Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD2430
2005-06-08 09:36:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

A STRUGGLE FOR THE MIND OF MUQTADA AL-SADR

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KISL PINR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002430 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: A STRUGGLE FOR THE MIND OF MUQTADA AL-SADR

REF: A. BAGHDAD 317

B. BAGHDAD 435

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002430

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: A STRUGGLE FOR THE MIND OF MUQTADA AL-SADR

REF: A. BAGHDAD 317

B. BAGHDAD 435

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Sadrist advisors Hamid al-Sharifi and Saayid
Imad Kelanter told PolOff June 7 that there is an ideological
struggle between two distinctly different Sadrist camps over
the conduct of relations with the Iraqi Transitional
Government (ITG) and the Coalition. Both men asserted that
Political Advisor Shaykh Ali Semaysim is looking to regain
his prominence over the political strategy for the Sadrist
movement and may be willing to reengage with the ITG and the
U.S. They key issue remains Sadr militia detainees held by
the Coalition. They urged the U.S. to put their trust in
Shaykh Ali Semaysim and that the relatively low level
intermediaries that the ITG and Coalition are now dealing
with on this issue are followers of Sadrist rival Qais
Khazali, an outspoken anti-Coalition advisor to al-Sadr. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
A TALE OF BETRAYAL AND MISTRUST
--------------


2. (S) In a June 7 meeting at independent politico Saad
Jabor's residence, Sadrist advisors Hamid al-Sharifi and
Saayid Imad Kelanter told PolOff that Shaykh Ali Semyasim
felt betrayed by broken promises made by Qassim Daoud and the
Allawi government over the issue of detainees. Kelanter
emphasized that Shaykh Semaysim took many risks in meeting
Daoud as well as the Charge in January as reported in the
reftels. The lack of any progress on the detainee issue,
according to Kelanter, greatly undermined Semaysim's
influence over Muqtada al-Sadr's camp and made future
meetings with the Coalition and the ITG impossible. He
claimed that their experience with allegedly corrupt and
ineffective IIG officials had deepened al-Sadr's suspicions.


3. (S) Kelanter alleged that Qais Khazali now has a huge
influence over al-Sadr. He said that money, weapons and
trained men from Iran provide Khazali with influence over
al-Sadr. Kelanter said he is aware of the ongoing
discussions by U.S. and ITG representatives with lower level

Sadrists over the detainee issue and argued that these
individuals (without naming anyone in particular) answer to
Khazali. PolOff said political discussions should be led by
the ITG with the Coalition providing information as needed.
Both men claimed that Semaysim is willing to reengage and
they hope to arrange a meeting in the near future.


4. (S) Kelanter said that progress on the detainee issue with
"tangible" benefits facilitated by Semaysim would improve his
standing with al-Sadr and allow him to move his more moderate
political agenda. (NOTE: Sadrist Shaykh Moussa al-Saadi told
PolOff on the same day that they have tentatively agreed to
meet representatives from the Prime Minister's office to
further discuss the issue of detainees on June 12. END NOTE).
He said that Semaysim hopes to complete the process of
pulling the Sadrist movement into the political process by
forming a separate, official political movement with its own
separate list of candidates for the next elections. Kelanter
asserted that they already have a list of potential names
that they hope to present to Prime Minister Jafari in the
hopes of gaining "legitimacy" in the eyes of the political
establishment. He asked for a U.S. opinion of a Sadrist
political party. PolOff responded by saying that the U.S.
always encourages wider political engagement by those who
have foresworn violence and reiterated that we do not choose
sides among competing political forces.


5. (S) Al-Sharifi asked PolOff for material support to help
improve Semaysim's position. He said that cell phones, an
armored vehicle and travel outside of Iraq would greatly
improve Semaysim's stature and expand his outlook by seeing
the outside world. PolOff said neither Semaysim, nor any
other Iraqi politician should make his way by depending on
such support, but noted our willingness to engage.

--------------
MUC-BADR CORPS NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


6. (S) On the issue of ongoing Sadrist-facilitated
negotiations between the Muslim Ulema Council (MUC) and the
Badr Corps over accusations of Badr collusion in the deaths
of Sunni clerics, al-Sharifi predicted the Badr Corps would
never accommodate the MUC. Al-Sharifi said that any
negotiated agreement between both sides would look like a
victory for al-Sadr, which is precisely what the Badr Corps
and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) do not want. He said Badr and SCIRI see the Sadrist
camp as their main challenger for influence.


7. (S) COMMENT: Al-Sharifi and Kelanter's assertions had the
feel of desperation and tend to substantiate rumors of
Semaysim's reduced influence within the Sadr movement. The
detainee issue, while materially important to the rank and
file Sadrists and the militia, is evidently being played as
an internal issue within the Sadrist camp to demonstrate
authority and influence. END COMMENT.


8. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK
minimize considered.
Jeffrey