Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ASUNCION935
2005-07-25 14:25:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Asuncion
Cable title:  

PARAGUAY ON OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONTROL AND

Tags:  PARM MASS EAIR ETTC PREL PTER PA OAS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000935 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR WHA, PM AND NP
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/AA
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD DAN JOHNSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2015
TAGS: PARM MASS EAIR ETTC PREL PTER PA OAS
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY ON OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONTROL AND
SECURITY GUIDELINES ON MANPADS

REF: A. STATE 113041

B. ASUNCION 00767

C. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0030 05 AND PRECEDING

D. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0006 05 AND PRECEDING

E. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0033 04

F. 04 ASUNCION 00099 AND PRECEDING

Classified By: PolOff Mark A. Stamilio, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000935

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR WHA, PM AND NP
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/AA
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD DAN JOHNSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2015
TAGS: PARM MASS EAIR ETTC PREL PTER PA OAS
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY ON OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONTROL AND
SECURITY GUIDELINES ON MANPADS

REF: A. STATE 113041

B. ASUNCION 00767

C. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0030 05 AND PRECEDING

D. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0006 05 AND PRECEDING

E. ASUNCION PA IIR 6 875 0033 04

F. 04 ASUNCION 00099 AND PRECEDING

Classified By: PolOff Mark A. Stamilio, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy has no information to suggest that
there are MANPADs in Paraguay, within or outside of
government control. However, the lack of import/export
controls on arms, corruption within the military, other
government agencies and Paraguayan society in general, and
known FARC activity in the region make it impossible to rule
out the possibility that MANPADs exist in or transit through
Paraguay. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) Paraguay has a long history as a major trafficking
route for contraband of all sorts, including weapons,
particularly through the tri-border area (TBA). The FARC,
for one, smuggles weapons and ammunition through the Southern
Cone of South America, particularly through Paraguay, on well
established trafficking routes. Weapons are traded for
Colombian cocaine in the TBA and Paraguay's northern Chaco
region, and some weapons stolen from the Paraguayan military
have been seized from FARC guerrillas in Colombia. (Comment:
If the FARC were trying to acquire MANPADs, it is conceivable
that they would transport them through Paraguay on these
established trafficking routes. End Comment.)


3. (S/NF) There are over 100 registered weapons and
ammunition dealers in Paraguay, and countless smaller,
unregistered businesses that deal in weapons and ammunition.
Most of these businesses purport to sell their wares for
hunting purposes, but it is widely known that a large
percentage of them buy and sell a wide range of illegal
weapons and ammunition. Many of the businesses are owned by
Chinese, Middle Easterners and Brazilians, as well as
Paraguayans.


4. (S/NF) EmbOffs are aware of several shipments of supposed
hunting weapons and ammunition that exceeded 40 tons each.
(Comment: It is not credible that a country with a population
of 6.3 million and an official per capita GDP of only USD
1,100 would import such quantities of legitimate hunting
weapons and ammunition. End Comment.) Because there are no
restrictions on the quantities of weapons and ammunition
imported or exported from the country, such shipments are not
inspected and clear customs with ease. The shipping
documents are routinely falsified, and corrupt customs
officials facilitate entry and exit of the contraband.


5. (S/NF) Once in the country, weapons and ammunition are
typically stored at a Paraguayan Navy depot or the facilities
of the Paraguayan military's Directorate of War Materiel
(DIMABEL). Corrupt military officials collect bribes in
exchange for the protection they provide for the contraband.
Among others, the Commander of the Paraguayan Presidential
Escort Regiment, Colonel Heriberto Galeano Rojas, has been
rumored to be involved in the scheme (ref C).


6. (C) Other military officials have been caught trafficking
high-caliber weapons stolen from the Paraguayan armed forces.
In one such case, Air Force LtCol Enrique Sarubbi Flores was
convicted of attempting to leave a military base with a
50-caliber machine gun in the trunk of his car while
conducting his duties as Officer of the Day (refs D and F).


7. (C) Admiral Julio Cesar Baez Acosta, who until recently
served as the Commander of the Paraguayan Navy, has a 1986
U.S. District Court conviction for attempting to illegally
export ammunition from the United States on board the
Paraguayan Navy vessel he skippered at the time (ref E).
Baez was replaced as Commander of the Navy in June 2005 amid
rumors that he was involved in corruption at the Navy's
repair facility (ref B).


8. (S/NF) In this environment, it impossible to rule out the
possibility that MANPADs exist in or transit through
Paraguay. However, Embassy has no information to suggest
that there are MANPADs in Paraguay, within or outside of GOP
control.
KEANE