Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ATHENS841
2005-03-24 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREECE: DEFENSE MINISTER ON EXPANDING COOPERATION

Tags:  PREL MARR GR AMB 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000841 

SIPDIS

DOD FOR ISP - GRAFF, STATE FOR EUR/SE AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR GR AMB
SUBJECT: GREECE: DEFENSE MINISTER ON EXPANDING COOPERATION
ON IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN

REF: ATHENS 770

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000841

SIPDIS

DOD FOR ISP - GRAFF, STATE FOR EUR/SE AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR GR AMB
SUBJECT: GREECE: DEFENSE MINISTER ON EXPANDING COOPERATION
ON IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN

REF: ATHENS 770

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D)


1. (C) Summary. In a March 24 meeting to discuss his
proposed travel to Washington, Defense Minister
Spiliotopoulos told Ambassador that Greece could provide the
Iraqi military with decommissioned APCs as they are replaced
over the coming years by new German models -- and perhaps
other military hardware sooner. Spiliotopoulos asked for
additional information concerning a NATO request that Greece
provide sealift for a donation of Hungarian T-72 tanks to
Iraq. He agreed to look into the possibility of SEEBRIG
taking the lead on the deployment of a Role 2 Medical
Facility to Kabul, particularly if SEEBRIG can move faster
than Greece, and bridge to a Greece national-flag Role 2
facility later. Finally, Spiliotopoulos agreed to discuss
the U.S. suggestion that Alliance members establish a policy
that officers assigned to IS and NATO command positions
henceforth not be subject to national caveats. End Summary.


2. (C) Greek Defense Minister Spiliotopoulos asked to see
Ambassador March 24, to continue discussions of the
Minister,s proposed meeting in Washington with Secretary
Rumsfeld (reftel). Working through an embassy-provided list
of ways to improve bilateral military relations and to
increase Greek contributions to NATO activities in Iraq and
elsewhere, Spiliotopoulos identified a series of steps he was
prepared to discuss during a proposed April 28 meeting with
SecDef.

Contribution to Iraqi Military: Something Now, APCs later
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Spiliotopoulos noted that Greece was considering
buying Marder Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) from Germany,
but that this procurement was only at a preliminary stage.
If the sale went through and once deliveries began, he said,
Greece could begin sending its current stock of Russian-model
BMP-1 APCs to Iraq. He cautioned that this might not begin
for two years or more.


4. (C) In the meantime, he offered to review the NATO
Training and Equipment Coordination Group,s (NTECG) list of
critical needs, to see what Greece could offer from its

existing stocks of equipment. Ambassador offered to assist
with coordination with NTECG, to avoid duplication of effort.

Considering Moving Hungarian Tanks
--------------


5. (C) Spiliotopoulos asked for details about a suggestion
that Greece provide sealift for other Allies, contributions
to Iraq. Ambassador said the most pressing need was to move
77 Hungarian T-72 tanks. Ambassador noted that our latest
information is that Hungary would get the tanks to the
Slovenian port of Koper but needed sealift to Iraq. After a
discussion of possible transportation routes, including via
Turkey or Kuwait, Ambassador agreed to seek additional
information from NATO, including preferred ports of
embarkation and disembarkation. Ambassador pointed out that
all NATO needed was sealift -- other arrangements would be
made to move the tanks to and from the ports.
Spiliotopoulos, Diplomatic Advisor Bourlogiannis said it
would be easier to accommodate such a request if it came from
NATO, rather than bilaterally from the United States.
Ambassador assured him that the request was from NATO.
Spiliotopoulos commented that commercial sealift would be
quicker than Greek Navy LSTs (which are slow),and emphasized
that all of the tanks would need to be mobile; Greece did not
have the capability to load inoperable tanks.

Medical Unit to Afghanistan: Greek or SEEBRIG?
-------------- -


6. (C) Spiliotopoulos noted that OSD/ISP Greece desk
officer Graf raised the possibility of deploying the Role 2
Medical Facility pledged by Greece to ISAF under the SEEBRIG
aegis, as a demonstration of SEEBRIG,s effectiveness. He
explained the Greek preference to characterize the deployment
as a national contribution, for political reasons.
Ambassador pointed out that SEEBRIG partners might have
mobile medical equipment on hand that would allow for
deployment of the unit faster, citing reports that Greece
would need to equip a team, a process that might take many
months. If this was the case, he asked, and if SEEBRIG could
deploy faster, would it be possible for some Greeks to go
first to Kabul as a part of a SEEBRIG unit and, possibly,
assume the lead later? Spiliotopoulos agreed to consider the
idea.

NATO Policy Against Future Caveats: Worth Considering
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Ambassador reminded Spiliotopoulos of the U.S.
suggestion made at the NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in
Nice to move past Alliance disagreements over Iraq and adopt
an Alliance policy against future national caveats on
officers assigned to NATO IS and command positions.
Spilitopoulos said such a policy would seem logical, and
agreed to discuss it with the Foreign Minister and others in
the Greek government. Diplomatic Advisor Bourlogiannis said
Greece was unlikely to be able to influence others in the
group of five countries with these caveats. Ambassador
replied that, if one of these countries supported such a
policy, it would make it easier for others to follow suit.
Ries