SCENESETTER FOR 10-16 DEC COUNTERPART VISIT OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007191

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS TU IZ AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR 10-16 DEC COUNTERPART VISIT OF
COMMANDER TURKISH LAND FORCES, GEN YASAR BUYUKANIT TO CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY.

REF: A. A. ANKARA 242


B. B. ANKARA 356

Classified By: DCM NANCY MCELDOWNEY; REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S) Summary: This Counterpart Visit (CPV) by the
Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, GEN Yasar Buyukanit,
will be the most significant event in US-Turkish Army to Army
relations in over half a decade. The already slowing
post-Cold War US-Turkish mil to mil relationship was derailed
in 2003 with the Turkish Parliament's March 1st, "No vote"
during OIF and the "Suleymaniye" or "July 4th incident" in
Northern Iraq. Military relations further chilled when, due
to Turkish perceptions that the US was going to withhold full
honors from the TLFC Commander during his planned CPV to
Washington in May 2003, the TLFC pulled out of the visit.
October 2004 saw the first sign of a thaw in the relationship
when, at the Conference of European Armies (CEA) GEN
Buyukanit stated in his bilat with the CSA that he wanted to
restore mil to mil relations to their traditionally strong
state. At the same bilat he accepted the CSA's invitation to
conduct this current CPV, and also invited the USAREUR
Commander to conduct a March 05 visit to Turkey. While 2005
has seen some additional efforts towards increasing mil to
mil relations, (SOCEUR intent to conduct a Special Forces
JCET in 06, Joint Staff hosting Turkish Special Forces
leadership in a DVOT in SEP 05, CG USAREUR's letter to GEN
Buyukanit expressing intent to begin staff to staff
exploration for engagement opportunities, conduct of HLDG in
Ankara Nov 05),it is likely that this CPV will be the green
light the TLFC needs to accelerate engagement. Additionally,
as GEN Buyukanit is currently in line to become Turkey's
Chief of Defense in August 2006, his visit to the U.S. has
enduring importance. End Summary.


2. (S) Army to Army engagement has diminished significantly
since the end of the Cold War and has been virtually
non-existent since OIF. While the desire to restore mil to
mil relations and explore engagement opportunities was
expressed by GEN Buyukanit at the 2004 CEA as well as to GEN
Bell during his visit to Turkey in March 2005, the pace has
been, as expected, slow. While the CPV will unquestionably
lay a foundation upon which more robust engagement can be
built, actual execution will likely continue to be
incremental as it is measured against resource restrictions
within the TLFC and negative public reaction to continued
terrorist operations in southeastern Turkey by the
PKK/KONGRA-GEL, directed and supported from its safe havens
in northern Iraq. Correspondingly, lingering anti-US
sentiment within the Turkish Armed Forces over OIF in general
and the July 4th 2003 Suleymaniye incident in particular,
will have some residual impact.


3. (S) With regard to resources, the 28th Mechanized (Peace
Keeping) Brigade is the TLFC's showcase unit for conducting
international operations and would likely be the first choice
for any joint exercises. However, its heavy commitments in
EUFOR, KFOR and ISAF (a company/team each) will likely only
increase in the future. Command Post Exercise potential is
still extremely viable with the recently completed state of
the art Simulation Center now fully operational on the War
College campus in Istanbul. The Turkish TRADOC Commander also
expressed great interest in a proposed Counterpart visit to
Ft. Monroe last year, but regretted when it became evident
that the trip would be a self-invite rather than a CPV.


4. (SBU) The TLFC has been seeking either Army Staff talks or
that an Army Sub Working Group (ASWG) be established as a
subset to either the Joint Staff Talks or the High Level
Defense Group. The latest request for an ASWG was made at the
November HLDG in Ankara. Establishing an Army to Army
dialogue, whether one of the Turks' proposals or something
else, would provide a venue where TLFC's objectives with
regard to interfacing with the US Army could be examined. As
Turkey buys less US military hardware (the Army is to receive
German tanks soon; no American company bid on the current
Attack Helicopter tender),such a venue would allow us to
explore new ways to ensure interoperability. It would also
provide opportunities to encourage Turkey to expand the

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number of its units trained and equipped for international
peacekeeping operation.


5. (S) While it is difficult to accurately gauge the depth of
General Buyukanit,s feelings towards restoring the
U.S.-Turkey mil to mil relationship, his enthusiasm to host
GEN Bell in March 05 as well as his commitment to conduct
this CPV likely serve as a reasonable barometer. The
last-minute cancellation of his visit to USAREUR as GEN
Bell's guest in September, as well as his replacement with
his CoS, General Saygun, at the 2005 CEA probably do not
reflect a change of heart with regard to the relationship,
but rather the result of an externally imposed
reprioritization of his calendar. (His staff assured us that
his sending of General Saygun was intended to demonstrate the
value he gave that visit.) Buyukanit, while charismatic,
popular within the Army and adept at working the press, is
also successful at playing his political cards close to his
vest. Members of his staff assert to us that he strongly
favors returning to a robust military relationship with the
U.S. He will also grip and grin with the best of them in
meeting you. General Buyukanit's succession next summer as
the CHOD has been the subject of much press speculation of
late. Editorials have appeared which suggest that the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) is seeking to retire
General Buyukanit early due to his strong Kemalist views and
anticipated opposition to the pro-Islam undertones of the
current government. The government subsequently denied it
intends to tinker with the planned TGS succession. And while
anonymous accusations of minor corruption on Buyukanit's part
have appeared on a government web site, these do not appear
to be significant or credible enough to impact his
progression.

TURKISH LAND FORCES
--------------


6. (C) The over 400,000 man Turkish Land Forces has since
the late 1990s, when the current CHOD, General Ozkok, was its
commander, been struggling to modernize both its equipment
and organization. While the term modernization, has
traditionally meant to the TLF equipment acquisition, since
2003 it has also encompassed some organizational and Command
and Control transformation. However, due to a combination of
economic constraints and internal resistance progress has
been halting at best. The primary operational focus for the
TLFC is currently its fight against the PKK/Kongra-Gel.
While the TLFC concedes that they live in a rough
neighborhood, they do not perceive any serious external
threat at the moment, save the PKK/Kongra-Gel presence in
Iraq. Their desire for US support in eradicating the PKK's
safe havens in Northern Iraq and the right to conduct
cross-border or hot pursuit operations is well known, as is
the US position that was expressed during both the Sept. 05
visit by General Jones and LTG Smith and during the November
HLDG--i.e., such an action could prove destabilizing in Iraq.
However, the subject is likely to be brought up during this
visit and is already planned to be the main focus of General
Buyukanit's presentation at the American Enterprise Institute
dinner on Dec. 14th.


7. (C) The major transformation effort in the TLFC seems to
take the shape of equipment acquisition, though also includes
a weakly executed strength reduction initiative by the CHOD,
General Ozkok. In May 2004, he directed a 10% reduction of
the Land Forces, to be realized by the abolishment of four
brigades and the Aegean Army HQs in Izmir. While in the past
there was some discussion of transforming the TAF into an all
volunteer force, this is not likely to happen anytime soon,
due to costs and the view within the TGS that conscription
serves as a valuable socialization process. The Minister of
National Defense stated, in the foreseeable future there are
no plans for an all volunteer army. However, as a cost
saving measure the TGS did already reduce the personnel
strength of the armed forces by 17% by shortening the
compulsory military service from 18 months to 15 months, thus
also reducing the conscript personnel across the Turkish
Armed Forces from 685,000 to 569,000.


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BEHIND THE SCENES SUPPORT FOR IRAQ
--------------


8. (SBU) Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, Turkey has
provided significant logistical support to both Operation
Iraqi Freedom and to OEF in Afghanistan. Turkey has approved
multiple requests for the use of Incirlik Air Base,
including: a tanker refueling operation which has delivered
28,132 gallons since operations began in 2003 and flown 2,578
sorties; the transit of 8,500 US troops on rotation from Iraq
from January through April 2004; and the establishment in May
2005 of a logistics hub which allows 6 US military C-17
aircraft to move the amount of cargo it took 9-10 military
aircraft to move from Germany. This hub has facilitated the
movement of 48,957 tons of supplies since its inception;
flown 1554 C-17 sorties; received 689 wide-body cargo
aircraft; and houses 150 TDY support personnel. Turkey also
approved the use of hub flights for the emergency evacuation
of US soldiers from Iraq.


9. (SBU) The Habur Gate crossing from Turkey into Iraq has
facilitated 25% of fuel shipments to Coalition forces in Iraq
-- approximately 340,000 gallons of fuel every day,
two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments for the
Iraqi people and three million gallons a day in humanitarian
fuel shipments. Significant shipments of food and water for
coalition forces also pass over the border.


10. (SBU) The Turkish government has also demonstrated its
support through its public announcements of support for the
January elections; provision of training in Turkey for Iraqi
diplomats, political parties and (as part of the NATO
training mission) for the Iraqi security forces; hosting a
training week-end for Iraqi constitution drafters; and
hosting a meeting of rival Tall Afar tribal leaders in August
for a reconciliation dialogue; and bringing together various
Sunni groups in Istanbul Dec. 4th to encourage participation
in the political process (Ambassador Khalilzad participated
in this effort).

PARTNER IN GWOT
--------------


11. (S) Beyond its support for Iraq, Turkey has provided
valuable assistance and cooperation to GWOT. On Aug. 8,
Turkey completed its second International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) command (II and VII) in Afghanistan, which it
held for six months and during which time it contributed over
1,600 troops. Additionally, it has maintained a company/team
force as part of every ISAF rotation). Turkey and France
have agreed on a shared command of the ISAF Central Command
in Kabul during the second half of 2006. Turkey also
contributes to reconstruction and training efforts in
Afghanistan. It is involved in the reconstruction of schools
and is exploring counter-narcotics training programs for
Afghan police and alternative livelihood options for poppy
farmers. Following PM Erdogan's May visit to Afghanistan, he
pledged an additional $50M in assistance to the country.


12. (U) Together with the US, Turkey coordinates military
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their
abilities to protect key energy transport routes. Turkey
subscribes to every nonproliferation arrangement it is
eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI). It will host the first PSI combined air,
land and sea exercise in May 2006.


IRAN AND SYRIA - DIFFERENT MEANS TO THE SAME END
-------------- ---


13. (S) Turkey's watchword for both Syria and Iran is
"engagement." While the government states that it shares our
goal of a nuclear weapons-free Iran, it doesn't want to
jeopardize its nascent trade development opportunities,
including energy, or its renewed intelligence exchange with
Iran on the PKK. According to TGS, Turkey and Iran began
sharing intelligence this summer on the PKK, holding regular

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meetings at the border. As of September, Iran had turned
over 40 suspected PKK members or sympathizers. Turkey touts
its support for the EU-3 dialogue and Turkish
officials stress to us the need to maintain dialogue and to
identify a diplomatic solution. The equivocal response by PM
Erdogan and the MFA to President Ahmadinejad's Oct. 25
statement about Israel, combined with Ankara's all-out
reception of Iranian FM Mottaki earlier this month,
demonstrate that Turkey is trying to walk both sides of the
line on Iran. Turkey's tact toward Syria is the same.
Turkish military officials have characterized Syria as a
scared cat that could lash out if "backed into a corner."
They and others in the government stress the need to support
Assad, who they claim is a reformer at heart, against those
Ba'athist dinosaurs in the regime who seek to undermine him
and regularly urge US engagement.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION WEAK
--------------


14. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of our bilateral
relationship, the bilateral security cooperation relationship
is declining significantly. Under Turkey's current policy,
being implemented by the Undersecretariat for Defense
Industries (SSM),the emphasis is on Direct Commercial Sales
at the expense of Foreign Military Sales and American
companies are having difficulty competing. The last
significant commercial tender won by a U.S. firm was the 2002
win by Boeing for an Air Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)
system. (Note: Boeing recently delivered a letter
threatening to take legal action against SSM over protracted
contract disputes and just signed the Critical Design Review
this month. End Note.) In early 2004, SSM cancelled three
tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks and ATAK Helicopter). Last
month MOD finalized an agreement with Germany to acquire 294
Leopard II A4 Main Battle tanks. A second UAV tender was won
by the Israelis weeks before PM Erdogan's spring 2005 visit
to Israel.


15. (SBU) The revised attack helicopter tender (Note: The
first tender was issued in 1995 and won by Bell Textron. SSM
cancelled it over technology transfer issues. End Note.)
issued in February 2005 was the first to contain new
"standard" terms and condition. The three US firms that took
the tender (Bell, Boeing, Sikorsky) found the new T&Cs so
onerous that Bell immediately dropped out of contention and
Sikorsky soon after. Boeing invested considerable time and
energy to try and work through its concerns with SSM but,
even after several contract revisions and two postponements
of the bid due date, was unable to justify participation. On
Oct. 13, Boeing notified SSM that it would not submit a bid.


16. (SBU) SSM's stated goal is to develop an indigenous
capability to supply sophisticated components for integration
into foreign products, beginning with the attack helicopter,
and has outlined an aggressive timetable to do so. To meet
that schedule, SSM requires companies to sign up
unconditionally to all T&Cs and to confirm at the time of bid
submission the supplier's government's willingness to allow
transfer of the required technology. DUSD Suzanne Patrick
and State DAS Greg Suchan explained to SSM in clear terms the
USG limitations that prohibit such upfront guarantees but SSM
has refused to revise the tender to remove that requirement.
Sikorsky, which is considering participating in a tender for
52 utility helicopters and, if it wins, establishing in
Turkey a global production site for export models of its
Black Hawk helicopter, will not bid if this condition is not
removed. ODC Chief MG Sutton has held extensive talks with
Service Chiefs, DCHOD Kosaner and J-5 head LTG Zorlu about
the negative impact of the SSM program on US participation in
the Turkish defense market. Across the board, they pledged
their preference for US equipment but professed an inability
-- or unwillingness -- to influence the process.
WILSON