DPM CHALABI ON IMPROVING MOD, PIPELINE SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002391

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DPM CHALABI ON IMPROVING MOD, PIPELINE SECURITY
AND SUNNI OUTREACH

Classified By: Classified by Political Military Counselor Ronald

E. Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (a),(b),and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi outlined
his top three priorities to PolMilCouns on June 3. He claims
to be engaging MoD Sadoun Dulaimi on improving MOD staff to
combat corruption and replacing Army officers in select units
with locally born commanders. Chalabi also briefed his
position on the stand-up of the pipeline security forces and
his outreach efforts to engage Sunni Sheikhs. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Claiming he was close to the new Minister of Defense,
Chalabi described Dulaimi as "beleaguered" as he grapples
with the level of corruption in the ministry. Chalabi
suggested recruiting professional technocrats to fill
mid-level ministry slots. He pushed for drawing on the cadre
of USG-trained Iraqis who received DoD training before the
war. While he did not say so, we suspect many are members of
Chalabi's political party. He also recommended replacing the
commanding officers of select brigade and battalions in some
of the most troubled areas with officers native to the
region. Chalabi believes this could temper the insurgency.
PolMilCouns noted our strong view that professional military
leaders should not be changed for political reasons. Chalabi
said he was not advocating a purge and hoped we could talk in
detail. Subsequently, the Minister of Defense made clear to
PolMilCouns that he has no intention of changing commanders
for political purposes. He said Iraq will have problems to
sustain financially the current size of the military the U.S.
and Iraq are standing up.


3. (C) Chalabi noted the country had lost $1 billion trying
to protect the pipelines since liberation. He just returned
from Kirkuk to survey several strategic (and heavily
targeted) portions of the line and appeared confident that
current interministerial planning for a new security forces
would be successful. Gathering intelligence in the areas
along the pipeline were vital to its protection. He
mentioned the Minister of State for National Security al Anzi
had proposed setting up a new intelligence agency, firmly
under Anzi's control. Chalabi reported Anzi has approached
the Prime Minister for $40 million to fund the effort.
Chalabi registered his firm opposition to this plan, but
appeared unsure whether he alone could block it. Chalabi
added that INIS Director Shahwani is making the situation
worse by refusing to show up at important meetings or deal
with the Government.


4. (C) Chalabi claimed he conducts his own campaign of Sunni
outreach, meeting with many individuals privately. He asked
Deputy Prime Minister Abd Mutlak al Jaboori to accompany him
on his recent trip to Kirkuk, "his neighborhood" according to
Chalabi. The purpose was twofold: to bolster his efforts to
reach out to Sunni tribal leaders and to use such contacts
for the gathering of better intelligence on those targeting
Iraqi's oil infrastructure. Despite his well known
credibility problems with the Sunnis, Chalabi asserted that
reconciling them would be among his primary tasks.


5. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK,
minimize considered.
Satterfield