Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD2538
2005-06-16 07:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

KURDS CAN'T CONCEIVE OF LIFE WITHOUT PESH

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS MASS PTER IZ KDP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002538 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MASS PTER IZ KDP
SUBJECT: KURDS CAN'T CONCEIVE OF LIFE WITHOUT PESH

Classified By: Classified by David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Miss

ion, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002538

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MASS PTER IZ KDP
SUBJECT: KURDS CAN'T CONCEIVE OF LIFE WITHOUT PESH

Classified By: Classified by David M. Satterfield, Deputy Chief of Miss

ion, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Key Kurdish leaders told DCM and MNF-I
Political Military and Economic Affairs Chief on June 13-14
they could not condone disarming the Kurdish pesh merga
forces, or its total dissipation into the Iraqi army. They
realized the sensitivity of Iraq having ethnically-based
forces, but said Baghdad must establish a solid record of
good intentions and actions before Kurds would feel safe with
a fully integrated army. Some felt the pesh merga could be
transformed into a National Guard equivalent. The leaders
differed on the wisdom of the pesh merga assuming a role in
border security (Kurdish PM Nechirvan Barzani felt it would
be almost impossible, given reservations of neighbors),and
on concepts for depoliticizing the forces. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) DCM Satterfield and MNF-I Commander for Political,
Military and Economic relations MG Hank Stratman discussed
possible options for the Kurdish paramilitary force (pesh
merga) with senior KDP and PUK officials in the Kurdistan
Region June 13-14. RC Kirkuk (notetaker) and DCM assistant
also attended the meetings.

Pesh to Remain until Kurds Trust Baghdad
--------------


3. (C) KDP leader (and newly sworn in President of
Kurdistan-Iraq) Massoud Barzani, Prime Minister of the
Kurdish Regional Government in Irbil, and PUK leaders
Noshirwan Mustafa, Kosrat Rasul, and Omar Sayid Ali told DCM
and MG Stratman in meetings June 13-14 that the pesh merga
must remain until the Iraqi government is able to convince
Kurds that Baghdad will not again turn against them.
Democracy was more than words; it would take years to rebuild
trust, given the bad blood between the Iraqi government and
the Kurds.


4. (C) For the same reason, PM Barzani said he could not
foresee the pesh coming under control of Baghdad. Both he
and his uncle Massoud said any future arrangement must be
jointly agreed between the Kurds and the central government.

Massoud -- whose new role as president also confers command
of a still-to-be unified pesh merga force -- said he could
consider some kind of integration, but only within an
established legal framework. Pesh merga could be deployed to
other regions, some individuals could be integrated into
Iraqi Army units outside the north, and entire units could be
deployed outside the region. He was willing to discuss these
options with Baghdad. Other pesh merga could be retired,
some could be moved into the regular army, some could take
civil service jobs. But some element must remain as pesh
merga to maintain security.


5. (C) Omar Said Ali, a senior PUK politburo member, told
DCM that the pesh merga defended the Kurds from Arab and
Islamic movements bent on oppressing minorities. He said
that the Kurds were "uncertain about the future of Iraq and
how its army will evolve. The Kurdish nation is small, its
neighbors always want to control us, and quash Kurds' rights.
After 10-15 years, the Kurds may trust the Arabs again, and
Iraq's neighbors, then the people might be comfortable
without the pesh merga." After the constitution was
ratified, the Kurds could reassess. The DCM stressed that
the U.S. did not favor the "ethnicization" of security
forces. Ali said he understood, but the change could not
occur now.

PUK Leaders Foresee Different Options
--------------


6. (C) DCM and General Stratman probed interlocutors on
whether the two parties needed so many forces. Kosrat Rasul,
a famous PUK pesh merga commander (head of the party
politburo executive committee) told DCM that some pesh merga
were already serving in the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan. Rasul
said others could be reformed as border guards or national
guard units. PUK Deputy Secretary General Noshirwan Mustafa
and Rasul also agreed that the forces could be drawn down and
integrated into something other than a purely party
structure, but they differed on context and approach.


7. (C) Rasul defended the current pesh merga structure,
which he said was a professionally trained force as compared
to the Badr Corps "militia." Perhaps the pesh merga could be
renamed, but they could not be entirely mixed into a
pan-Iraqi body. Only the Kurds were able to maintain
security in the mountains, because they knew the area.
Furthermore, Kurds would play an anti-terrorism role,
protecting Kurdistan, and helping the Iraqi Army when needed.


8. (C) Mustafa, on the other hand, while agreeing the pesh
could not disband, said they must cease existence as party
militias. The forces both take orders from party leaders,
and are not loyal to government. As such, they posed the
main threat to democracy. They stymie political dialog, as
no one dares to speak out because the threat of arms lies
behind all words.


9. (C) Mustafa said the pesh could become like a U.S.
national guard unit, part of the Iraqi Army, funded by
Baghdad, but still distinct. They must be loyal to both
Kurdistan and Baghdad, not political parties. Meanwhile,
Baghdad should show the Kurds it was willing to put the Iraqi
Army under civilian control, and keep military spending low,
perhaps no more than 5% of the budget. The non-Kurdish units
of the army should not have an automatic right to enter
Kurdistan.

U.S. Protection Would Allow Pesh Reductions
--------------

10. (C) Mustafa said that a U.S. presence in the north
would allow the Kurds to draw down forces as it would
convince the Kurds that neither the Iraqi nor Iranian armies
would intervene in Kurdish affairs, it was a major desire of
most Kurds. Ali felt that the Kurds should receive some kind
of U.S. protection similar to that provided to Israel.

Kurds Fill Security Vacuum on the Borders,
but Formal Role a Problem for Neighbors
--------------


11. (C) MG Stratman asked if the two parties would be
receptive to the idea of pesh merga providing border security
in the north, a move that would make non-Iraqi forces there
redundant. The DCM noted that such a role would be
coordinated with Turkey.
President Barzani said that if appropriate arrangements were
made, a border security role might be possible. He said the
pesh merga were aleady filling a vacuum in the mountainous
north.


12. (C) When MG Stratman asked whether pesh merga
deployments along the border were currently coordinated with
the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad, which had line authority
for this function, President Brzan sad that Baghdad has no
capability on the northern borders. He said the new
constitution should work this out. Thereafter, the KRG MOI
or pesh merga ministry and Baghdad MOI would have a legal
framework to determine their respective roles.


13. (C) Nechirvan Barzani said that a pesh merga border
force likely would not be accepted by Iran or Turkey. On
that note, he said it was important for Turkey to understand
the Kurds were serious about fighting the PKK. He said
without exception Iraqi soil should not be used to harm its
neighbors.



14. (C) It is no surprise that the Kurds wish to retain
some capacity to repel aggression, given their history with
Baghdad. How this can be resolved without unduly entrenching
ethnic divisions nationwide remains to be seen. In Iraq,
where money is a frequent precursor for loyalty, perhaps
Mustafa's option of a national guard type unit, paid by
Baghdad yet distinct, is worth exploring further. (in Iraq,
money is a frequent precursor for loyalty)


15. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Jeffrey