BAYKAL USES NATIONALISM TO CEMENT CONTROL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007070

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: BAYKAL USES NATIONALISM TO CEMENT CONTROL OF
LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY

REF: A. ANKARA 006878


B. ANKARA 000501

C. ANKARA 000581

D. ANKARA 004042

(U) Classified by POLCOUNS Janice G. Weiner, , E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Party Chairman and former Foreign Minister
Deniz Baykal was re-elected chairman of the main opposition
Republican People's Party (CHP) on November 19, solidifying
his dictatorial control over the party. The convention also
showcased the continued evolution of CHP from a progressive,
center-left party into an undemocratic, nationalistic, pro
status-quo party with a penchant for anti-Americanism. End
Summary.

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THE CHP CONVENTION: BACK TO THE FUTURE
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2. (C) On November 19, Deniz Baykal was reelected chairman of
the Republican People's Party (CHP). He received all 1,158
of the valid votes, out of a total of 1,223 votes cast.
Candidates for the party leadership needed 262 nominating
signatures to be become an official candidate at the
convention and new CHP rules required everyone who wanted to
nominate a candidate to personally walk to the front of the
convention hall and sign their name to the nomination in
front of everyone. It was well known that anyone who
nominated a challenger to Baykal would later be purged from
the party. As a result, Baykal was the only candidate on the
ballot.


3. (C) The atmosphere at the CHP convention was designed to
remind the participants and television audiences of CHP's
nationalistic and republican credentials. The CHP convention
hall had pictures of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of both the
Turkish Republic and the CHP, wearing the type of hat popular
during the War of Independence that Turkey fought against
European powers. Many youngsters were running around the
convention hall wearing similar hats. A short film
juxtaposed the War of Independence with Baykal's trips around
the country. (Comment: The intent was to suggest that
Turkey now faces a new war of independence against foreign
powers trying to break-up the country and undermine the
secular republic. End comment.) One of the banners hanging
from the rafters proclaimed, "March First is Our Honor," a
reference to 1 March 2003, when CHP MPs voted en masse
against a resolution in the Turkish parliament that would
have authorized U.S. troop deployment into Iraq through
Turkey.


4. (C) Baykal delivered a three hour speech at the
Convention, repeatedly asserting that CHP is the defender of
the secular and unitary Turkish Republic. He claimed that
forces were attempting to break up the country and turn it
into an "Islamic theocratic state". He accused PM Erdogan,
the leader of the governing and pro-Islam Justice and
Development Party (AKP),of being a member of the "Taliban."
He also stressed the importance of holding early elections in
2006 so that Erdogan does not become president in 2007 (ref
A).

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BAYKAL'S PARTY
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5. (C) Baykal and his inner circle exercise nearly complete
control over CHP, despite widespread dissatisfaction with,
and criticism of their leadership among the rank and file.
POLOFFs have heard repeated criticism of Baykal and his inner
circle from a variety of current and former CHP members,
including dissident CHP MPs Hasan Aydin, Memet Tamanbay, Inal
Batu, and Zenep Damla Gurel; former CHP MPs Erol Tuncer and
Serafettin Elci; and former senior CHP leaders Erol Cevikce
and Ertugrul Gunay. Baykal has systematically purged all
opponents from positions of power within the party according
to Batu, Cevikce, Tamanbay, and others. All the delegates
who opposed Baykal at the January 2005 party convention have
been punished by the party. All local and regional party
leaders who backed Sisli mayor Sarigul for the party
leadership earlier this year (refs B and C) have been
replaced.


6. (C) Baykal and his cronies have used a variety of dirty
tricks to retain control of CHP. A common tactic is to
advertise that local party meetings will be held at a
specific time, date, and location to elect deputies to
regional or national conventions, and then hold the meetings
with a small group of loyalists at a different time, date,
and place -- and select pro-Baykal candidates. Baykal's
dictatorial tactics have undermined CHP's popularity and
caused many grassroots supporters to desert the party (ref
D).

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INCREASING NATIONALISM AND ANTI-AMERICANISM
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7. (C) Although CHP MPs continue to describe their party as a
contemporary, European-style, social democratic party, CHP's
leadership is increasingly using nationalistic,
anti-Islamist, anti-EU, and anti-American rhetoric to defend
the statist status-quo. CHP's leaders reject accusations
that their party is anti-EU because CHP MPs have routinely
supported EU reform legislation in parliament. At the same
time, however, CHP's leaders have engaged in anti-EU rhetoric
and contributed to conspiracy theories alleging that the EU's
real goal is to break up Turkey. In conversations with
POLOFFs, CHP MP Fuat Cay, CHP MP Sinan Yerikaya, and other
senior party leaders close to Baykal

-- talk endlessly about their perceptions of corruption,
mismanagement, and Islamic extremism within AKP;

-- rail against the EU and IMF;

-- criticize U.S. foreign policy, especially in Iraq and the
lack of U.S. military action against the PKK; and

-- spin conspiracy theories about supposed repeated U.S.
interventions in domestic Turkish politics, including
allegations that the USG supported AKP's rise to power in
Turkey.


8. (C) Comment. Although Baykal's strategy has garnered him
complete control of the party, he has alienated many Turks
who are ideologically inclined to support a secular, social
democratic party. Baykal, moreover, has failed to attract
nationalistic voters to the party, despite blatant attempts
to pander to that portion of the population. CHP received 19
percent of the vote in the November 2002 election, but an
October 2005 ANAR poll published in Turkiye newspaper on
November 24 indicated that CHP's support had dropped to 14
percent. Whatever the specific poll numbers, there is wide
agreement here that CHP,s support has declined. The future
of the Turkish left will remain dim, unless CHP, one of the
other leftist parties, or a new left-of-center party is able
create internally democratic structures, develop policies
that address the real concerns of average Turks, and build a
grassroots party base. Despite CHP,s weakness, its anti-EU
and anti-American rhetoric will exert a negative domestic
influence on Turkish, European, and American interests. End
Comment.
MCELDOWNEY