DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JAN. 3 MEETING WITH TURKISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000078

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS MARR TU IR IZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S JAN. 3 MEETING WITH TURKISH
DEPUTY PM/FONMIN GUL


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Secretary underscored U.S. support
for Iraqi elections on schedule; dismissed Gul's assertions
that the U.S. favors Kurdish rather than Turkish concerns;
and noted what Syria needs to do against former Iraqi
regime elements if it wants better relations with the U.S.
Gul emphasized Turkey's shared interest in seeing Iraqi
elections on schedule; underscored Turkey's "closeness"
with Sunni Arabs and the need to get them to participate;
spoke enthusiastically about Turkey's warm relations with
Syria and influence on Syrian developments; and urged more
U.S. support for ending Turkish Cypriot isolation. End
summary.

Iraqi Elections: Hold Them On Schedule
--------------


2. (C) Deputy Secretary led off by underscoring Allawi's
determination to proceed with Jan. 30 elections in Iraq
despite Sunni Arab reluctance. The USG continues to urge
that the Sunni Arabs not repeat the Shi,as, historic
mistake
of depriving themselves of a voice by boycotting Iraqi
elections in the 1930's.


3. (C) At the same time, the security situation in the
Baathist Triangle, including Mosul, remains very difficult;
Turkey's liaison units should be in a position to brief
Ankara on the measures Task Force Olympia may have to
take. In addition, the Deputy Secretary underscored how
bluntly he had expressed to KDP Chief Barzani the USG view
that the KDP should stop trying to delay Kirkuk provincial
elections; it appeared Barzani understood the seriousness
of our message. Deputy Secretary added that he had
delivered the same clear message by phone to Talabani.
Turkey can also help by delivering a strong message to Arab
countries participating in the Jan. 6 Amman neighbors'
meeting.


4. (C) Gul responded that he regretted the recent failure
of both Turkey and the U.S. to engage in meaningful
bilateral consultations. We need to demonstrate again that
we are strategic partners, that we look to the long-term
health of our relationship, and that we recognize we need
each other.


5. (C) Turkey wishes success for the U.S. in Iraq since
Turkey and the U.S. share the same objectives, Gul
claimed. Turkey suffered terribly during the previous
Iraqi regime. Any delay in elections would worsen the
security situation, throw Turkey's Iraq policy into
disarray, and force Turkey to re-assess its approach.
Therefore, it is important to support the Jan. 30
elections. If Iraq wants foreign soldiers to leave then
this is the plan to achieve that goal. Otherwise, Turkey
and Iraq's other neighbors, including Iran, don't want the
Coalition forces to leave. But the U.S. can't remain for
ever.

Sunni Arabs
--------------


6. (C) The problem is the Sunni Arab boycott, Gul
continued. The Turks and Sunni Arabs have a traditional
closeness, he declared. The Sunnis appreciate Turkish
religious values more, are less politicized in their
religiosity and more open to a secular system. Indeed,
they have more in common with the West than the others in
Iraq. Admittedly, at the same time the Iraqi dictator
arose from the Sunnis. Thus all is a question of
psychology: we should understand that the Sunni Arabs are
angry and frustrated.


7. (C) Yet we should convince them to participate, Gul
stated. Turkey is doing everything it can, and the GOT has
invited all the Sunni religious leaders to Ankara for
consultations, Gul averred. Among them is the
leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Muhsin Abdul Hamid.
(Note: Post has heard Abdul Hamid's name mentioned as a
conduit to Sunni radicals that Gul's colleague, and foreign
policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu used in fall 2004 to spring
kidnapped Turkish workers and truck drivers. End note.) Gul
claimed Abdul Hamid is "a clean man whose Islamist identity
corresponds to that of the people, but who is rational, not a
dreamer." Some MPs from
ruling AKP studied with Hamid and are convinced he can be
reasoned with, Gul claimed. However, he has not yet
responded to the Turks' invitation. Gul added that he would
insist to his Arab colleagues at the Jan. 6
neighbors' meeting in Amman that everyone support elections
as scheduled.

Gul: The Kurdish Problem
--------------


8. (C) Barzani is another problem, Gul asserted. The U.S.
is aware of all that Turkey has done for Barzani, all the
concessions Turkey has made in the past ten years, even
though Turkey saw the danger that he would use Turkish help
to build his own power infrastructure. The Kurds need to
persuade themselves that they are part of Iraq; they
shouldn't be allowed to damage the process of building a
united Iraq. This is why Turkey is sensitive. It's true
that people in Turkey's southeast feel kinship ties to the
Kurds in northern Iraq, but "we" (Turks) also have
relatives among the Turkmen and among Caucasian peoples.
More than 100,000 Kurds have been sent to Kirkuk; we are
disturbed. Therefore, Barzani shouldn't spoil the
balance. In the 1950's through 1970's 90% of Kirkuk city
center was Turks (sic). Modernization brought others into
the city, but Turkey objects to organized attempts to
change the balance. In this regard, Turkey appreciates
that the U.S. recognizes a higher population figure for the
Turkmen than before.


9. (C) Deputy Secretary noted that Saddam also changed the
demographic balance, bringing Arabs and others into
Kirkuk. In any event, in answer to the Deputy Secretary's
question Barzani had said there are no problems in his
relations with Turkey and he reiterated the same goals for
Iraq as the U.S. and Turkey have. How did Gul evaluate
Barzani's assessment?


10. (C) It's not just the Kurds who have suffered, Gul
responded. The Kurds shouldn't monopolize the Iraq
question. Because of Barzani's resistance there is still
only one border opening between Turkey and Iraq, whereas
the Iraqi-Iranian border is wide open and there are four or
five crossings with Syria. Turkey is an open society and
the citizenry is closely questioning the GOT why so many
trucks are waiting at the border to cross into Iraq. The
U.S. takes Barzani's interests fully into account but
doesn't take Turkey's enough into account, he contended.
Turkey is not against the Kurds. In the past, Turks, Kurds
and Sunni Arabs were all united against the Shi,a. We don't
need artificial problems, he concluded. Moreover, Gul
said, the MFA is extremely disturbed by a report from the
Turkish security services that the Pentagon has sponsored a
public opinion poll in eastern and southeastern Turkey
asking whether respondents want to secede and who should be
their president if they do so. How could the Pentagon do
such a thing on Turkish soil? Anti-Americanism is already
on the rise in Turkey. If such activity leaked to the
press it would be exceptionally damaging. Gul asked his
staff to pass details to the Embassy.


11. (C) Deputy Secretary rejoined that Gul's
characterization of the U.S. approach is unfair; the U.S.
takes Turkey's concerns into account. The Turks should put
themselves in President Bush's position: the U.S. has
150,000 troops in Iraq and some are dying nearly every
day. We have the same interests in success. Concerning
the reported poll, it makes no sense that the U.S. would be
associated in any way with such a venture; we would look
into it as soon as the Turkish side could give us
information. With regard to anti-Americanism, the U.S. has
noted many bad statements coming from many quarters in
Turkey.


12. (C) Gul retreated, answering the Deputy Secretary's
final remark by placing all the blame on a "mistaken
statement" equating the Fallujah operation with genocide by
the AKP chairman of the parliamentary human rights
committee.

Syria
--------------


13. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted his lengthy Jan. 2
conversations with both President Assad and FM Shara. While
Syria has taken some measures to return Iraqi funds moved by
the Baathis to Syria and has somewhat strengthened its border
with Iraq against infiltration into Iraq by foreign
insurgents, former Iraqi regime elements still have
unimpeded entry and exit. Syrian authorities have a good
idea who is in their country and the Deputy Secretary noted
he had told Assad amelioration of U.S.-Syrian relations
depends on Syria's getting tougher on this score: the road
to better relations with Syria runs through Baghdad. Assad
and Shara seemed to get the message, although Shara was
repeatedly vague when the Deputy Secretary pressed him on
whether he would attend the Amman meeting. How did Gul
assess the Syrians?


14. (C) Gul replied that Turkey's relations with Syria are
very good. Turkey will have an indirect but tangible
effect in bringing change to the Syrian regime. Therefore,
Turkey needs to continue to engage systematically, and help
the Syrians to help themselves and to help the peace
process. At the same time, Gul asserted, Turkey has told
its interlocutors to be careful with terrorist
organizations: in this world of electronic surveillance, no
one can hide anything any more. Transparency is necessary.
Trying to be clever is merely a sign of weakness. The
world is changing and Syria needs to take lessons from what
is happening in its immediate region. Gul claimed that, in
response to these Turkish points, he sees more
understanding on the part of the Syrian leadership.


15. (C) So far, the Syrian regime trusts us, Gul continued,
and we are very open. The people of Syria are very happy
with the improvement in relations with Turkey. Thus Turkey
is in position to pass any messages to the Syrian
leadership the U.S. might wish. Gul's staff noted he could
approach Shara in this way at the Amman meeting and Deputy
Secretary suggested that Gul mention two points: (1) the

SIPDIS
U.S. is looking for active, not passive Syrian assistance
in moving against former Iraqi regime elements; and (2)
there is a window of opportunity in the peace process after
Jan. 9 and we will need the support of the new Palestinian
leadership to end violence.

Cyprus and Armenia
--------------


16. (C) Turning to Cyprus, Gul lamented that it had not
been easy to respond to President Bush's call for Turkey to
be courageous and to support the Annan Plan. Yet despite
Turkey's decision to change its policy, to be a problem
solver, it is the Greek side which is being honored and the
Turkish side which is being punished. If the U.S. doesn't
take the lead to end the Turkish Cypriots' isolation the
Greek side will continue to insist on its policy.


17. (C) When the Deputy Secretary asked whether Gul
couldn't see all that the U.S. is doing, Gul retreated half
way, acknowledging that he has seen helpful U.S. actions,
but immediately adding that, if the U.S. wants a
settlement, then the Greek Cypriots must also compromise.
The U.S. needs to tell the Greek Cypriots that if they do
not show movement, then the U.S. will do more for the
Turkish Cypriots. Likewise, Turkey wants to solve the
question of Armenia, but, again, Turkey can't compromise or
sacrifice unilaterally. Gul thanked the U.S. for its strong
support for Turkish EU accession.

Afghanistan
--------------


18. (C) On Afghanistan both agreed Turkey's re-assumption
of ISAF command is important; both agreed that the
narcotics problem is both very serious and difficult to
bring under control.


19. (U) The Deputy Secretary approved this cable.


20. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN