PARAGUAY'S AG UPSET OVER INCSR, DISCUSSES:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000531

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL SNAR PA
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY'S AG UPSET OVER INCSR, DISCUSSES:
CABRAL, HIJAZI, POLICE REFORM, AND MONEY LAUNDERING WITH
AMBASSADOR


Classified By: DCM KEVIN M. JOHNSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

SUMMARY


1. (C) AG Oscar Latorre complained vigorously to Ambassador
4/14 that the section of the 2005 International Narcotics
Strategy Control Report (INCSR) on Paraguay unfairly singled
him out for criticism. Ambassador stressed that the report
identified problems with the Public Ministry he heads rather
than him personally, and explained why. Latorre predicted
Cabral,s promotion was dead, one way or another. He offered
only tepid proposals to advance the Hijazi tax evasion/money
laundering case, money laundering legislation, and
cooperation with SENAD and SEPRELAD, alleging that in the
case of the latter issue these institutions must prove
themselves to prosecutors. Significantly, he said the
President would by decree designate 50 police officers to
form an elite unit under the AG pending establishment of a
new judicial police force. Latorre was genuinely irate over
the INSCR, but displayed the stonewalling attitude on a host
of issues that is a major source of criticism. The AG
apparently fears cooperating too closely with the USG and
allies in SEPRELAD and SENAD will limit his freedom of
action. End Summary.

INCSR AND THE ANGRY AG


2. (C) Ambassador hosted lunch for AG Latorre April 14
after the AG made it known he was livid over criticism in the
INCSR. Latorre said he was shocked and angered over language
he interpreted to be directed at him personally, signaling
that he was worse than the police and judicial sectors, which
were cited for corruption while he was also called
inefficient. Noting that the criticism was institutional,
rather than personal, the Ambassador conceded that some
language should be more precise. Latorre asked if this was
retribution for the Cabral case, alleging he had no
responsibility for the multiple misdeeds by prosecutors and
others in letting Cabral escape punishment. The Ambassador
said it was about institutional problems, not one case.
Latorre claimed that SENAD personnel (not necessarily SENAD
Chief Hugo Ibarra) plotted against him, including campaigning
for Ruben Romero, the President of the Council of
Magistrates, to replace him.

CABRAL


3. (C) After a lengthy, self-serving self defense of his
own role in the Cabral affair, Latorre said the President now
sought a new indictment of Cabral as grounds to withdraw his
promotion from the Senate. &NDF calls me every day on
this,8 lamented Latorre, arguing that the legal issues were
difficult. New evidence and accusations by the trafficker
Jaime Amato don,t stand up to legal scrutiny, he said, and
previous charges were badly mishandled, making it hard to
move forward. & I don,t want to be another General
Rodriguez,8 he continued, referring to the former head of
SENAD assassinated in the mid-90s. In conclusion, however,
Latorre said Cabral,s promotion was now out of the question;
it was just a matter of deciding how to end the situation.
(Comment: Throughout the Cabral affair actors in all branches
of government have steadfastly pushed responsibility for
derailing his promotion to others; the President,
prosecutors, the Supreme Court, and the Senate have all
refused good opportunities to put this to rest. The back and
forth continues in an almost comic way, but Cabral,s
promotion now appears less likely. End Comment.)

MONEY LAUNDERING LAW


4. (C) Latorre praised the draft money laundering
legislation in the Senate, arguing that it was a good moment
to push it, and there shouldn,t be too much opposition. He
suggested a joint meeting with Colorado Senator Bader Rachid,
who heads a committee examining broader penal code reform, to
gain momentum. The Ambassador asked about NDF and Latorre
pushing it, rather than relying on Rachid (an uncertain ally
at best). Latorre agreed the President could do that.
(Comment: Rachid and other Senators close to shady business
leaders may wish to shape the legislation in small but
important ways to protect themselves and their friends.
Latorre,s suggested approach shows reluctance to push the
law; he prefers either making a deal with powerful Senators
or having others do the pushing. Ambassador will raise this
again with President Duarte, who has expressed strong support
for the bill but will now need to press Senators to pass it.
End Comment.)

FISCALIA COOPERATION WITH SEPRELAD AND SENAD


5. (C) The Ambassador pressed Latorre for better
cooperation by prosecutors with SEPRELAD. The AG described
at length why prosecutors historically haven,t trusted
SEPRELAD or SENAD, arguing that small steps are needed to
build confidence. Asked about the Hijazi money laundering
case, Latorre suggested a meeting where SEPRELAD could
explain to prosecutors how it can help. (Note: this has
been done already. end note.) Asked about unfulfilled
promises by prosecutors to share documents with SEPRELAD, he
repeated his argument that trust needs to be established. He
suggested working a few small cases, such as illicit
enrichment by police officers, as a first step. Latorre then
criticized SENAD, saying it was impossible to believe the
marijuana in San Pedro Department couldn,t be detected and
destroyed; SENAD lacked the will to act, he maintained. The
Ambassador noted dramatic improvements in SENAD and SEPRELAD
and urged prosecutors to take better advantage of their help.
(Comment: Latorre,s laments about two imperfect but
improving institutions rang especially hollow given the poor
public image of prosecutors from different offices within the
Public Ministry. End Comment.)

NEW POLICE UNIT


6. (U) The AG said NDF had agreed to detail 50 police
officers to his office to form an elite investigative unit.
This is an interim step to deal with dramatic problems in the
police pending possible creation of a new judicial police
force, he added.

COMMENT: CONFIDENTLY PURSUING HIS OWN AGENDA


7. (C) Strengthened by his relatively good performance in
the Cubas case (compared to the police),Latorre may be
reelected in August and is flexing his muscles. While the
INCSR language bothered him, his exaggerated reaction is a
way to question whether it is worth it to cooperate with the
USG and agencies we,ve sponsored (SEPRELAD and SENAD.) His
reluctance to share information with Embassy allies has a
simpler explanation, however; too close cooperation limits
his ability to control the agenda, decide who gets prosecuted
and what information gets public, which friends are rewarded
and enemies punished, etc.

KEANE