Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA865
2005-02-15 13:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

AFGHANISTAN: TURKS RELAXED ABOUT MAZAR REJECTION

Tags:  MARR PREL PGOV TU AF UK 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000865 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2030
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV TU AF UK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TURKS RELAXED ABOUT MAZAR REJECTION

REF: A. ANKARA 356

B. ANKARA 353

C. ANKARA 504

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000865

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2030
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV TU AF UK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: TURKS RELAXED ABOUT MAZAR REJECTION

REF: A. ANKARA 356

B. ANKARA 353

C. ANKARA 504

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) The subject of Turkey's interest in replacing the UK
at its PRT in Mazar-e Sharif (refs A and B) came up during a
meeting on another subject between MFA DDG for South Asia
Aydin Evirgen and polmilcouns. Evirgen understood that
London was no longer interested in Turkey taking over the
Mazar PRT and that others would be filling this role. He
said the important thing was that the job get done -- whether
by Turkey or someone else was not important. Given the great
reluctance in Ankara for Turkey to do a PRT, Evirgen thought
no one would be disappointed. When asked to expand on the
GOT's reluctance to lead PRTs, Evirgen explained that the
concept was relatively new and not well defined. How a joint
civilian-military operation would be conducted was difficult
for senior Turkish officials and politicians to grasp. Each
time Turkey has explored leading a PRT, it has only been with
the reluctant approval of decision-makers.


2. (C) Evirgen noted that ISAF stage 2 expansion seemed to be
progressing well, with nations stepping up to take the lead
in PRTs in the West. Polmilcouns observed that stage 3 was
still to come; he encouraged Turkey to consider contributing
to that effort. With the command of ISAF until August,
Turkey's contribution is significant Evirgen responded.
After that, Ankara would examine how Turkey could usefully
further assist Afghanistan. Meanwhile MFA was continuing to
encourage the Turkish military to contribute to the training
of the Afghan National Army, focusing on the war college (ref
C). The GOT was also planning some high-level visits:
Foreign Minister Gul was supposed to attend the Feb. 13 ISAF
change of command, but bad weather forced him to postpone to
sometime in March. Prime Minister Erdogan is planning to
visit Kabul in April.


3. (C) Comment: The Turks understand that their taking over
the PRT in Mazar is not in the cards. The leadership's
reluctance to embrace PRTs and the military's reluctance to
take on a more robust combat role (the Turkish General Staff
twice declined CENTCOM's requests in 2003 to contribute to
OEF) suggest winning a Turkish contribution to ISAF's
expansion into the south will not be easy. The Afghanis will
need to tell Gul and Erdogan that they would prefer Turkey to
contribute to ISAF's move south if we are to convince the GOT
to do so. End comment.
EDELMAN