Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD2505
2005-06-14 11:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

MODIFICATIONS BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH ON SUNNI ARAB

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KISL IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002505 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MODIFICATIONS BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH ON SUNNI ARAB
CONSTITUTIONAL INCLUSION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James F. Jeffrey for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002505

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MODIFICATIONS BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH ON SUNNI ARAB
CONSTITUTIONAL INCLUSION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James F. Jeffrey for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: June 13 was another day of negotiations on
Sunni Arab inclusion on the Constitution Committee.
Negotiators modified their positions, but did not resolve
their disagreements. Deputy Constitution Committee Chairman
Adnan al-Janabi told the Charge that he felt "plus 15" (i.e.,
total of 17 Sunni Arabs) was a reasonable number of additions
but complained that irresponsible statements from President
Talabani and the Sunni Waqf had driven the number up. He
requested that Talabani retract his support for 25. We spoke
to Talabni's chief of staff who pointed to his statement to
the media on June 12 as having clarified that Talabani was
not committed to any particular number. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) leader Muhsin Abd al-Hamid
reduced his demand to 20 representatives in a separate June
13 meeting with Charge. He said that he feared that going
any lower would open his party to charges that the IIP was
selling out Sunni Arab interests. Abd al Hamid agreed to
discuss the issue with his colleagues. Charge emphasized,
and Hamid agreed, that a quick resolution of the issue would
speed the path to Iraq's next elections. End Summary.

--------------
JANABI SAYS HE'S "DEADLOCKED"
--------------


3. (C) Adnan al-Janabi said that felt "deadlocked" between
hardline stances by the Shia leadership and his own Sunni
Arab colleagues. Shia leaders who publicly called for adding
only 11 Sunni Arabs to the committee provoked Sunni Arabs for
no reason he said. That led leaders like Adnan Dulaymi to
announce an unrealistic goal of some 25 additional members,
he said. Meanwhile, President Talabani's public statement
June 8 indicating support for 25 additional Sunni Arabs only
hardened their position. Janabi warned that continued delays
on the issue had brought the matter near a "crisis" point and
Sunni Arab leaders were considering publicizing their
grievances and withdrawing from the process.


4. (C) Janabi said he considered 15 additional Sunni Arabs to
be a reasonable number but would need help pressuring the

Sunni Waqf and Iraqi Islamic Party. He also asked the USG to
weigh in with Talabani and ask him to retract or moderate his
support for 25 additional Sunni Arabs, a stance that was
complicating negotiations. He claimed that he saw the
possibility that Talibani would push all sides to add 16
Sunni Arabs, for 18 total. In any event, Janabi urged the
USG to consider statements that would help Sunni Arabs agree
"without losing face." He specifically mentioned the idea of
emphasizing the principle of consensus and allowing
additional Sunni Arabs join the process as non-voting
consultants and experts.

--------------
TALABANI WITHDRAWS HIS SUPPORT FOR 25
--------------


5. (C) After the Janabi meeting, we contacted Presidential
Chief of Staff Kameran Qaradaghi who pointed out that his
June 12 public statement had distanced the president from the
demand for 25. Qaradaghi said that Talibani's previous
statement was "misunderstood." He added that Talibani was
most concerned that all members of the Committee be equal and
was not in a position to set numbers.

--------------
IRAQI ISLAMIC PARTY DROPS TO 20
--------------


6. (C) Iraqi Islamic Party leader Muhsin Abd al-Hamid stuck
hard to 25 representatives in a separate June 13 meeting with
Charge but had dropped to 20 by the end of the meeting. IIP
Secretary General Tariq al Hashemi acknowledged that Talabani

SIPDIS
had changed his position. Abd al Hamid claimed that if he
went any lower, competing Sunni groups would attack him for
selling out their community's rights. He claimed that even
the call for 25 representatives was less than the Sunni Arabs
deserved. He made the familiar specious argument that the 42
percent of Iraqis who did not vote in January were all Sunni
Arabs, meaning that their community should have
representation of that proportion on the Constitution
Committee.


7. (C) Abd al Hamid said that he strongly supported meeting
the August 15 deadline and believed that new elections were
the surest path to improving Sunni Arab participation in
politics. He warned that Shia politicians would try to miss
the deadline so as to extend their own time in power. Hamid
said his party had only nominated legal experts to the
Constitutional Committee, consenting to add one political
representative, Ayad al-Samarai, only at the insistence of
the Shia leadership.


8. (C) COMMENT: We now have heavy Sunni hitters like TNA
Speaker Hasani and Janabi both pushing for an additional 15
Sunni Arabs, and the gap between them and the Iraqi Islamic
Party crowd has narrowed to five. All parties are discussing
this relentlessly and we will keep communications ongoing.
What is behind all of this of course are decades of
misunderstanding and distrust, horrific Ba'athist rule, and a
perceived need by all parties to score points in a
particularly rigid zero sum game. Thus even when we resolve
the numbers dispute, the names themselves may be another
issue. We will continue to urge The Iraqi Islamic Party and
National Dialogue Council to improve their communications to
resolve the numbers argument. We anticipate further
developments over the next two days as the TNA convenes and
the Constitution Committee meets. END COMMENT


9. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Jeffrey