KEY IRAQI LEADERS PROMISE SUPPORT FOR SUNNI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002548

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: KEY IRAQI LEADERS PROMISE SUPPORT FOR SUNNI
INCLUSION IN CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of the June 14 swearing-in of
Massoud Barzani as Kurdistan Regional President in Irbil, DCM
engaged leaders from all Iraqi political groups to urge them
to support the inclusion of 15 credible Sunnis in the
constitutional committee. All interlocutors were supportive
of our approach, but with varying degrees of optimism
regarding the ability of the fragmented Sunni political elite
to come together on names or numbers. END SUMMARY.

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ENGAGING KEY LEADERS ON SUNNI INCLUSION
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2. (C) On June 14, on the margins of a ceremony to swear-in
KDP leader Massoud Barzani as president of the Kurdistan-Iraq
Regional Government, DCM (accompanied by MNF-I Deputy Chief
of Staff for Political, Military and Economic Operations MG
Hank Stratman) pressed key Iraqi leaders to settle the issue
of the constitutional committee with an inclusive process
that brings in up to 15 Sunnis. DCM spoke separately with
President Jalal Talabani; Vice President Adel Abdul-Mehdi;
Hassan Hamoudi, chairman of the constitutional committee in
the TNA; Hachem al-Hassani, speaker of the TNA;
Kurdistan-Iraq Regional President Massoud Barzani; and
incoming Prime Minister of the Kurdistan-Iraq (unified)
Regional Government Nechirvan Barzani to drive home the
urgency of resolving the Sunni constitutional role. He asked
them to weigh in with both Sunnis and their own
constituencies to ensure positive outcomes. DCM noted that
the most senior levels of the USG are concerned at the
prospect of further delays in the process, as this would
benefit the insurgents and cause Iraqis to lose hope in the
electoral process.


3. (C) In a detailed discussion touching on a range of
constitutional issues, Hassan Hamoudi told Charge that he
could accept limiting the numbers of Sunnis to 15. He said
that Sunni Waqf leader Sheikh Adnan Dulaymi wielded real
influence on this issue, but he was playing a spoiler role
because he believed he was about to be relieved from his
post. DCM said the U.S. was prepared to weigh in with
Ja'aferi to prevent this, and committed to continued U.S.
efforts with Dulaymi directly.


4. (C) Adel Abdul Mahdi and Hachem Hassani were both more
skeptical that they, or we, could win broad Sunni acceptance
of the latest initiative. The Sunnis are pressing for larger
numbers because they are not united. Both leaders advised
DCM to weigh in with Salah Mutlaq, although Abdul-Mehdi said
he believes in the end the U.S. would simply have to choose
15 names from the Sunni list and "have done with it."
Hammoudi told DCM that he had a fallback plan to constitute a
separate advisory committee of 57 Sunnis, whom the
constitutional committee would consult with weekly to solicit
views. Hammoudi said he would not broach this "plan B"
unless all else failed, viewing it as unwieldy and less than
likely to gain Sunni support. DCM agreed on both points,
noting that Iraqis must keep the process within the
(enlarged) committee. Hammoudi also reiterated concern
regarding the UN, saying that "some Sunnis" are listening to
"some voices from the UN" and expect that "Ashraf Qazi would
come at the end as their savior" to arbitrate the issue of
Sunni inclusion. Hammoudi dismissed such talk as "dangerous
nonsense." For his part, Hassani said he would be traveling
in the next week, but would weigh in with key figures upon
his return.

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BARZANI WILL ENGAGE SUNNIS IN BAGHDAD AND IRBIL
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5. (C) Massoud Barzani said he had twice convened Sunnis
before the elections to urge them to participate in
elections, but most had been too afraid to vote. This would
not happen again because they now realized the price of
non-participation. He said there were some former Ba'athists
who were organizing. They were still waiting in the wings,
but the Kurds were exploring engagement. In the meantime, he
committed to weigh in with Adnan Dulaymi, who had asked to
come see him upon Barzani's return from Baghdad (on or about
June 20).


6. (C) Barzani said he thought that Dulaymi, although a
hardliner, would come around to limiting the Sunnis to 15 new
members. Barzani agreed with DCM's characterization of a
splintered leadership among Sunnis that complicated all
dialog with them. Sunnis must realize, he said, they are now
"only one part of" a political process that includes others.
They had not yet adapted to this reality. DCM agreed they
had experienced a psychological earthquake, which had
reverberated throughout the whole region. Barzani claimed
that his "longstanding ties" to the Sunni leadership gives
him a special influence, greater than that of Kurdish rival
President Talabani, whose calls for 25 Sunnis to join the
drafting committee had been "unhelpful".
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TALABANI BACKTRACKS
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7. (C) An upbeat President Talabani told DCM he regretted his
earlier ("misinterpreted") call for 25 new Sunnis, and that
he too would support the addition of only 15 new members, and
committed to work with Iraqi Islamic Party Leader Mohsin
Abdul Hamid (present at the swearing in). KRG Prime Minister
Nechirvan Barzani, in a separate meeting, told DCM that
Talabani had felt obliged to publicly support up to 25 Sunnis
in order to make amends for his earlier statements supporting
the integration of Badr Corps into the Iraqi Army (an idea
strongly opposed by the Sunnis). Nechirvan agreed that
President Barzani had credibility with Dulaymi and had agreed
to leverage him. He said that the Kurds would also weigh in
with key Shia. SCIRI leader Abdul-Aziz Hakim was currently
in Iran, but the Kurds would follow up upon his return. He
said Hammoudi was also a critical player.

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JA'AFERI NOT COMMITTED TO TAL OR THE KURDS?
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8. (C) Barzani said he believes once the constitutional
committee meets, things could move rapidly, perhaps within
weeks. But only if the Shia remained true to their
commitment they would treat the TAL as "the" constitutional
framework. If they deviated from the TAL as the foundation
-- and there were real fears among Kurds that Ja'aferi would
waffle -- it would be an entirely different story.


9. (C) Nechirvan Barzani said the Kurds were very wary of
Ja'aferi. He had not attended the President's swearing in or
the Kurdistan National Assembly opening, nor sent greetings,
he had stalled on convening the Article 58 committee, he had
not mentioned federalism or Kirkuk or the Kurds in his
government program, he has never mentioned Kurdish suffering,
and he has gutted some of the powers of key Kurdish
ministers, such as the Minister of Planning Barham Salih.



10. (C) COMMENT: Barzani is prepared to use his influence
with key Sunni leaders, although the meeting with Dulaymi
will have to await his return from Baghdad. Although
Abdul-Mahdi and Hassani were more downbeat than usual, they
recommended that Embassy continue to work over the Sunni
leadership -- notably Mutlaq and Dulaymi -- to press for 15
names coinciding with our own approach. We will continue to
stress that there will be no understanding in Iraq or
elsewhere, certainly the U.S., if a consensus-based
constitutional drafting process is held up over two or three
names. END COMMENT


11. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Jeffrey