Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ATHENS2663
2005-10-11 16:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA NAME: GOG REJECTS LATEST NIMETZ PROPOSAL

Tags:  PREL MK GR AMB MACEDONIA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002663 

SIPDIS

FOR P, EUR, EUR/SE, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015
TAGS: PREL MK GR AMB MACEDONIA
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA NAME: GOG REJECTS LATEST NIMETZ PROPOSAL
AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

REF: SKOPJE 1222

Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002663

SIPDIS

FOR P, EUR, EUR/SE, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015
TAGS: PREL MK GR AMB MACEDONIA
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA NAME: GOG REJECTS LATEST NIMETZ PROPOSAL
AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

REF: SKOPJE 1222

Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Citing its long-standing opposition to a
dual-name solution, the GoG clearly rejected the latest
proposal from UN Envoy Matthew Nimetz, leaving prospects for
a solution dim before the EC's November 9 avis on Macedonia's
EU application. At an October 11 meeting with Ambassador,
MFA SecGen Rokanas had little to offer in the way of next
steps, but noted that the GoG had no objection to the
continued use of "FYROM" in order not to block Macedonia's EU
progress. Meanwhile, the Greek media of all persuasions
unanimously slammed the proposal, with many arguing that the
U.S. was behind it, a charge that Ambassador told Rokanas was
wrong and unfair. Some predicted that PM Karamanlis would
choose to hold a referendum on the name issue -- a worrisome
but unlikely development, given that FM Molyviatis has told
us he fears this above all. END SUMMARY.

GoG Rejects Latest Plan


2. (SBU) In a detailed statement on October 10, the GoG
deemed "unacceptable" the latest name issue proposal from UN
Envoy Matthew Nimetz (full text at www.mfa.gr). While we
have yet to see the actual proposal itself, based on reftel
and broadcast/print reports here, the Greeks objected in
particular to a dual-name solution -- a stance they have
maintained for some time and which FM Molyviatis has
repeatedly told us is unacceptable. The statement also
accused Nimetz of bias in favor of the Macedonian position.
However, the statement devotes a lot of space to support the
European perspective of Macedonia and makes clear Greece will
continue to work within the framework of the UN process.


3. (C) In an October 11 meeting with Ambassador and DCM,
MFA Secretary General Rokanas said that while he himself did
not believe this, most Greeks considered the U.S to be behind
the new proposal. Ambassador replied that that
characterization was both wrong and unfair and that Nimetz
had been careful not to brief it to the U.S. before
presenting it to the two sides to avoid just such an
impression. He also reminded Rokanas that when Greece had
accepted Nimetz's last proposal as a basis for negotiations

("Republika Makedonija-Skopje"),few then had made such an
accusation.


4. (C) Ambassador reiterated USG support for Nimetz and the
UN process and that we remained anxious for a solution,
especially in relation to the November 9 avis from the
European Commission on Macedonia's readiness to begin
accession talks. Noting that U/S Burns had made these same
points to FM Molyviatis at their September 18 meeting in New
York, Ambassador asked whether the GoG would accept the term
"FYROM" for Macedonia's EU accession prospects to proceed;
Rokanas answered that he believed so. Asked the way ahead
now that the GoG had rejected this proposal, Rokanas said he
was unsure, but noted that Greece's relations with Macedonia,
aside from the name issue, were excellent. He did not know
when or what the GoG would formally reply to Nimetz.

Greek Media Frenzy, Opposition Jumps on Bandwagon


5. (U) Meanwhile, the Greek press of all political stripes
gave prominent space to the proposal, unanimously
characterizing it with such words as "travesty" and
"disaster." Two pro-government papers (Eleftheros Typos and
Apogevmatini) argued that PM Karamanlis would now choose to
hold a referendum on the name issue and use the outcome as a
platform to veto Skopje's desire to join both NATO and the
EU, if it chose to pursue membership with its constitutional
name. Pro-main opposition party PASOK media characterized
Karamanlis as "buckling under American pressure" and not
receiving anything in return. PASOK foreign affairs
spokesman Papoutsis charged that it was the ND government's
"lack of strategy" that had brought Greece to this juncture.
Both PASOK and other opposition parties have also asked the
government for a briefing on the proposal and some have asked
for a convening of the National Foreign Affairs Council, made
up of all the parliamentary parties.


6. (C) In an October 11 conversation with poloff, MFA
spokesman Koumoutsakos complained that he was taking a lot of
heat from journalists, who were asking why the GoG did not
hold a referendum on the issue and why it had nothing to show
for its so-called strategic partnership with the U.S. Poloff
noted that the USG was unfairly being attacked and
Koumoutsakos agreed, but said that in this atmosphere, it
made more sense to say as little as possible than take the
issue head on.


7. (C) COMMENT: It should come as no surprise that the GoG
quickly rejected this latest Nimetz proposal. FM Molyviatis
has been clear and consistent that Greece could never accept
a dual-name solution. Our key interest in all this, of
course, is to make certain the name issue does not de-rail
Macedonia's EU prospects. If there is no solution by
November 9 -- and this DOA proposal makes the chances look
increasingly dim -- at least the Greeks will not object to
the continued use of "FYROM" in the accession process.


8. (C) COMMENT (cont'd): Another factor that needs to be
kept in mind is the GoG's fear of what Molyviatis calls the
"referendum virus." He is afraid that with the focus on the
name, pressure will build even in pro-government circles for
Greece to promise to hold a referendum on Macedonia's EU
accession to strengthen the government's negotiating
position. Besides introducing uncertainty into Macedonia's
future, a referendum commitment would make it hard to avoid a
similar vote on Turkey's accession. While both accession
decisions seem to be distant prospects, referendum promises
made now would be hard to undo later.
RIES