi suggested a number of Sunni leaders with whom
USG officials should meet, including Sheikh Razi Halish of
the B'ai tribe, leaders from Makmudiyah, such as Amar Ali
Lehmon of the Sheikhly tribe, and the Ulema Council's Harith
al-Dhari. He described al-Dhari as a significant player -- a
person who could make the system either fail or succeed --
and suggested that it is necessary to establish a
relationship with him to build rapport. For increased Sunni
participation, said Chalabi, several steps are necessary.
First, he said, the Government must disassociate the Sunnis
from the Ba'athists. Doing this would mean making the Sunni
community a larger part of the Government and, in particular,
the Cabinet. Secondly, insisted Chalabi, the Sunnis need to
be more involved politically in the security problems in
their communities.


8. (C) According to Chalabi, part of the problem has been
that, previously, the Sunnis had no say in the process of
vetting security forces. Without that commitment, he said,
the Government failed. What the Sunnis do not need, insisted
Chalabi, is to feel that outsiders are "beating them up." As
part of the solution, Chalabi noted some government leaders
agree on the need for reconciliation committees at the
provincial level under the auspices of the Government with
which to engage the locals and help maintain security in the
'flash points.' He argued that overall casualties --
including those taken by CF -- could be reduced if the 'flash
points' were taken care of.


9. (C) Chalabi noted the real need to create an integrated
military. It was a mistake, he said, to merge the Iraqi
National Guard (ING),given its local orientation, with the
army. Charge pointed out that the logic for doing so was to
prevent the ING from morphing into local militias, as well as
to balance out the less well-prepared army. The problem,
countered Chalabi, is that now there are Sunnis in Shi'a
areas and vice versa.


10. (C) Releasing some detainees, said Chalabi, hiring former
generals in an advocacy capacity, and re-establishing the ING
would serve to reassure the Sunni leadership to some degree.
Additionally, it is important to address the problem of the
the roughly 35 mosques, that Saddam built and gave to the
Sunnis. According to Chalabi, the Shi'a took over these
mosques after liberation. Additionally, he noted that the
property seizure bill had not been approved, recognizing that
the Sunnis would see it as a bad idea.


11. (C) Turning to the issue of detainees, Chalabi said the
approximately 13,000 currently in custody are not moving
through the process quickly enough and they need either to be
charged or released. Charge explained that MNF has the
authority to detain individuals but not to prosecute them.
Hence, it is necessary to identify a mechanism by which to
transfer detainees to Iraqi custody so the judicial process
can begin. Chalabi suggested that up to 80 percent of the
detainees could be released and said a mechanism needs to be
developed to talk to detainees to determine whether they are
releasable. (Comment: Chalabi clearly lacks even minimal
familiarity with detainee issues, especially the Combined
Review and Release board, which has Coalition representation,
but is mostly Iraqi. We will brief him. End Comment).


12. (C) There is little chance, said Chalabi, that consensus
on a constitution covering all the issues will be reached.
He suggested that a partial constitution is likely, but said
issues such as Kirkuk, federalism, and the allocation of
resources will not be resolved. However, he opined, success
is a function of U.S. pressure. Nonetheless, he cautioned
against haste, saying it would not help the process and
emphasizing the need to adhere to the TAL. Chalabi also
advised utilizing the six-month delay provided in the TAL
rather than risk having the constitution rejected. Sunni
participation, he said, is critical to this, but pointed out
that there are no assurances that the Sunnis on the
Constitution Committee can guarantee the Sunni vote. Key
players, he said, such as Nasir Chaderchi and Adnan Pachachi
represent an Iraqi political tradition and their
participation is necessary -- but they were not selected to
be part of the Committee. (Comment: Given their miserable
vote counts in January 2005, it is not clear that Chaderchi
or Pachachi can guarantee much of a Sunni vote either. End
Comment.)


13. (C) The discussion turned to the insurgency and Chalabi
insisted that it is primarily comprised of Ba'athists who
want to reclaim power. "Our failure," he said," has been to
not separate the Ba'athists from the Sunnis." Chalabi
alleged that the insurgency's funding is coming from Jordan
and Syria, and that it still has access to the USD 920
million and EU 90 million that Hussein withdrew from the
Central Bank just prior to the fall of his regime. Chalabi
also told Levin that King Abudullah of Jordan should freeze
the accounts of those helping the insurgency, adding that he
(the King) knows who they are. (Comment: We cannot confirm
the accuracy of this particular batch of Chalabi accusations.
End Comment.)


14. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
Minimize considered.

Satterfield