SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S JANUARY 11-12

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000097

SIPDIS

FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM AMBASSADOR EDELMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS TU IZ AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S JANUARY 11-12
VISIT TO TURKEY

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Our bilateral relationship with Turkey has
become quite bumpy over the last years. The comfort of our
NATO Alliance has been tested by Turkish perceptions of our
operations in Iraq, developments on the domestic scene, and
the movement toward the EU. Turkey shares our overall policy
goals for Iraq, but is concerned about the possibility of a
Shia-dominated government after elections as well as Kurdish
aspirations for independence. Turkey has been constructive
in insisting on elections on time everywhere in the country
and tells us it is reaching out to Sunnis to encourage their
participation in the political process. Iraq dominates our
bilateral relations with Turkey; the Turks are bitter about
our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel, our arrest of
Turkish SF personnel near Suleymania in July 2003,
"aggressive" coalition military operations, and what they
perceive as our excessive tilt toward Iraq's Kurds (including
some disinformation via Iraqi Turkmen sources they are
probably responsible for themselves). Turkish leaders seem
ready to believe the most outrageous and false reporting in
the Turkish press about civilian deaths and coalition tactics
in anti-insurgent operations. Nonetheless, Turkey cooperates
with our efforts in Iraq by allowing our tankers to refuel
cargo flights on OIF and OEF missions, the use of Incirlik
for rotation of troops out of Iraq, and by keeping open a key
GLOC for coalition sustainment and goods for the Iraqi
people. Insurgents have killed about 70 Turkish truck
drivers and contractors in Iraq, as well as five Turkish
police officers transiting Mosul on Dec. 17; the latter event
especially shocked the country. In Afghanistan, the Turks do
not participate meaningfully in OEF, but allow us to do some
logistical support out of and move detainees through Turkey.
They will take over the rotating ISAF command for the second
time in February with about 1,600 troops. End summary.

Iraq: Still a Wedge Between Us
--------------


2. (C) Iraq impacts our entire bilateral relationship.
Senior military commanders have worked hard to repair the
damage caused by Turkey's failure to approve passage of the
4th ID in March 2003 and our arrest of Turkish Special Forces
personnel in Suleymania on July 4 of that year, and
relationships at the top have improved. Nonetheless, the
relationship remains fragile. The GOT shares our policy goal
of a unified, prosperous, democratic Iraq at peace internally
and with its neighbors, but our action in Iraq has always
been unpopular in Turkey. The images of violence,
exaggerated stories of civilian casualties--including some
information circulated by the Turkish-influenced Iraqi
Turkmen Front--turn the Iraq issue into one that undermines
the basic perception of common values, including among the
Turkish military at many levels.


3. (C) Concerns about the ethnic balance in and future of
Kirkuk, Kurdish desires for independence, our lack of action
against the terrorist PKK/Kongra Gel (hereon Kongra-Gel)
camps in northern Iraq and perceived discrimination against
Iraq's Turkmen population underpin Turkish attitudes on Iraq.
While the government took measures to reiterate the value of
U.S.-Turkish relations, sensationalist, irresponsible press
reports and statements by public figures feed perceptions
that we caused massive civilian casualties, including in
Fallujah; that we tolerate Kurdish designs to seize Kirkuk
and break away; and that the U.S. acquiesces to (or supports)
the PKK's presence in Iraq. All of this continues despite
continuing mission efforts to keep the GOT informed and to
hold the GOT and the media to a strict standard of fact in
their statements.


4. (C) You will be coming to Turkey less than three weeks
before the Iraqi elections, elections that both we and the
Turks believe are crucial to the future of Iraq and the
region. Whether the elections proceed smoothly or not, the
Turks have grave concerns about Iraq's future. They worry
about long-term U.S. staying power in Iraq, that events in
Iraq will spiral out of control, and that Ankara could be
faced with either a Shia-dominated government that they
assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an intensified
movement toward an independent Kurdish state emanating from
northern Iraq, or both. Turkish leaders will seek your
assurance that the USG, and our military, remain committed to
ensuring a stable--and unified--Iraq. Turkey has thrown its
full support behind holding Iraqi elections on time. FonMin
Gul told Deputy Secretary Armitage Jan. 3 that any delay in
elections would worsen the security situation, throw Turkey's
Iraq policy into disarray, and force Turkey to re-assess its
approach.

PKK/Kongra-Gel: Another Sticking Point
--------------


5. (C) Coincidentally, you will also arrive here on the same
day the U.S., Turkey, and Iraq will hold our first trilateral
discussion on border security, specifically PKK/Kongra-Gel.
Senior Turkish military leaders tell us that they understand
that we are not now able to take action against this
terrorist organization. They remind us, however, of the need
to show resolve and to stand with Turkey in working on ways
to render the PKK/Kongra-Gel ineffective. (NOTE: We also
know that the military uses our lack of action against
PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the current government, which it
dislikes, and claim it cannot deliver, either. END NOTE.)
We hope these talks will produce some results to indicate
that the U.S., Turkey, and Iraq are working together to
fulfill President Bush's pledge that Iraq will no longer be a
base for terrorist operations against Turkey. This is all
the more important since PKK/Kongra-Gel uses northern Iraq as
its command and control base and its terrorists infiltrate
into Turkey from Iraq and murder Turkish security personnel
and civilians. The GOT knows that there is no substantive
connection between your visit and these talks, and we will
also work with the press to avoid this confusion.

Turkey Hurt By Insurgency
--------------


6. (C) Though Turkey has lost about 70 truck drivers and
contractors to insurgent attacks in Iraq, Turk were
especially shocked when on Dec. 17 AIF murdered five Turkish
police officers (and an Iraqi driver) who were driving
through Mosul on their way to Baghdad to provide security for
the Turkish embassy there. Task Force Olympia personnel
killed two of the terrorists, treated the Turkish WIA, and
helped repatriate both the five bodies and the WIA Turk back
home. This incident was a cause for national mourning and
angst, and the entire state apparatus from the President and
Prime Minister to the CHOD and National Police Chief turned
out for the funeral. After the DCM admonished DCHOD General
Basbug concerning initial outrageous press reports and a
Turkish General's irresponsible and uninformed comments,
implying the U.S. was responsible for the deaths, Turkish
leaders and senior officials have gone out of their way to
express their appreciation privately for TFO's efforts
(including a warm letter from CHOD GEN Ozkok to GEN Myers).
However, publicly they remain silent. We have tried to use
this tragic incident to point out to the Turks that coalition
operations against AIF are seeking to prevent the very
attacks that have resulted in the deaths of their police
officers and truck drivers. Even privately, Turkish leaders
seem unable or unwilling to acknowledge this point, though it
is true that since this incident both officials and the press
seem to have toned down the anti-American rhetoric...a bit.

Not All Bad News...
--------------


7. (C) Despite our policy differences, Turkey has provided
valuable assistance and cooperation, for which you should
express appreciation. Ankara offered to send peacekeeping
troops to Iraq in October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik
Air Base for tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions
for both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF),authorized the transit of U.S. troops from
Iraq on rotation out, and permits the transit of supplies for
our forces and humanitarian goods (since its inception until
the end of CY 04, over $2.5 billion worth of coalition
sustainment and humanitarian assistance). The GOT has
reached out to all major Iraqi groups to encourage
participation in elections on January 30. Turkey is also
active in reconstruction efforts, including providing
electricity for Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi
diplomats and, as its contribution to the NATO training
mission, Iraqi security forces.

...But Turks Dragging Their Feet on Further Cooperation
-------------- --------------


8. (C) That said, recent requests to increase our use of
Incirlik AB (e.g., establish a logistics air hub, support
EUCOM's request to increase training deployments) have been
delayed as Turkish officials consider them part and parcel
with the idea that we might seek to move F-16s permanently to
the base as part of the Defense Posture Review Initiative.
Turkish military leaders have told us that they support the
use of Incirlik as a cargo hub, but that the decision now
rests with the civilian leadership. You may want to remind
your civilian interlocutors (especially FonMin Gul) that the
cargo hub--which we requested of the GOT over six months
ago--would be of vital operational assistance to the success
of OIF and OEF.

Support for the GWOT
--------------


9. (C) The public and official preoccupation with Iraq
overshadows the positive cooperation we have in other aspects
of the GWOT: Since 9/11 and the November 2003 Istanbul
attacks, our traditional intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation has improved. Our militaries coordinate
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their
abilities to protect important energy transportation routes.
Turkey subscribes to every arms control arrangement it is
eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security
Initiative. Ankara has been supportive of international
efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA,
although they are more inclined to persuasion than coercion.
The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training Center
provides counterterrorism and other training to personnel
from PfP partner countries. The military has recently
established a NATO Center of Excellence for the Defense
Against Terrorism that will provide more specialized training
opportunities for both NATO partner nations and Allies. And
Turkey will again assume the command of ISAF in February for
a six-month period, during which they will significantly
increase their contribution (up to about 1,600 troops) to
this important NATO mission.

Afghanistan
--------------


10. (C) While Turkey has only token participation in OEF, it
maintains a constant presence of about 220 soldiers in ISAF.
Starting next month it will begin another six-month stint as
rotating commander of ISAF. During the spring and summer of
2004, we succeeded in getting Turkey to commit to provide a
PRT, but NATO planners, the U.S., and other Allies sent mixed
signals to the Turks on where their PRT might serve, and the
Turks withdrew their offer. Now that NATO is seeking PRTs
for Phase II, we are gently probing the Turks to again
consider the issue.

Your Meetings
--------------


11. (U) The GOT has confirmed meetings for you with Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul, Deputy CHOD General Ilker Basbug, and
Chairman of the Turkish National Security Council Ambassador
Yigit Alpogan. Regrettably both Prime Minister Erdogan and
CHOD General Ozkok will be out of the country during your
visit.

Gul
---


12. (C) Gul was serving as Prime Minister during the leadup
to the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote denying the use of
Turkey for OIF, and he was seen within the ruling AK Party as
working directly to ensure the motion did not pass. He
remains a difficult interlocutor for us on Iraq. Despite his
seemingly good English and apparently amiable demeanor, Gul
has Islamist origins and is at best uncomfortable with the
U.S. presence in the region. During his Jan. 3 meeting with
Deputy Secretary Armitage, Gul accused the U.S. of favoring
the interests of the Iraqi Kurds over those of Turkey and
Iraq's Turkmen population. That said, he has maintained the
Foreign Ministry's generally constructive approach to Iraq,
including outreach to Iraq's Sunni politicians to encourage
their participation in January elections as well as claiming
that Turkey is using its influence to get the Iranians and
Syrians to cease their support for terrorism in Iraq.

Alpogan
--------------


13. (C) Amb. Alpogan took over in Oct. 2004 as the first
civilian Secretary-General in the seventy-year history of
Turkey's National Security Council, an executive foreign
policy body composed of the President, the Prime Minister and
other key ministers, and senior military officers. Previous
Secretaries-General had been four-star Army generals.

SIPDIS
Alpogan is reforming the organization's heavy reliance on the
armed forces, creating a mixed organization of professional
diplomats as well as military officers. As with your other
interlocutors, he will likely be focused on Iraq, but will
also be interested in a broader discussion on other countries
in your AOR.


14. (C) Points to Emphasize With Gul and Alpogan:

--Appreciate you working together with us as elections
approach in Iraq.

--Appreciate also your outreach to Sunni parties to encourage
their participation, which is vital not just to the election
but to the future of a unified Iraq.

--We are working hard to ensure that Iraqi Kurds remain part
of a unified Iraq. An independent Kurdistan is not in either
of our interests.

--For example, we have pressed them hard on participating in
governorate council elections in Kirkuk.

--Understand that the insurgency has taken its toll on your
citizens, including your truck drivers and more recently the
five Turkish police officers murdered in Mosul.

--Insurgents want to discourage Turkey from carrying out a
constructive role in Iraq; we cannot let them win.

--As we did during the Talafar and Fallujah operations, we
will do our best to share real-time information both here in
Ankara and with your LNOs in Iraq.

--The wildly exaggerated and just plain wrong reporting in
the Turkish press about our operations (especially in
Fallujah)--regrettably repeated by some Turkish leaders--can
strain our partnership. Urge you to correct the record where
possible.

--The terrorists we go after in such operations are the same
people who kill your citizens in Iraq.

--Understand that the government is still considering our
request to use Incirlik Air Base as a cargo hub for OIF and
OEF. When can we expect a response?

--Appreciate Turkey again assuming command of ISAF next
month. Your command period will cover Afghanistan's
parliamentary elections, a key milestone.

--NATO is still lacking enough PRTs to cover Phase II needs.
Would Turkey again consider offering a PRT, perhaps after
your ISAF command ends in August 2005?

Basbug
--------------


15. (C) Basbug is an experienced commander, comfortable with
and accessible to foreign guests. Though he and his military
colleagues are distrustful of the current moderate Islamist
government, TGS stood aside and kept silent in the runup to
the EU's Dec. 17 decision to begin accession negotiations
with Turkey this year. The Turkish armed forces share the
GOT's concerns about Iraq, and are deeply suspicious of the
aspirations of both Iraq's and Turkey's Kurds. While
Turkey's military leaders used to raise our inaction again
Kongra-Gel in nearly every meeting with U.S. officials from
mid-2003 to mid-2004, of late they have not mentioned this
issue very much; they have stopped asking when we will take
action. This lack of communication does not mean their anger
is allayed. Basbug especially will likely note the
coincidence of your visit here with the trilateral Kongra-Gel
talks.


16. (C) Points to Emphasize With Basbug:

--Understand that the insurgency has taken its toll on your
citizens, including your truck drivers and more recently the
five Turkish police officers murdered in Mosul.

--Insurgents want to discourage Turkey from carrying out a
constructive role in Iraq; we cannot and will not let them
win.

--As we did during the Talafar and Fallujah operations, we
will do our best to share real-time information both here in
Ankara and with your LNOs in Iraq.

--Appreciate Turkey again assuming command of ISAF next
month. Your command period will cover Afghanistan's
parliamentary elections, a key milestone.

--NATO is still lacking enough PRTs to cover Phase II needs.
Would Turkey again consider offering a PRT, perhaps after
your ISAF command ends in August 2005?

--(IF RAISED) Understand your frustration that Kongra-Gel
remains in place in northern Iraq. We need to work together
with the Iraqis to take steps to weaken the organization so
that it cannot threaten you or Iraq.


17. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.


18. (U) Kabul minimize considered.
EDELMAN