ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S MINISTER OF INTERIOR AFTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002376

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MCAP PREL PTER PINS PINR MARR IZ
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S MINISTER OF INTERIOR AFTER
ONE MONTH

REF: A. BAGHDAD 001844

B. BAGHDAD 001995

C. BAGHDAD 002210

Classified By: Classified by Political-Military Counselor Ronald E.
Neumann for reasons 1.4 (a),(b) and (d).


1. (S/REL UK AND AUS) SUMMARY: In the month since
Minister of Interior Baqir Jabor took office, he
appears to be delivering on his initial commitments
(ref A). Jabor retained qualified personnel
regardless of their ethnic background or political
affiliation, while also developing a plan to remove
unqualified personnel. Jabor traveled to Najaf to
discuss national versus provincial roles with the
Governor and Chief of Police. To emphasize the
importance of the provincial Chiefs of Police, Jabor
held a national conference in Baghdad his second week
in office. Although rumors and innuendo are always
circulating, there is no specific evidence to support
widespread concerns of a Shia-led security strategy
within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) directed against
the Sunni. Nothing is guaranteed to last, but Jabor
seems to be actively reforming the MoI to address the
security challenges Iraq is facing. END SUMMARY


2. (C/REL UK AND AUS) SENIOR PERSONNEL: Jabor's
personnel actions are commendable. Prior to making
any personnel decisions, Jabor sought recommendations
from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)-
MoI advisors and the Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Jabor has met with
his Deputies on multiple occasions, both as a group
and individually. Jabor kept his word on retaining MG
Adnan (a Sunni and the uncle of the former Minister of
Interior) as the head of the special police, including
the commandos. After extensive consultation, Jabor
retired two Deputy Ministers: MG Hekmet (Deputy
Minister for the Iraqi Police Service) and MG Abdul
Jabal (Deputy Minister for the National Crime Agency).
Replacements have not been decided; however, Jabor
intends to replace Hekmet with a young Sunni with
career law enforcement experience based upon the
individual's capabilities and not simply time spent in
the Ministry. We have a generally poor view of
Hekmet; letting him go is a sound decision.


3. (C/REL UK AND AUS) RANK AND FILE: Jabor stated he
would not add to the ranks of the police for political
patronage. Jabor plans personnel system reforms that
would release from duty or retire his predecessor's
numerous Samarah patronage hires; "ghost" employees,
who are on the payrolls, but perform no clear service
for the ministry; employees identified as unqualified
by the MoI Qualification Committee (MOIQC) (ref B);
personnel age 60 or over (subject to waiver); and
those charged by the inspector general with
corruption. Jabor asserts a commitment to retaining
"hard-working professionals." However, the
predominantly Sunni work force (and likely the broader
Sunni population) may perceive the terminations as a
purge of their ranks. Jabor is faced with significant
budget constraints and understands that the number of
police on the payroll needs to be reduced
significantly.


4. (C/REL UK AND AUS) PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL
JURISDICTION: Last month, the MoI hosted a two-day
Chiefs of Police conference that did not yield any
specific results, but was valuable symbolically.
Sixteen provincial Chiefs of Police attended; never
before had this been accomplished. The provincial
representatives stayed late on a Thursday evening and
even met on their day off, Friday. CPA Order 71,
which outlines, inter alia, provincial and national
level authorities, was discussed at length among the
attendees. A healthy debate ensued with some
attendees claiming ignorance of CPA Order 71, and
others disagreeing with the order. The real value of
the conference was the opening of lines of
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S MINISTER OF INTERIOR AFTER
communication.


5. (C/REL UK AND AUS) The Minister's trip to Najaf
was a clear indication of his intention to address
issues head-on. Initially, there was concern that
Jabor would not fully engage with IRMO-MoI advisors;
the opposite has been true, as evidenced by the IRMO-
MoI advisor accompanying the Minister to Najaf (ref
C). Once again the Minister kept his commitment to
address problems that had been ignored by the previous
Minister.


6. (S/REL UK AND AUS) COMMENT: There is widespread
concern of a Shia security strategy to purge the MoI
ranks of Sunnis and implement a MoI de-Ba'athification
plan. Jabor was handed a Ministry with serious
personnel, leadership, control and financial problems.
The proactive agenda pursued by the Minister fits the
task of reforming the Ministry; however, the dismissal
of Sunni MoI employees, raids on Sunni insurgents and
discussions with Shia leaders (such as Grand Ayatollah
Sistani) leave an impression of a Shia plot against
the Sunni.


7. (S/REL UK AND AUS) COMMENT CONTINUED: Nothing we
are seeing is guaranteed to remain the same. Although
the Minister continues to do and say the right things,
we will remain vigilant. The Minister is politically
astute and a skilled technocrat who knows his every
move is being watched for signs that Iran, the Shia,
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) and/or Badr Corps are controlling the Minister
behind the scenes and directing unprovoked action
against the Sunni population or implementing a
separate de-Ba'athification policy. We also remain
cognizant of Shia influence in the south and continue
to watch for incidents of Shia purging Sunnis from the
police ranks at the provincial and local levels and
installing SCIRI/Badr loyalists in their stead. There
are some indications that this may be occurring,
albeit quietly (septel). Jabor appears to be his own
man; however, it is unclear to what degree his
decisions are influenced by SCIRI, particularly its
leader Hakim. END COMMENT.


8. (U) REO Basrah, REO Hillah, REO Mosul and REO
Kirkuk minimize considered.


Satterfield