Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD2877
2005-07-09 07:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CHARGE MEETS WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINS PHUM IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002877 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
MWAFAQ AL-RUBAI

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(a),
(b),and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002877

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETS WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
MWAFAQ AL-RUBAI

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(a),
(b),and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Charge, Iraqi National
Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai expressed optimism that a
constitution will be drafted and ratified on time, expressed
his opinion that the insurgency will be long and difficult
and must be countered with means other than security assets,
discussed the difficulties with launching an amnesty program,
and urged continued USG pressure to maintain high standards
on human rights. Rubai also addressed the hot button issue
of de-Ba'athification. He believes that for Iraq to defeat
the insurgency and to construct a viable democracy with
strong, survivable institutions Iraq's leaders must put old
divisions aside and promote an "Iraq First" policy, a step
that will take much courage. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge, accompanied by Political Counselor and
Acting PolMil Counselor called on Iraqi National Security
Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubai at his office on July 7, 2005.
Charge expressed the gratitude of the Mission and MNF-I for
the role Rubai has agreed to take in the government. He
emphasized how critical it is for the Mission to have a
partner in the government to deal with on political and
security issues and expressed confidence that Rubai is the
right person for the job. Charge assured Rubai that he has
our full support and told him he should not hesitate to ask
us for any support he needs to do his job.

--------------
BULLISH ON THE CONSTITUTION
--------------


3. (C) Rubai thanked the Charge and the President for
making the commitment, paid for dearly in blood and treasure,
to liberate Iraq and to launch a new trend of democracy in
the Middle East. He acknowledged that the Iraqi Transitional
Government (ITG) has many, many serious problems to face, but
expressed confidence that they are on the right track. He
observed that the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) had started
with "less than zero", and accomplished a major victory with
the elections of January 30. On that day the people of Iraq

said "yes" to the first truly elected government in the
history of the country. Rubai is optimistic about the
prospects for the constitution, noting that the Sunnis have
now been included in the process and that signs from the
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) are also encouraging.
He predicts the constitution will be ratified by October and
is confident it will be written in a way that will make it
impossible for anyone to veto. When asked whether he
believes the Sunni delegates will participate throughout the
drafting process, he replied yes. The Sunnis, he explained,
are chastising themselves for not participating in the
democratic process during the elections and realize that they
have paid a price. As a result, he strongly believes they
will not desert the process again.

--------------
THOUGHTS ON THE INSURGENCY
--------------


4. (C) Rubai stated that in his view the insurgency, which
he termed "very sophisticated," will now begin to follow
Irish Republican Army tactics. That is, there will be a
somewhat acceptable political arm and, at the same time, an
active and violent military wing. In addition, he said that
until recently he would have described the insurgency as an
"armed Sunni insurgency." Now he would describe it as "an
armed insurgency within the Sunni community." He stated the
obvious when he told Charge that for the Sunnis, the
insurgency is all about regaining the power they have lost,
more so than simply destroying "traitors." He mentioned
that just the prior day, an arson fire had been started on
the fifth floor of his government building in the office of
the Director General in charge of de-Ba'athification. For
generations the accepted paradigm in Iraq has been one in
which it was the will of God that the Sunnis should rule. It
was a well-established system where one group dominated the
other. That has been turned on its head. When the Sunnis
lost their power, they lost with it all the privileges that
flowed from it. This turn of events is so unthinkable to
them that the idea of ruling through partnerships or
consensus is totally foreign.


5. (C) To overcome this obstacle to democracy, it is
necessary to change the Sunni mindset by assuring them that
their rights will be protected by the constitution. "If we
can in the constitution secure the rights of minorities and
give them a veto power over their fates they will participate
in the process." When asked how he thought this could be
accomplished he replied that this might be possible by having
a second or upper chamber in the legislature that would give
minorities enough representation to veto laws that threaten
their interests. In addition, there has to be an answer to
the question of what is Iraq. He mused that the country has
lost its identity, which must be redefined. Before Saddam's
fall, Iraq was an Arab state. Today, there is a place in it
for Kurds and others who are not Arabs. This is an almost
impossible concept for some to grasp.


6. (C) With regard to the future of the insurgency, Rubai
believes Iraq must prepare for a long, drawn out fight. He
also acknowledged that it must be fought by education as well
as by security means, and derided those in the government
afflicted with what he termed "short-termism syndrome." He
said many of his colleagues are kidding themselves because
they believe they can solve the problems laid before them in
six weeks. He also believes that to defeat the insurgency,
resources must be expended in areas other than in the
security field. Approaching the problem on the single track
of "security" is like having tunnel vision. Rubai also
observed that building institutions is just as critical as
building a government. The institutional framework has
suffered because everyone is preoccupied by simply getting
elected and holding power. The institutions that are being
built today by the ITG must be strong enough to remain in
place though changes of government so that they will remain
constant, no matter whom the Prime Minister may be. He
lamented that much time has been lost as, to date, almost
everyone has tended to focus solely on the security issues.
To defeat the insurgency, then, Iraq must have both political
and economic development, coupled with politicians brave
enough to make tough choices, a commodity in short supply.

--------------
THE ISSUE OF AMNESTY
--------------


7. (C) With regard to amnesty, Rubai acknowledged the ITG
is working on a comprehensive plan to address this issue. In
the short term the purpose of amnesty would be for political
gain, in the long term for peace. He is considering an idea
whereby detainees would be released immediately in return for
a written promise. This process would be watched and
evaluated to see what impact it has on altering the behavior
of others. Rubai explained that one big problem for Iraqis
with the idea of amnesty is defining who is being talked
about. For example, in the insurgency the fighters are
either Iraqis, Arabs from other countries, or other
foreigners. However, in Iraqi culture it is ingrained in the
mind that there is no distinction between an Iraqi and an
Arab from elsewhere. Therefore, to Iraqis, when one says
"foreign fighters" Arabs from other nations are not included.
The terms therefore need to be carefully defined, a step,
Rubai opined, that will take great courage.

--------------
THE NEED TO SHOWCASE SUCCESS
--------------


8. (C) Charge advised Rubai that the people of Iraq need to
be shown that progress is being made, specifically that the
Iraqi security forces are being trained and are gradually
taking over from Coalition Forces. Rubai acknowledged that
lack of confidence in Iraqi forces is a real problem that
causes insecurity among the public. He confided that
everyone involved with the imminent return of the Convention
Center and other portions of the International Zone to the
Iraqis and the Red Zone is nervous about this prospect,
including the Prime Minister. The fact remains, however,
that there are cities under Iraqi control where relative
peace prevails. And the plan is to stand up more and more
Iraqi units in the next year so that Coalition Forces can be
pulled out of cities. Charge emphasized this must be done in
a manner that makes it loud and clear to the population that
the Iraqi government is successfully taking responsibility
for its own people.

--------------
HUMAN RIGHTS, DE-BA'ATHIFICATION
--------------


9. (C) Charge pointed out that as Iraqi security forces
begin to assume more responsibilities on their own, the Sunni
population must be assured that they are being protected from
the government and the Shias. Many Sunnis are convinced that
purges of their people are taking place in government
ministries and steps must be taken to alleviate these fears.
In addition, Sunnis feel that the MNF-I and ISF are directing
their campaigns at the Sunni community as a whole. Rubai
agreed and urged the USG to continue to emphasize respect for
human rights as the Sunnis must gain confidence that the old
way of doing things are gone. The Charge responded that he
agrees, but pointed out there is no single contact in the ITG
for us to address our human rights concerns.


10. (C) With regard to de-Ba'athification, the Charge
emphasized to Rubai that this program is causing such
distrust and anxiety in the Sunni community that it must be
moderated. Rubai responded that the TNA is leading this
effort and that feelings are quite strong. However, he had
three major modifications to suggest. The first is to
suggest that de-Ba'athification be pursued by province, and
that the three Sunni provinces be exempted. His second
proposal would be to declare the Ba'ath Party a terrorist
organization as of a certain date. Those who remain active
members beyond that date will be held accountable for
provable individual acts, not mere membership in the
organization. Those who were simply members before the date
would not have a problem. He believes this idea can be sold
in the south, but acknowledges that the Kurds would have a
difficult time accepting this plan. His third suggestion is
to look at the Ba'ath Party in a different way. Many of the
basic tenants of the party focus on Arab nationalism, which
in and of itself may be a legitimate political inclination.
Stripping away or declaring illegal ideologies that people
have spent most of their lives believing in will only serve
to alienate them further. So what needs to be done is to
draw the distinction between acceptable ideologies that were
part of the Ba'ath platform and the perverted, extremist
version that Saddam perpetuated. In other words, people
should be punished for specific bad acts, not mere
membership. Whether his suggestions are adopted or not,
Rubai believes that the message must be unmistakably made
that the Ba'ath Party of Saddam Hussein is a thing of the
past.

--------------
LEADERSHIP COUNTS
--------------


11. (C) Rubai concluded the meeting by emphasizing that in
his view the leadership of the country must be able to
clearly enunciate an "Iraq First" message that will reassure
all factions that the days where one group dominates another
are over. He acknowledges how difficult this will be and
that brave steps will be necessary to transition Iraq into a
democratic and peaceful society.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Rubai is an engaging interlocutor who shows the
intellectual abilities to think outside the normal Iraqi box.
The question is, can his views be appreciated by his
contemporaries in the government and by the public at large?
His appeal for brave leadership to advance an "Iraq First"
policy may ring hollow among his countrymen who do not have
the ability to put historic ethnic and religious strife
behind them. Another possible concern is Rubai's tendency to
alienate colleagues and superiors who find his style
challenging or overly ambitious. He fell from grace with IIG
Prime Minister Allawi, who found him overreaching. He plans
to attend the Joint Commission on Reconstruction and Economic
Development meetings in Amman in the coming days and deliver
a speech on economic matters, a subject not necessarily
directly related to his portfolio as National Security
Advisor, a fact that might raise the eyebrows of his critics.
Nevertheless, Rubai is forward thinking and well placed to
move the ITG forward on the security front. He has developed
very good working relationships with Embassy staff and with
GEN Casey and the MNF-I leadership. We are hopeful that he
will energize the Ministerial Committee on National Security
(MCNS) process for which he is responsible and that Prime
Minister Ja'afari is capable of delegating the necessary
powers to give him a running chance at success. End Comment.


13. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO KIRKUK, REO MOSUL
minimize considered.

Satterfield