NATO-EU COOPERATION: STILL HOSTAGE TO CYPRUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000777

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY MT
SUBJECT: NATO-EU COOPERATION: STILL HOSTAGE TO CYPRUS

REF: A. STATE 19853


B. ANKARA 373

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkey will not change its position on
NATO-EU cooperation absent ROC concessions on the Cyprus
issue, including measures to help the Turkish Cypriots. End
summary.


2. (C) Ambassador delivered ref a demarche Feb. 9 to MFA
Deputy Under Secretary for Multilateral Political Affairs
Nabi Sensoy. Ambassador urged the GOT to think creatively
about possible solutions in order to ensure that certain
European countries are not able to use this issue to drive
NATO and the EU further apart. President Bush's
participation in the Feb. 22 NATO Summit would be an
especially good setting to deliver the news that this issue
is at least partly behind us.


3. (C) Sensoy responded that with the Feb. 22 summit
approaching the GOT had expedited its interagency discussion
on this issue. While Turkey places great importance on the
transatlantic link and on its relationship with the EU,
Sensoy said, "I can't give you good news." While as of Dec.
17 Turkey may have gained official status as entering formal
accession negotiations with the EU, the experience of the EU
summit itself and the lack of any significant action to
ameliorate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) since
May of last year make it impossible for Turkey to contemplate
making an opening on this issue. Given the current
situation, Sensoy added, it would be premature even to
discuss the possible areas for NATO-EU discussion outlined in
ref a non-paper.


4. (C) Ambassador responded that we don't want to see a
situation where the Cyprus problem creates "collateral
damage," such as NATO-EU cooperation. With several issues
related to Cyprus piling up at once--NATO-EU cooperation,
Cyprus' application for bodies such as the Wassenaar
Arrangement, the Ankara Agreement extension protocol--Turkey
runs the risk that many in the international community will
again view Turkey as it did before 2004: as THE obstacle on
all issues related to Cyprus. If we were to see a positive
step on Cyprus--for example if the ROC were to remove its
block to EU aid and trade for the Turkish Cypriots--would
Ankara be ready to move on this issue?


5. (C) Sensoy said he was "not in a position" to say that
this would make a difference. The key, he pointed out, was
that Turkish politicians would need to see real progress for
themselves, progress they could also display to the Turkish
people. Absent such movement, why should Turkey feel
obligated to move first?


6. (C) Ambassador also discussed the issue Feb. 8 with
Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul as Gonul prepared to depart for
the Nice Defense Ministerial. Gonul responded that the GOT
must first see movement from the EU on Cyprus before it can
make any concession on NATO-EU cooperation. Feelings about
Cyprus in Turkey are running so high now, he said, that to
make any concession absent any action from the EU could
derail Turkey's EU candidacy.


7. (C) In addition to the Ambassador's efforts, PoMilCouns
called on Deputy DG for Security Policy Fatih Ceylan Feb. 8
to discuss ref a demarche. Ceylan confirmed (as reported ref
b) that the Turkish MFA has presented some ideas for
compromise to the GOT, but the decision on NATO-EU
cooperation is now both politicized and political. Turkey's
political leadership is grappling with two competing policy
priorities: increasing NATO-EU cooperation and dealing with
the EU's lack of progress on aid and trade for northern
Cyprus. Ceylan (please protect) candidly stated that the
battle within the GOT is between the Cyprus hard-liners and
the Atlanticists. PolMilCouns noted that we continue to seek
creative thinking on this issue. Ceylan responded that even
if Turkey were to decide to allow Cyprus and Malta to
participate in NATO-EU security cooperation discussions, the
topics could not cover any Berlin Plus issue, i.e., any topic
which would include NATO operational planning.


8. (C) Comment: The MFA has firmly linked NATO-EU cooperation
to ROC concessions on Cyprus and measures to help the TCs.
Ceylan's comments suggest the GOT understands the stakes and
is therefore wrestling with this issue; Sensoy's indicate
that the hard-liners are still on top. Unfortunately, we
cannot share ref a's view that Turkey's post-Dec. 17 status
has changed the Turks' perspective on this issue. Indeed, it
may even have hardened. As we noted ref b and Sensoy told
the Ambassador, the Turks still have a bitter taste in their
mouths regarding how the EU handled Cyprus at the Dec. 16-17
EU summit and the lack of measures to help the TCs. Sensoy
made clear that Turkey feels betrayed by the international
community--and especially the EU--for this lack of progress.
We predict no movement on this issue from Ankara at least
until and unless the EU can convince the ROC to stop blocking
measures to assist the north.
EDELMAN