BADR CORPS AND MUC CONDUCT MUQTADA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002375

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2025
TAGS: KDEM PGOV KISL IZ KINR
SUBJECT: BADR CORPS AND MUC CONDUCT MUQTADA
AL-SADR-FACILITATED NEGOTIATIONS ON "LETTER OF PROMISE"

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Henry S. Ensher.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary. Muqtada al-Sadr representatives
facilitated discussions between Badr Corps and Muslim
Ulema Council (MUC) officials on Hareth al-Dhari's May
18 comments accusing the Badr Corps of assassinating
Sunni clerics. The group met May 28 in the residence
of Transitional National Assembly (TNA) Sadrist member
Baha al-Araji in Baghdad to come to terms on a
proposed "Letter of Promise" agreeing to cast away
past rhetoric and work to minimize sectarian violence.
Despite initial progress in the discussions, no
agreement has been signed. Badr Corps representatives
say they are committed to continued engagement with
MUC. Muqtada al-Sadr continues to burnish his image as
a nationalist leader. End Summary.

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MUC Accusations
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2. (C) In a televised press conference on May 18, MUC
leader Hareth al-Dhari accused police commandos and
the Badr Corps of killing two Sunni clerics that week
as well as participating in several other earlier
killings targeting Sunnis. Shia notable and SCIRI
head Abdul Aziz al-Hakim responded by calling for calm
and an end to accusations that could lead to sectarian
war. Badr Corps chief Hadi al-Amiri on May 19
denounced the accusations. Al-Amiri told PolCouns on
May 21 that he was doing his best to keep things calm.
PolCouns emphasized that it is important for senior
leaders on all sides to keep young, impressionable men
off the street in this sensitive period. Al-Amiri
said that Sunni notable Adnan Dulaimi (Sunni Waqf)
visited SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim on May 20.
According to Al-Amiri, both men agreed that all
mosques (Sunni and Shia) should not be used for
political or military purposes.

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Negotiations Commence
--------------


3. (C) Sadrist TNA member Baha al-Araji and Iraqi
Hizbullah TNA member Abd al-Karim Muhammadawi told
PolOff May 31 that discussions on May 28 between the
MUC and Badr Corps over a proposed "Letter of Promise"
were initially encouraging. Al-Araji asserted that
the discussions were initiated by Muqtada al-Sadr and
that his brother, Hazim Al-Araji, and Sadr Bureau
notables Abdul Hadi al-Daraji and Shaykh Nasser al-
Saadi were facilitating these discussions "in the
interest of Iraq." Badr Corps Political Advisor Abdul
Kareem al-Naqib told PolOff on May 31 that the Badr
Corps refused to sign the letter without an apology
from Hareth al-Dhari or presentation of hard evidence
of Badr Corps participation in the recent attacks on
Sunni clerics. Al-Naqib said that Badr Corps leader
Hadi al-Amiri went to visit Muqtada al-Sadr on May 29
in Najaf and the two men agreed to continue engaging
the MUC.


4. (C) Al-Naqib said that the MUC representatives
(Al-Rawi and Al-Ani) alleged that the Badr Corps
participated in MNF-I operations in Fallujah and
helped the Iraqi Government manipulate the elections
results through their control of elections security.
According to Al-Naqib, Al-Rawi and Al-Ani also
asserted that the Badr Corps is predominant in MOI's
Wolf Brigade now conducting operations in Baghdad and
that this unit was likely behind the Sunni clerics'
deaths. Al-Naqib told PolOff that, in response, he
detailed several acts of political violence directed
against the Shia. Al-Naqib said that while the MUC
represents a minority of Sunnis, he believes that the
Shia must engage in these discussions in the interest
of national unity. According to Al-Naqib, the MUC
representatives originally proposed signing the Letter
of Promise to "wash away the past".


5. (C) Hadi al-Amiri told PolOff on June 1 that the
Badr Corps is willing to sign "100 letters" if they
receive an apology. Conversely, Al-Amiri said that if
there is such evidence of Badr Corps militia taking
part in these killings, he would personally seek
justice against these criminals and drop the lawsuit
against Hareth al-Dhari. PolOff urged al-Amiri to
avoid harsh rhetoric that could disrupt efforts to
promote inclusion in the constitutional process.


6. (C) Al-Amiri said that the Badr Corps is committed
to continue engaging the MUC. Al-Naqib was much more
ominous in his comments. He said that if Al-Dhari
does not apologize, he could find himself unable to
move freely about Iraq, especially in the middle
Euphrates region and the South. After Poloff
criticized the implied threat, Al-Naqib said that he
simply meant that Al-Dhari would be met by public
demonstrations that would be peaceful but would
effectively limit his ability to move about the
country.

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Muqtada's Role
--------------


7. (C) Al-Amiri told PolOff that he felt compelled to
personally meet Al-Sadr as he is now a legitimate
political force. According to Al-Amiri, Al-Sadr urged
a peaceful resolution to the conflict between MUC and
Badr. Al-Sadr also reportedly told Al-Amiri that he
is committed to joining the political process but from
a distance through his key lieutenants. Al-Naqib was
much more blunt in his analysis of Al-Sadr's
involvement. He told PolOff that he thought Al-Sadr
was being opportunistic and that his actions should be
watched closely.


8. (C) Comment: The Badr Corps-MUC discussions may
not result in a written agreement. Both sides'
willingness to engage is positive. Both sides also
appear to be sensitive to the fragile, simultaneous
outreach efforts to promote at Sunni participation in
the constitutional drafting process. The seeming
contradiction between Muqtada's willingness to play
peacemaker and his harsh rhetoric against the US is
explained by his drive to be seen as a true
"nationalist" leader. His remarks demanding immediate
release of detainees should be seen in the context of
his key lieutenants' willingness to engage the Iraqi
government on facilitating additional releases of
detained Sadrists. The restraint demonstrated by the
Sadr Bureau in reaction to the May 23 car bomb attack
on the edge of Sadr City was also indicative of their
growing willingness to engage in politics rather than
combat. End Comment.


9. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO
KIRKUK minimize considered.


Satterfield