MOLYVIATIS ON CYPRUS/TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000617

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2014
TAGS: GR PREL TU AMB
SUBJECT: MOLYVIATIS ON CYPRUS/TURKEY


Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries. Reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek FM Molyviatis told Ambassador he was
working on a meeting between PM Karamanlis and Turkish PM
Erdogan (on the margins of the March 22 EU Summit in Brussels
and just before Molyviatis's visit to Washington),and his
own trip to Turkey in April for discussions of Greek-Turkish
bilateral disagreements in the Aegean and the Cyprus issue.
On the Aegean, Molyviatis held out little hope of resolution
(until there was some measurable progress on Cyprus) and
warned that ongoing Turkish "provocations" were becoming a
political problem that might impact on Greek support for
Turkey's EU accession. On Cyprus, Molyviatis agreed that
Cypriot President Papadopoulos did not seem inclined to
engage on new talks.


2. (C) At their February 28 meeting, Molyviatis told
Ambassador that Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Erdogan had
agreed to meet on the margins of the March 22 EU Council in
Brussels. The staffs were trying to work out a quiet dinner
for the two. In addition, Molyviatis had decided to travel
to Ankara in April for substantive discussions on the
Greece-Turkey bilateral relationship. Molyviatis said that
"it was time to revive the process" but he cautioned against
expectations of a breakthrough on either the bilateral
relationship or Cyprus.

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AEGEAN TENSION BECOMING POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR GREECE
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3. (C) Referring to the February 24 round of "exploratory
talks" between Greek and Turkish experts (the
Skopelitis-Tuygen channel) on air/sea space and continental
shelf issues, Molyviatis admitted to Ambassador that nothing
special had occurred. The channel itself was good for
Greek-Turkish dialogue, but there was no real convergence of
views. (NOTE: One of the Greek members of the negotiating
team as well as the Turkish Embassy here confirmed this view.
They told us it was "more of the same.") END NOTE.)


4. (C) Asked whether the Aegean issues would become easier
to resolve if the Cyprus issue was solved, Molyviatis was
quick to respond that Cyprus was not a bilateral issue.
However, he admitted that progress on Cyprus would create a
new climate of trust and optimism that would impact
positively on Aegean tensions.


5. (C) Molyviatis, reiterating his theme to visiting CODEL
Goodlatte on February 25 (septel) warned that ongoing Turkish
"provocations" in the Aegean undermined public support for
Turkey's accession to the EU. Molyviatis himself said the
"thousands of euros a day spent on dogfights over the Aegean"
was also a looming problem for Greece. Molyviatis warned
Ambassador that for Turkey to continue "in this way" would
give rise to serious political difficulties for the Greek
Government, and could affect the way the Greeks support
Turkey in other fora.

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CYPRUS GOING NOWHERE
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6. (C) Molyviatis and Ambassador agreed that there was not
much interest in a new initiative on Cyprus as long as the
Greek Cypriots were unwilling to put some of their concerns
on the table. In response to Molyviatis's question whether
the new team at the State Department would put forward new
ideas for Cyprus, Ambassador acknowledged that the new team
would necessarily review the issue, but the onus would remain
with the Parties to regain momentum themselves, rather than
an outside push.


7. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about how to get
Papadopoulos to act constructively, Molyviatis told
Ambassador that despite Greek support for reopening the
Cyprus issue "and we talk all the time to Papadopoulos about
it", Molyviatis did not believe the conditions existed to
restart negotiations. Ambassador urged Molyviatis to
continue to press the Greek Cypriots to respond to UNSYG
Annan's request to Nicosia to lay out their specific concerns
about the Annan Plan.

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ANKARA PROTOCOL "DOOMED" BY RECOGNITION ISSUE
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8. (C) Molyviatis agreed with Ambassador that it was a good
sign to see a Turkish delegation in Brussels to negotiate the
Ankara Protocol. Molyviatis was, however, gloomy in his
predictions that the signing of the Protocol would become a
headache for the EU because Turkey (he believed) would try to
sidestep the "obvious" link between signing the Protocol and
the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. While both
Molyviatis and Ambassador agreed it would be best to avoid a
midnight crisis on this issue on October 2 (before Turkey-EU
talks begin on October 3),the Minister clearly did not hold
out much hope that this would be the case.


9. (C) COMMENT: Molyviatis' comments reflect the situation
that, despite the close, personal relationship between PM
Karamanlis and Turkish PM Erdogan, there has been little
positive movement in Greek-Turkish relations since Karamanlis
took power nearly a year ago. Karamanlis is preoccupied with
domestic difficulties, particularly a ballooning budget
deficit, and, in any event, is known for his extreme caution
and unwillingness to get out in front of sensitive issues.
END COMMENT.
RIES