FALLUJAH: GRASS ROOTS POLITICS -- LEADERS INITIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2025
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: FALLUJAH: GRASS ROOTS POLITICS -- LEADERS INITIATE
POLITICAL AND SECURITY MEETINGS

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a step promoting more political
engagement by large segments of Anbar, 200 religious,
tribal, political and academic leaders from around
Fallujah on June 4 hammered out a fifteen-point
document outlining a more participatory Sunni posture
in the political process. Beyond the standard demand
for a Coalition Forces withdrawal, the declaration
condemns attacks against Iraqi civilians (not
Coalition Forces) and urges participation in drafting
of the constitution. A follow-on meeting is
tentatively set for July in Fallujah with over 300
area participants expected. Internal dialogue about
national political issues will remain the primary
focus of future gatherings, according to organizers.
They also flagged that similar meetings might be held
in Ramadi and Al-Qa'im in coming weeks. A similar
gathering of tribal leaders in Ramadi was scheduled
for June 15 but was postponed due to insurgent
intimidation in the city in advance of the session.
These meetings and efforts to organize them do not
mean that Anbaris won't boycott future elections, but
they do suggest that Anbaris are more willing to
engage in politics after the bitter January 2005
election experience. END SUMMARY.

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SUNNI GRASS ROOTS POLITICS?
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2. (C) According to one of the principal organizers,
Engineer Fawzi Mohammed (local business leader and
manager of a large Fallujah cement factory -- site of
the meeting),the gathering of 200 area leaders mainly
focused on the upcoming referendum and follow-on
election. While a stated goal remained the withdrawal
of Coalition Forces (and other now standard objections
or complaints),increased Sunni political
participation represented the primary impetus for the
self-initiated meeting. Participants for the meeting
included the full spectrum of local leaders from the
tribes, clerics, business community and ex-military.
(COMMENT: This gathering marks the first time that
such a large group of Fallujans have met independently
-- and at the grass roots level -- to discuss national
political issues. Until now, most area caucuses have
been almost exclusively geared toward Fallujah
reconstruction specifics (water, power, sewer lines)
or local political issues (compensation payments,
etc). END COMMENT.)

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FALLUJAH SHOULD NOT BE HAND THAT DESTROYS IRAQ
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3. (C) Fawzi acknowledged to Fallujah PolOff
privately that "you know what happened in the last
election" - adding that Sunnis did not want to repeat
the mistake of failing to vote. He continued that
Iraq should not be "stung by bombings; we want Iraq to
be stable." Fawzi conveyed that when he went on trips
to Baghdad, his family phoned him a dozen times each
visit, to check on his safety. He did not want this
situation to continue. (COMMENT: In December 2004
and January 2005, Fawzi used to reiterate to PolOff
familiar Sunni arguments critical of the national
political process and the need for election delay. He
did the same in a January 2005 session, pre-election,
with Senator John Kerry at Camp Fallujah. END
COMMENT.)


4. (C) Fallujah, according to Fawzi, had suffered too
much - and, as a city leader, he did not want Fallujah
to "destroy the union of Iraq." He said that the city
cannot be the "the hand that does that." Most wanted
the situation to return back to normal. The meeting
was intended to help pull some insurgents into this
larger group. As for the next election, Fawzi
declared it was more a matter of Sunnis having to
vote, rather than wanting to vote.


5. (C) In a separate discussion, Fallujah
reconstruction committee coordinator Basil Mahmoud
(who supplied Fallujah Poloff with a copy of the
consensus document) confirmed Fawzi's characterization
of the meeting. Basil noted that he had stayed in the
back of the room throughout the two-hour session; the
heated discussion had been wide ranging and included
elements who opposed all aspects of the Coalition
presence in Iraq. (NOTE: Basil did not categorize
these participants as "insurgents" but implied as
much. END NOTE). He added that Fawzi had brought
together "not all the good people, but all the right
people." More meetings needed to be held; a follow-on
gathering in Fallujah proper was set for July. Basil
said coalition forces would likely be asked to help
provide security, given that 300 plus participants
might attend.

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CONSENSUS DOCUMENT: SOME NEW POINTS AMID USUAL
COMPLAINTS
-------------- -


6. (C) The cement factory meeting resulted in a
consensus document (full text, paragraph 14),listing
15 key points. Noteworthy in the list are the
following:

--Condemnation of "all criminal activities against
citizens and innocent Iraqi people. Any such action
will be considered an act of terrorism." (number 3)

--Reforming a national committee to write the
constitution that should include all the people's
rights now and in the future. (number 8)

--Reforming the Iraqi Army with new technological and
modern methods to be a strong army using the
experience of ex-Iraqi officers. (number 9) (NOTE:
Fallujah is home to a number of former military
officers, many of whom served in key Iraqi army
positions. They have established their own
association in the city. END NOTE).

--Asking all neighboring countries not to interfere
with Iraqi internal issues. (number 12)

--Allowing the people to participate in political
actions and the writing of the constitution. (number
13)

--Ensuring that Iraq will be one nation that will
stand against anybody trying to separate it. This
will be considered the red line that nobody should
pass under any circumstance. (number 14)



7. (C) Other points reflect usual demands or
complaints, such as: specific timetable for Coalition
Force withdrawal from Iraq; release of detainees;
canceling the de-Ba'athification law; and formation of
Fallujah security forces from city recruits. One
additional request stands out: post-invasion
compensation for damages "from all the countries that
participated in the war in Iraq on unproven
allegations, such as weapons of mass destruction."
The group proposed that a United Nations body be
established as was done in Kuwait after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait to oversee compensation payments.
(COMMENT: The text drafters are unlikely to consider
billions in appropriated U.S. reconstruction funds
equivalent to war reparations. END COMMENT).

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A GATHERING OF TRIBES
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8. (C) Several area tribal leaders (Sheikh Abdulwahed
Hamed Khalel al Janabi, Hameed Farhan Abdullah Mohamdi
al Hamda, Ahmad Sarhan Abed Mashan, Kamel Mohammed
Saif) told poloff June 11 that the meeting's
objectives were political in nature. When asked if
local residents were intending to take part in the
referendum and vote, even at this early stage, a half
dozen nodded and raised hands expressing they would.
(NOTE: This weekly meeting with so-called "street
sheikhs" at the Fallujah Civil Military Operations
Center incluesabout a dozen local tribal leaders,
who in effect are the closest to the Fallujah-area
people; the most senior tribal leaders sit on the new
city council. END NOTE).


9. (C) At a June 14, 2005, Fallujah city council
session, Sheikh Khamis Hisnawe Aifan al-Esawe (al-
Buessa tribe) -- considered by many residents to be
Fallujah's most influential and senior tribal leader -
- made a notable, and uncharacteristic, public
statement. He informed everyone gathered that he
would convene all area tribes in nearby Amiriyah, a
community where "five or six dead bodies" were being
found daily. The purpose of the gathering would be to
address security issues. Khamis said the harassment
needed to stop, as "these are our brothers." Coalition
Forces and police should not be present, in order to
avoid problems. Khamis added that the meeting would
be held at the Amiriyah mosque, lists with names would
be brought by tribes to "identify crooks and robbers."
(NOTE: Initial reports indicate that the meeting was
well attended. END NOTE)

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RAMADI, TOO?
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10. (C) Fawzi told PolOff June 7 that some Sunni
leaders in Ramadi were considering forming their own
political group, like the one in neighboring
Fallujah. He did not offer details but noted that
political interest among Sunnis had noticeably
increased. Al Qa'im residents might do the same.
According to a separate Marine intelligence report, an
Iraqi source claims Ramadi leaders intend to hold this
kind of meeting June 16. Marines in Ramadi confirmed
at a June 15 meeting at the provincial government
center that the political gathering would be held.
Anbar Governor Ma'moun told Marines that he was
notified by organizers about the event, but believed
he was not extended an invitation. He added "an
uninvited guest at a banquet sits in no chair." The
Governor stressed that that the official voice of Al
Anbar would remain through the Provincial Council and
his office. (NOTE: The June 16 gathering in Ramadi
was postponed; insurgents effectively intimidated
potential participants from attending the meeting.
END NOTE)

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COMMENT
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11. (C) While these political and security
initiatives by Fallujah and other area leaders remain
in the initial stages, they mark a surprising shift.
Organizing to such a degree at the local level will
need to be sustained in coming weeks. A return to
status quo Sunni indifference is possible, but
unlikely if locals follow-up on these early
initiatives. They could spread to other parts of
Anbar.


12. (C) Engineer Fawzi Mohammed and Sheikh Khamis are
representative of two key Sunni constituencies central
to reversing insurgent intimidation and fostering
political participation: the former is a major Anbar
business leader and ex-Ba'athist; the latter a senior
tribal sheikh. Both have considerable "wasta"
(influence) in the community. If they are getting off
the proverbial fence, others should follow.


13. (C) These meetings will not ensure high Sunni
turnout for the referendum or on election day; taken
together, however, they could be the basis for
sustained political dialogue and voter education that
equals sizeable turnout. In December 2004 and January
2005, Fallujah-area Sunnis fell largely silent on
overarching political matters; today, there is at
least the beginning of self-initiated and frank
discourse, including about the costs of non-
participation. The 15-point consensus document
produced at the Fallujah meeting reveals -- for now --
this more balanced, and pragmatic, Sunni mindset at
the grass-roots level.


14. (U) The consensus document agreed at June 4,
2005, meeting of Fallujah-area leaders is translated
as follows.

BEGIN TEXT:

FINAL REPORT
The national political gathering in Fallujah held its
initial meeting on June 4, 2005. The meeting included
different groups from religious leaders, tribe
leaders, political and education leaders.

The committee had a heated discussion about the future
of Iraq regarding internal and international
relationships. This will help avoid all kinds of
discrimination and tribal differences. Fallujah will
have one democratic group. This has been done through
a democratic discussion between different people from
Iraq. We will form a national team that will be
working day and night to rebuild a democratic Iraq.
This team will also help the citizens of Iraq to
participate in all political actions and decisions
including the right to vote. We will not have a
separated Iraq anymore. The committee also discussed
all the issues that face Iraq at the present time. The
committee agreed on some issues, to include politics
and the constitution.

The points that the committee agreed on are:

-Setting a specific schedule for the occupational
forces to withdraw from Iraq.
-Accepting a peaceful and a national force that
follows all international laws.
-Condemning all criminal activities against citizens
and innocent Iraqi people. Any such action will be
considered an act of terrorism.
-Asking the occupational forces and the interim Iraqi
government to release all political detainees. They
will also stop raiding houses and mosques.
-To disband all illegal political parties in Iraq.
-Asking that the interim government to work on
canceling all the Iraqi debt, as well as compensations
that have been put on Iraq by unjust international
decisions.
-Canceling Albaath law, and consider it as a legal not
political issue.
-Reforming a national committee to write the
constitution that should include all the people's
rights now and in the future.
-Reforming the Iraqi army on new technological and
modern methods to be a strong army using the
experience from ex-loyal Iraqi officers.
-Calling for the withdrawal of the occupational forces
from Fallujah; and forming an Iraqi police and an army
from the people of Fallujah itself to do their duty in
keeping peace.
-Allowing all Middle Eastern and foreign mass media to
get in Fallujah to send to the world a picture of what
really happened.
-Asking all neighboring countries not to interfere
with the Iraqi internal issues.
-Allowing the people to participate in political
actions and the writing of the constitution.
-The committee will ensure that Iraq will be one
nation that will stand against anybody trying to
separate it. This will be considered the red line that
nobody should pass under any circumstances.
-The committee will ask for compensation from all the
countries that participated on the war in Iraq on
unproven allegations; such as weapons of mass
destruction. This compensation will be given to a
committee that the United Nations will establish as
they did in Kuwait. Any Iraqi, company, or government
institution has the right to turn in their claims to
get their compensation.

Finally, the committee's door is open for any efforts
that will help the abovementioned points.

END TEXT.


Satterfield