Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ASUNCION556
2005-04-25 16:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asuncion
Cable title:  

DUARTE FORETELLS CABRAL'S OUSTER, SEEKS CLOSER

Tags:  PREL SNAR US PA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000556 

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015
TAGS: PREL SNAR US PA
SUBJECT: DUARTE FORETELLS CABRAL'S OUSTER, SEEKS CLOSER
COOPERATION

REF: A. ASUNCION 531


B. ASUNCION 499 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Keane for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000556

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2015
TAGS: PREL SNAR US PA
SUBJECT: DUARTE FORETELLS CABRAL'S OUSTER, SEEKS CLOSER
COOPERATION

REF: A. ASUNCION 531


B. ASUNCION 499 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Keane for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Duarte invited me to see him early on April

22. His purpose was to assure me that controversial police
commissioner Aristides Cabral would be taken out of the
picture, although it had not been easy because of Cabral's
powerful backers. Cabral would be indicted soon, or he would
retire. (Later that day, Cabral announced his retirement.)
This led to a soliloquy about the tentacles of corruption
which pervade Paraguayan society and the need for
perseverance as well as patience. He touched on his
relations with the South American neighborhood, particulary
Brazil. I told him that the local Venezuelan Ambassador's
remarks implying U.S. involvement in the attack on the
Paraguayan Ambassador in Caracas were ridiculous and stupid.
Other topics included counterdrug cooperation and Paraguayan
security concerns. Senior Duarte advisor Carlos Walde was
present. End Summary.

--------------
CABRAL TO LEAVE
--------------


2. (C) President Duarte's aide called me at 6:30 a.m. on
April 22 asking me to come see Duarte at 8:30 that morning.
Duarte got right to the point. Maintaining "governability"
in Paraguay, he said, is a difficult balancing act. "I don't
run things any way I want here" he went on; "there are many
powerful players. I cannot divide my party (Colorados),my
block in the Senate. I would not be able to govern. I have
to bring along my allies (Senator) Galaverna and the
President of the (Colorado) Party (Senator Herminio Caceres).
Without a united block we will lose governability. This
Cabral ... it takes time, perseverance, patience."


3. (C) He said he had requested Attorney General LaTorre
sometime ago to build a case to indict Cabral so that he
would have unchallenged grounds to withdraw his promotion,
and he did not know why it had not happened. I told Duarte
of my conversation with LaTorre (ref A),and explained that
with a little effort investigating the disapearance of
500,000 dollars in 2001 they should be able to build a good
case.


4. (C) The President said that even if LaTorre delays, the

problem should go away because Cabral told him he is going to
request retirement. (I suspect Duarte instructed him to do
so.) One way or another, Duarte assured me, Cabral will not
become Police Commander and will not be promoted. I replied
that I welcome that news because Cabral is a "big stone in
the road impeding closer bilateral cooperation."


5. (U) Later that day, Cabral announced that he was
requesting retirement "due to personal reasons." The press
speculated that he knew he could not be promoted and he might
be indicted again if he did not remove himself.

--------------
TILTING AT CORRUPTION WINDMILLS
--------------


6. (C) Duarte then requested my forebearance with an
explanation of his discouragement. For twenty minutes or
more he went on about how corruption was deliberately
nurtured by the dictatorship (pre-1989) and subsequent
governments; it was the "business model," and leaders of all
powerful sectors benefitted handsomely: political leaders of
all parties, GOP bureaucrats, the private sector. They are
resisting reform, and it takes time to chip away at it, to
strengthen institutional capacity to prevent, detect and
attack it. He gave many familiar examples (state
enterprises, ministries, the public health and pension
system, etc.),but new to me was his complaint that Brazil
will not cooperate with Paraguay in trying to bring
transparency to the Itaipu Binational Entity which manages
the billion dollar hydroelectric facilities of the same name.
He claimed to be so disheartened that he is not interested
in re-election. (Comment: He was not convincing and his
supporters are gearing up for this without any signs Duarte
disagrees with the effort.)

--------------
THE NEIGHBORHOOD'S LEFTWARD SLOPE
AND VENEZUELA'S LACK OF CREDIBILITY
--------------


7. (C) What followed was a quick review of how the
"neighborhood" has become more unfriendly toward the U.S. He
mentioned that Vazquez (Uruguay),Lula (Brazil),Kirchner
(Argentina) and Chavez (Venezuela) are exerting pressure on
the other South Americans to tilt "leftward," but asserted
that he has a different outlook vis-a-vis the U.S. and wants
closer cooperation, particularly on the counterdrug,
anti-organized crime, security and anti-corruption efforts.
He said he strongly disagreed with Chavez.


8. (C) The Venezuelan Ambassador in Asuncion, I noted,
recently made outrageous allegations implying that the U.S.
was behind the April 8 attack on the Paraguayan Ambassador in
Caracas. I told him the remarks were ridiculous and stupid.
Duarte replied that no one believes what the Venezuelans say
and he knows the charge was absurd.

--------------
DEEPENING COOPERATION
--------------


9. (C) Duarte returned to the topic of enhancing
U.S.-Paraguayan cooperation and requested helicopters, fuel
for the air force, and trucks for the police and military. I
replied that U.S. assistance is continuing and that we were
turning over to Paraguay that very morning 6 vehicles for the
counterdrug secretariat (SENAD). Moreover, we had provided
fuel for many operations. I noted that we were awaiting a
reply on our request for a capability to detect and monitor
airborne trafficking. Walde said he was aware of a U.S.
program to provide excess defense articles. I replied that
significant provision of U.S. equipment was not possible due
to budget and other constraints. Moreover, I added, lack of
an Article 98 agreement, negotiation of which has entailed
three years of effort without results, precludes the
possibility of excess defense articles. Duarte offered no
reaction. With respect to cooperation on public safety and
against trans-national organized crime and terrorism, I noted
that we are prepared to be supportive and suggested that a
visit by Vice President Castiglioni to Washington to explore
ideas might be useful. Duarte concurred. We agreed to meet
again soon to discuss other topics.

--------------
MENDING FENCES
--------------


10. (C) Comment: Duarte was obviously eager to let me know
that the Cabral issue was near resolution, and to explain why
it was so difficult. I do not doubt that, but remain
troubled by the implication that drug traffickers' allies
have gained so much power in Congress, the courts and the
Public Ministry. Duarte's stress on the need to retain the
undivided support of his party block in Congress (which hold
only 40% of seats in the Senate) is well placed; all of his
predecessors as President during the democratic era lost that
support and with it the ability to govern at first and,
ultimately were overwhelmed by political instability.
Cabral's departure removes a significant impediment to closer
cooperation, but the whole episode is a reminder that
progress against corruption will require constant vigilance
and at times relentless pressure. We will need to take
account of this as we work with the GOP in the formulation of
its MCC Threshold program implementation plan including
quantifiable measures of results. A case in point is the
Public Ministry, whose flaws are a major factor in the
impunity which is so pervasive.
KEANE