Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA7342
2005-12-15 08:52:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY FUMBLES BOTAS GAS CONTRACT TRANSFER

Tags:  ENRG EINV EPET TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

150852Z Dec 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007342 

SIPDIS

USDOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/CPD/CRUSNAK

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EINV EPET TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY FUMBLES BOTAS GAS CONTRACT TRANSFER

REF: (a) ANKARA 5080, (b) 04 ANKARA 6797

Sensitive But Unclassified. Please handle accordingly.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007342

SIPDIS

USDOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/CPD/CRUSNAK

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EINV EPET TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY FUMBLES BOTAS GAS CONTRACT TRANSFER

REF: (a) ANKARA 5080, (b) 04 ANKARA 6797

Sensitive But Unclassified. Please handle accordingly.


1. (SBU) Summary: In a complicated tale of intrigue and
ineptitude, an apparent effort by the Turkish state-owned
pipelines company BOTAS to demonstrate that the 2001 law
requiring transfer of import contracts to the private
sector was unworkable blew up in the company's face as
the press leveled charges of corruption and insider
dealing against the company and Turkish politicians. The
fiasco showed the depth of Turkey's difficulties in
liberalizing its domestic energy markets and opening them
up to foreign and domestic private investment. Turkey
will need major new investment in its energy sector over
the coming years, but needs help, including from foreign
companies, in designing an energy regime that will meet
investors' needs. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Contract Release Model Fails - As Expected - Even Desired
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) As the GOT seeks to liberalize Turkey's domestic
energy markets, finding a practical way to get the GOT
and its wholly-owned Pipelines Company BOTAS out of the
natural gas import business has been a major challenge.
A key issue has been the model for transferring BOTAS's
contracts with foreign suppliers to private companies.
One option for BOTAS has been whether it should "release"
its existing purchase "contracts" to private sector
companies -- leaving contract terms unchanged vis a vis
the foreign supplier. The second has been for BOTAS to
auction the "volumes" those contracts represent, leaving
the winners to negotiate new contracts and terms with the
foreign supplier.


3. (SBU) The "contract release" model was supported by
the World Bank, and codified in the 2001 Natural Gas
Market Law, which targeted the transfer to the private
sector of 80% of BOTAS' import contracts by 2009. This
goal was widely viewed as unachievable, principally
because it was believed suppliers would be unwilling to
switch their counterparty from the GOT to a private
company without a sovereign guarantee. Reflecting
misgivings about the law within BOTAS and the GOT, the
release program has been "underway" for over one year,

postponed four times, and subject to much debate. Like
BOTAS, private companies generally supported a "volume
release" that allowed for the negotiation of new terms
with the foreign supplier as more logical and doable.


4. (SBU) Seeking to enforce the 2001 law, Turkey's
Energy Markets Regulatory Agency (EMRA) pushed BOTAS hard
to proceed with contract releases. In 2004, EMRA fined
BOTAS for not carrying out the process in a timely way.
In order to comply with EMRA's requirements, but perhaps
also to demonstrate the unfeasibility of the contracts
model and force a change to the 2001 law, BOTAS conducted
its first contract transfer tender on November 30. As
many predicted (and as BOTAS officials told us later they
had expected),the tender failed miserably -- but not in
the way BOTAS may have expected. Both BOTAS and the
process ended up tarnished and burned by the gamble.


5. (SBU) Rather than fail to sell any of the contracts,
BOTAS to its surprise succeeded in finding buyers for 16
lots out of the total tender amount of 64 lots of gas,
initially set as a target corresponding to 64% of
Turkey's 25 BCM annual natural gas imports, tendered.
Contracts with Nigeria, Algeria, Iran and Russia's Blue
Stream and West-2 line failed to find takers because
suppliers refused to agree to switch from BOTAS to a
private company. Surprisingly, however, Gazprom
certified four Turkish and foreign companies -- Shell,
Enerco, Avrasya and Bosphorus Gas -- as eligible to bid
on the contract for one-half of Russian West line, the
Turusgaz line, for 4 BCM of natural gas. Out of the four
bidders Gazprom certified to participate in the tender,
Shell was the highest bidder, offering $2.0 million for a
single lot. Shell's bid was followed by Bosphorus Gas,
known to have a partnership relation with Gazprom, which
offered $1.8 billion per lot for 3 lots. Enerco won 10
lots, with a $1.6 million bid per lot, while Avrasya
obtained 2 lots with a $910,000 bid per lot.

-------------- -
But BOTAS and the GOT Tarnished in the Process
-------------- -


6. (SBU) The second surprise for BOTAS was a firestorm
of press allegations that there had been collusion
between Gazprom, GOT officials, and the Turkish companies
(excepting Shell) that participated in the tender
process. In particular, it was alleged that Enerco
(which won the most lots at a relatively low price) used
relationships between its owners and PM Erdogan and his
political associates to secure the permission from
Gazprom to participate in the tender. (Erdogan and
Putin, the story went, cooked up the deal at their
November 17 meeting in Samsun to open the Blue Stream
pipeline). Also, the fact that Bosphorus Gas is 40%
owned by Gazprom suggested that there had been improper
collusion in its case. Furthermore, the entire process
was assailed by economic nationalists as granting
privileges to a foreign entity -- since Gazprom was able
to "choose" its Turkish counterparts -- that were
reminiscent of the Ottoman-era capitulations.

--------------
Comment
--------------


7. (SBU) As Turkish Energy Under Secretary Sami
Demirbilek told DAS Bryza in August (ref a),Turkey is
flailing and failing as it tries to figure out how to
manage a liberal energy market. Its home-grown
mechanisms, even with the advice of the World Bank, have
not had private sector input and therefore do not seem to
be working out. As Demirbilek told Bryza, this offers an
opportunity for foreign companies who want to take
advantage of the opportunities in Turkey to engage with
the GOT to help it shape its new mechanisms - drawing on
the companies' experience with what has worked in other
countries.
Wilson